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This book centres on the different layers of identity among the Serbs of 
Vojvodina and their implications for political preferences regarding the 
basic structure of the state, namely either for regionalization or for the 
centralized model of the nation-state. The main focus is on the period 
from the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until 
present day. Nevertheless, this topic requires a historical background to 
set the Serbs as an ethno-national group in context. Particular emphasis 
is laid on the national identity of the Vojvodinian Serbs and the process 
of its formation.
The regional identity of Vojvodina is also set in historical context. 
This firstly sets out the regional concept of Vojvodina as a ‘Serbian 
homeland’, which was developed by the Serb nationalist elites and 
the Serb intelligentsia within the Habsburg Monarchy during the 
nineteenth century. Subsequently, in the Communist era, Vojvodina’s 
regional character was redefined in terms of a socialist multicultural 
society and this requires a historical perspective. Reference to the 
broader historical context can clarify the complex relationship between 
centre and periphery and consequently the local understandings of the 
unitary model of the nation-state and the regionalist alternatives that 
have been proposed in Vojvodina since the year 2000.
The pattern of ethnic relations in this region is highly unique. Although 
Vojvodina hosts approximately twenty-five ethnic communities 
(including a sizeable and politically organized Hungarian minority), 
besides the Serbian majority, it is by no means an ethnically divided 
society. Alongside separate ethnic group cultures, a trans-ethnic cultural 
substratum, which manifests itself in the form of Vojvodinian regional 
1
Introduction: Setting the Conceptual  
and the Theoretical Frames
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identity, is present. Intercultural cohabitation has been a living reality 
in Vojvodina through time. This more ‘integrated’ pattern manifests 
through the lower impact of territorial segregation and ethnic distance, 
as well as the higher frequency of intermarriage in urban and rural 
settlements alike. This book explores in depth Vojvodina’s intercultural 
realities and illustrates how these have facilitated the introduction of 
flexible and regionalized legal models for the management of ethnic 
relations in Serbia since the 2000s. This regional monograph also casts 
its focus on fresh developments (most notably, the recent arrival of 
war refugees from Syria and Iraq) and measures the impact that these 
have been exerting on social stability and inter-group relations in the 
province.
Most importantly, perhaps, Vojvodina is a region that not much has 
been written about, especially by Western academics and in the English-
language academic literature (e.g. Stjepanović 2018). This has created 
a black hole in the study of the society and politics of Central and 
Southeast Europe, since Vojvodina is one of these ‘small places with big 
issues’. The modern-day Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina is 
situated exactly at the geographic area where the Balkan peninsula meets 
Central Europe. For centuries, this zone was the frontier that separated 
two contesting realms: the Ottoman and the Habsburg. Throughout the 
past century, the same area saw different political and administrative 
systems come and go. The combination of the aforementioned catalysts 
resulted in the, forced as well as organized, migrations of several ethnic 
groups towards modern-day Vojvodina and the subsequent formation 
of a varied mosaic of group identities in the region. This triggered the 
emergence of various political concepts regarding Vojvodina’s regional 
character among its inhabitants, the Serbian majority in particular.
The first main object of this book is the question of identity 
definition among Serbs in Vojvodina. The Serbian community in 
Vojvodina comprises three segments with different historic origins: 
the so-called ‘old Serbs’ who trace their ancestry back to the days of 
the Habsburg Monarchy; Serbs originating from other parts of the 
former Yugoslavia, who moved to Vojvodina after the two world wars 
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(‘new settlers’/‘colonists’); and the latest refugee waves from Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991–5). Each of these groups has its own 
grassroots perceptions of identity and this book analyses the way that 
these perceptions are communicated on the political level. The sources 
that this book has relied on are electoral data, public opinion polls 
and parliamentary/governmental reports. Especially electoral data 
can prove very helpful in regard with the assessment of the political 
tendencies and voting patterns of each segment. At the same time, the 
relations among the three segments are set in comparative perspective. 
Particular emphasis is laid upon the integration process of the colonists 
and, more recently, the refugees into the Vojvodinian society.
The second main object of this book is the interaction between 
identity-formation and political preferences for the constitutional and 
administrative framework in Serbia. Since the mid-1970s, Vojvodina, as 
one of the two autonomous provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (the other was Kosovo), enjoyed broad administrative, 
legislative and economic autonomy. The centralization process, which 
was undertaken during the 1990s, caused the resentment of quite a 
few Vojvodinian Serbs towards the regime in Belgrade. Consequently, 
quite a few projects which demanded the concession of an ‘asymmetric’ 
administrative status to Vojvodina within Serbia were drafted by certain 
political and academic circles in the province. These projects were and are 
still contested up to date by the proponents of various forms of a unitary 
arrangement, in Vojvodina and Serbia in general. Therefore, this book also 
assesses the dynamics of the two aforementioned trends in Vojvodinian 
society, with specific focus on the post-Communist era. With respect 
to the Serbian majority, the degree (if any) to which the inclinations of 
Vojvodinian Serbs for or against their province’s asymmetric status within 
Serbia are conditioned by the segment that they originate from is assessed.
The third main object of this book is the theoretical definition of the 
pattern of multi-ethnic cohabitation that is observed in Vojvodina. In 
other words, an answer is sought to the question whether the Serbian 
majority and the numerous ethnic minorities form a coherent whole 
within the Vojvodinian society or if, on the contrary, social segregation 
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along ethnic lines is the case. Particular emphasis is laid on the relations 
between Serbs and the most numerous and politically organized ethnic 
minority who live in Vojvodina, the ethnic Hungarians. Interethnic 
relations in the province are also viewed from a historical angle. In regard 
to its methodological scope, this book has largely relied on the notion of 
‘situational identity’. The meaning of the term is that the construction (or 
reinforcement; even transformation) of collective identities and loyalties 
is highly influenced by socio-economic and political factors.
This notion is a dynamic one, in contrast to that of ‘fixed identity’. 
This mode of interpretation will help the reader comprehend the 
regional character of Vojvodina and the local standpoints for or against 
regional autonomy more adequately.
In the following pages, selected theoretical approaches with a 
direct relation to the scope and objectives of this book are outlined. 
Particular attention is paid to theoretical approaches that situate the 
operation of constituent myths of origin inside identity-construction 
processes (namely, ethnosymbolism) and to theoretical approaches in 
ethnopolitics beyond groupism and groupness. Then, the focus shifts 
to identity-formation processes under ‘special’ circumstances with 
a major stress on the cases of ethnic minorities and migrant groups. 
Finally, this chapter touches upon the subject-areas of regionalism and 
regionalization with case-specific references to Western Europe as well 
as to Central and Eastern Europe.
The ‘nation’ as a socio-psychological phenomenon
According to Anthony D. Smith, the modern nation can be summarized 
as ‘a named human population, sharing a historic territory, common 
myths and historic memories, a mass public culture, a common 
economy and common legal rights and duties for all its members’.1 In 
1 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 11.
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this section, particular reference is made to the common myths and 
historic memories of the nation. These myths and memories usually 
form part of the collective experience of the core group around which 
the nation-building process takes or has taken place (e.g. Hungarians in 
Hungary, Greeks in Greece). A core group, or ethnos in Classical Greek, 
can be defined as ‘a named human population with myths of common 
ancestry, shared historic memories and one or more common elements 
of culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree 
of solidarity, at least among the elites’.2 Perhaps the most powerful myths 
are those referring to the linear continuity of the group through the 
ages and also those pointing towards an older ‘golden age’ of the group. 
These myths acquire a poetic and mystical dimension when associated 
with an ancestral or ‘sacred territory’.
The ultimate objective of myths of origin is to create an overriding 
commitment and bond for the group. Such myths aim to forge an 
imagined continuity of the group through the ages. Roughly speaking, 
there exist two types of myths of origin: myths that point towards 
genealogical descent (‘biological continuity’ myths) and myths that 
cite an ancestry of a cultural–ideological variant. ‘Biological’ myths 
generate high levels of communal solidarity, since they regard the 
national community as a network consisting of interrelated kin groups 
descending from a common ancestor. In this case, imagined blood ties 
provide the basis for a strictly primordialist sense of belonging and 
identity (e.g. certain currents of Basque nationalism).
The other, and perhaps the most common, type of constituent myths 
of origin are those that rest on the cultural affinity with the presumed 
ancestors. In this case, we have to do with a spiritual type of kinship, 
which seeks to trace a ‘historical’ link between the present ideals and 
aspirations of the group and those of its presumed ancestors. Cultural–
ideological myths of descent stress the persistence of certain types of 
collective virtue (e.g. the heroic spirit) or other distinctive cultural 
qualities, such as language, religion and customs through the ages. They 
2 Ibid., 13.
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also seek to draw a parallel between these old qualities and the present 
virtues and cultural qualities of the group in question. By locating the 
present in the context of the past of the group, myths of origin interpret 
social changes and collective aspirations in a way that satisfies the drive 
for meaning, by making up new identities that also seem to be very 
old. All myths of group descent have as focal point of reference an 
older ‘golden age’. Some examples of such ‘golden ages’ are respectively 
Periclean Athens in Modern Greek nationalism and the Nemanjid 
dynasty in Serbian nationalism. The reference to a ‘golden age’ is always 
linked with a ‘myth of decline’. The latter seeks to provide an explanation 
about how the community fell from its state of prosperity in the past, 
to its present state of alleged decay.3 On such occasions, the ‘golden age’ 
serves as a model for the regeneration of the community.4
Myths of origin are always associated with specific ancestral 
territories. Hence the importance attached to ‘sacred territories’ in 
all types of nationalist imagery. ‘Sacred territories’ are added a poetic 
dimension: these are the territories where the group flourished during 
its golden age and which have to be defended by all means and at any 
cost.5 To sum up, then, in Anthony D. Smith’s words, constituent myths 
of origin serve the following purposes:
1. They link past to present (or future) and act as models.
2. They possess external references of comparison, even implicitly.
3. They designate a space and time for action, a territorial programme.
3 For instance, nineteenth-century Greek intellectuals (Adamantios Koraes, in particular) 
bewailed the degeneration of their contemporary Greeks in comparison to the 
underlying genius of their community, as revealed in its purest form during the golden 
age of Periclean Athens (fifth century BCE).
4 On some occasions, the need for the regeneration of the community may acquire rather 
mystical and semi-religious dimensions. A notable example is the notion of the ‘Serbian 
Golgotha’ in Serbian nationalist imagery. On this issue, see Dinko Tomašić, Personality 
and Culture in East European Politics (New York: George W. Stewart Publisher Inc., 
1948), 30.
5 Again, a characteristic example is the importance attached to the ‘Saga of Kosovo’ in 
Serbian nationalism. For an example of this kind see the article by the historian Milutin 
Garašanin in Review of International Affairs, ‘Kosovo: Past and Present’ (Belgrade, 
1986).
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4. They contain impulses for collective action, mobilizing people.
5. They are developmental, assuming the possibility of change.
6. They are partly voluntaristic, in that successive generations may add 
to the heritage and even regenerate themselves.6
Such core myths persist and are espoused through state rituals, even 
in states with a pronounced ‘civic’ character.7 As far as their mobilizing 
power is concerned, this has mainly to do with the fact that these myths 
pertain to the non-rational domain of the ‘nation’. Constituent myths 
endow the ‘nation’ with a near universality through the employment of 
certain images and phrases (e.g. home, forefathers, brothers, mother), 
which aim at forging a subconscious bond of integrity among its 
members. This is of vital importance for mass mobilization since, as 
Walker Connor phrases it, ‘people do not voluntarily die for things 
that are rational’.8 Even Marxist-Leninists have taken advantage of 
the mobilizing potential of constituent myths of origin, despite the 
philosophical incompatibility between nationalism and Communism.9
All these hint that the political and cultural–socio-psychological 
components of modern nations may in practice overlap with each 
other. The value of the ethno-symbolic approach (Connor 1993; 
Smith 1999 and 2000) for the purposes of this book consists precisely 
in that it seeks to situate the position of constituent myths of origin 
inside modern nations. This approach also positions the nationalist 
intelligentsias inside nation-building processes. The nationalist 
intellectuals are assigned with the task to recover each layer of the past 
and trace the origins and evolution of the nation from its rudimentary 
6 Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 82–3.
7 A good example of this kind is the British state rituals (e.g. Remembrance Day). Zdzislaw 
Mach, Symbols, Conflict and Identity (English language edition) (Krakow: University of 
Krakow, 1989), 101–10.
8 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: A Quest for Understanding (London: Routledge, 
1993), 206.
9 For example, Mao Tse-tung frequently stressed the ‘family ties’ among the Chinese 
people, and their descent from a common ancestor (Huang-ti, the legendary first 
emperor of China). Ibid., 199.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   7 30-08-2019   16:40:58
National Identity in Serbia8
beginnings until present day. The intelligentsia responsible for creating 
the symbolic capital, from which a national culture is formed, derives 
from disciplines such as history, archaeology, linguistics, literature and 
folklore studies. Through its endeavours to elaborate core myths and 
create a standardized national culture, a rediscovered and authenticated 
past is ‘scientifically’ appropriated for present ends.
Ethnicity without groups and triadic  
configurations of ethnopolitics
Despite the academic value of ethno-symbolism, this book would 
also benefit from the complementary employment of an additional 
approach: one theoretical approach set beyond groupism. The term 
groupism addresses the tendency to view ethnic groups and identities 
as bounded, regards them as the leading protagonists of conflicts and 
treats them as the key units of social discourse. Of particular value for 
this book would be to rely on Rogers Brubaker’s concept of ‘ethnicity 
without groups’.10 Ethnic conflict is obviously the conflict between 
ethnic groups. But these groups should not be perceived as compact 
entities or ‘collective individuals’. Instead, group cohesion should be 
viewed as a continuous process that in some cases may be brought to 
completion but in others fail. Within this framework of interpretation, 
the notion of categories is of pivotal significance. For example, ‘Serb’, 
‘Slovak’ or ‘Hungarian’ (as ethnic definitions) constitute categories but 
not groups. In order for these categories to generate a high degree of 
solidarity among a given number of people, become external markers 
and, ultimately, culminate into group cohesion (or groupness), a whole 
process is required.
The engineers of this process are certain actors, most commonly 
organizations, who claim to speak in the name of an ethnic group. 
10 Rogers Brubaker, ‘Ethnicity without Groups’, Arch. Europ. Social. XLIII, no. 2 (2002): 
163–89.
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These organizations may range from paramilitary formations and 
terrorist organizations to political parties and cultural associations. 
Consequently, the strategies employed by these actors in order to 
achieve groupness differ considerably from each other. They may range 
from armed operations to political engagement within mainstream 
structures. The common denominator, however, remains the endeavour 
to make good use of the historical background, collective myths, as well 
as an array of cultural and psychological catalysts, in order to cement 
group cohesion. An instrument for achieving this aim is violence. For 
instance, the attacks of the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against Turkish and Serbian security 
forces, respectively, resulted in state reprisals against the ethnic Kurdish 
and Albanian populations. This cycle of violence generated insecurity 
and increased group solidarity among ethnic Kurds as well as Kosovo 
Albanians. This was also the case in regard to the Kosovo Serbs and the 
Turks resident in the Kurdish-populated areas, respectively.11
At this point, attention should be paid to the cognitive dimension 
of ethnic conflict. In other words, what is it, specifically, that makes 
an armed or political conflict an ethnic one? The ‘ethnic’ quality is not 
intrinsic to ethnic conflict. It is up to organizations and a variety of 
individuals (e.g. government officials, political activists, journalists 
and others) to frame and, ultimately, constitute a conflict as ethnic. 
Framing an incident as a ‘pogrom’ or a ‘riot’ is not just a matter of 
external interpretation but an act of definition that can have important 
consequences.12 The more an organization succeeds in constituting a 
conflict as ethnic or interpreting a governmental decision as detrimental 
to the group that this organization claims to represent, the more it 
succeeds in forging cohesion within the group. This success acquires 
a higher significance if the organization manages to internationalize 
its standpoints. For example, throughout the early 1990s, the primary 
11 Ibid., 170–3.
12 R. Brubaker, M. Loveman and P. Stamatov, ‘Ethnicity as Cognition’, Theory and Society 33 
(2004): 37 and 47.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   9 30-08-2019   16:40:58
National Identity in Serbia10
concern of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania was to 
portray certain policies of the Ceausescu era not as violations of civic 
rights but as a campaign of cultural genocide against ethnic Hungarians 
This successful lobbying not only put the Hungarian minority behind 
the party’s platform; it also made a number of Western political analysts 
and NGOs sympathetic to the party’s line.
Another particularly useful concept towards the objectives of this 
book, coined by Rogers Brubaker, is the triadic nexus theory.13 According 
to the author, nationalism in multi-ethnic societies is often a dynamic 
interaction among the ‘nationalizing state’, the national minority (or 
minorities) living in that state and the minority’s (or the minorities’) 
external national homeland (or kin-state). A ‘nationalizing state’ is the 
one which subtly promotes the culture, language and political primacy 
of the titular nation within the state through the governing institutions. 
Each of these actors is not a static entity but a ‘variably configured and 
continuously contested political field’. The interaction among these 
actors depends upon the relations and balances within each of them. 
Within this framework, the minorities’ frequent response to the policies 
of the ‘nationalizing state’ is to push for more cultural or territorial 
autonomy and resist actual or perceived policies of discrimination. The 
external homeland’s role is to monitor the situation of their co-ethnics 
in the state in question, protest alleged violations of their rights and 
assert the right, even the obligation, to defend their interests.
Rogers Brubaker’s theoretical matrix becomes highly topical inside 
the context of numerous disputes over the collective statuses of ethnic 
minorities across Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. In light 
of the increasing significance of international institutions/organizations 
and supranational processes in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
prospect of European Union (EU)-membership started functioning 
as a powerful pole of attraction for most post-Communist states. This 
prompted several academic experts to reformulate Brubaker’s triadic 
13 Rogers Brubaker, ‘National Minorities, Nationalizing States and External Homelands in 
the New Europe’, Daedalus 124, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 109.
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nexus into a quadratic one, in light of the EU’s eastward enlargement, 
and add the EU as a fourth actor inside the nexus.14
Identity-formation under ‘special’  
circumstances: Ethnic minorities
The formation of ethnic minorities within European nation-states has 
been the result of multifaceted political processes. On some occasions, 
minority groups were included in new nation-states as a result of the 
dissolution of larger state formations. This was the case, for instance, 
with the Hungarians who found themselves within Yugoslavia and 
Romania after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and, more recently, 
the Russian speakers who found themselves within Estonia and Latvia 
after the Soviet Union broke up. Often, the new borders divided one 
group from its fellow-ethnics who happened to be the dominant 
group in an adjacent state (e.g. the case of the Albanians of the former 
Yugoslavia in relation to Albania).
On other occasions, ethnic minorities were formed after the inclusion 
of small groups, whose external homeland was not an adjacent state, 
in a larger state (e.g. the cases of the Slovaks and the Ruthenes in the 
first as well as the second Yugoslavia). The main difference between 
these two cases consists in that, in the former case, the emergence 
of irredentist trends is possible under certain circumstances. The 
irredentist mini-nationalism of a minority group can be boosted in 
the event that the territory that it inhabits is a bone of contention, as 
a ‘sacred territory’, in the national mythologies of both the minority 
group (also its adjacent external homeland) and the titular nation in the 
state where the minority resides. This has been the case, for instance, 
with the Hungarian-Romanian dispute over Transylvania.
14 Vello Pettai, ‘Explaining Ethnic Politics in the Baltic States: Reviewing the Triadic Nexus 
Model’, Journal of Baltic Studies 37, no. 1 (2006): 124–36; David Smith, ‘Framing the 
National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?’ The Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no. 1 (2002): 3–16.
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In international law, there is no universally accepted definition 
of ethnic minorities. In accordance to the definition by the Council 
of Europe (Recommendation 1201, 1993) ‘a national minority is a 
group which: has been residing in a certain territory within a state; 
is numerically inferior and politically non-dominant; displays ethnic 
characteristics that differentiate it from the national majority; its 
members are conscious of their group-identity and strive to preserve 
and promote it’. For the purposes of this book, an ethnic minority can be 
tentatively defined as a segment, living within a national society, which 
differentiates from that society in a variety of ways. The differentiating 
factors may be collective historic memory, language, religion, customs 
or a combination of all these (i.e. the ‘ethnic characteristics’ of 
Recommendation 1201). Individuals belonging to minority groups have 
a specific legal relation with the nation-state where they live, that is they 
are recognized as its citizens and have been vested the right to political 
participation.
The function of the modern nation-state has highly relied on the 
homogenization of the linguistic and cultural trends within its territory. 
On such an occasion, two attitudes are usually encountered within the 
minority group. The first is the desire by some individuals belonging 
to the minority to transcend ethnic bounds and assimilate with the 
mainstream majority. In this way, they expect to gain certain advantages, 
especially as far as their professional and social life is concerned. The 
second tendency is the radicalization of the minority group or, at least, 
some segments within it. On such an occasion, the group tends to stress 
its identity even stronger and demand the concession of collective rights, 
even territorial sovereignty; in other words, political independence. The 
radicalization of minority groups is a common occurrence in states that 
pursue assimilative policies. On such occasions, ethnic minorities try to 
resist the cultural hegemony of the nation-state through the use of oral 
and unofficial tools of resistance, such as jokes, folklore and protests. 
This is so because the minority group does not possess the wide array 
of institutions available to the official state in order to construct its own 
history, culture and identity. However, as minority movements become 
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better organized and better financed they begin to obtain some of the 
facilities initially available only to the official state (e.g. educational 
institutions).
Again, the key part is played by the intelligentsia within the group, 
assigned with the task to collect the orally transmitted group myths, 
appropriate them and give them a standardized form and meaning. 
The main motivation behind the actions of both the political and the 
intellectual elites within the minority is the desire to increase their 
power and privilege. By reinforcing the group’s identity and advocating 
collective rights and autonomy, even political independence, these 
individuals expect to reach hierarchal positions, which are far more 
difficult to acquire in the more complex mainstream system. The 
question of ‘unreliable minorities’ generated political tensions within 
the states of Central and Eastern Europe throughout the interwar 
era. In this case, it was not solely the new elites that regarded the 
formerly dominant groups within their states with mistrust (e.g. the 
case of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Yugoslavia). It was also 
the mainstream societies that often did not possess much confidence 
with regard to their newly gained national sovereignty and were very 
suspicious of ‘others’.
Nevertheless, even in the immigrant states of the new world, 
constituent myths of origin and ancestral homelands retain an emotive 
aura and provide materials out of which the group can construct an 
identity that corresponds to its present needs. Symbolic activities, such 
as the cult of ethnic saints, the veneration of historical heroes and the 
celebration of ethnic holidays, create boundaries with which a group 
stresses its uniqueness in a pluralist society. For example, in the United 
States there exist third-, even fourth-, generation ethnics who still 
designate themselves as Irish, Poles or Italians and try to communicate 
their ethnic sentiment in ways that suit their individual and small 
group needs.15
15 On this issue, see Zdzislaw Mach’s case studies on the cases of the American and British 
Poles in Mach, Symbols, Conflict and Identity, 207–21.
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Migrant groups
The notion of a historical homeland possesses a focal position in all 
group myths. In the case of migrant groups, the spatial association of 
the group with its historic homeland has been disrupted as a result 
of a mass movement to another territory. There are two types of 
migration: voluntary migration and forced migration, or displacement/
deportation. In the former case, individuals decide to leave their home 
base in search of a better future, usually for economic reasons. The land 
of the ancestors usually becomes idealized through the preservation of 
myths of origin in literature, art and folklore. The original homeland 
remains a part of the group’s cultural worldview, a major component of 
their symbolic model of the universe. The migrants seek to reconstruct 
their group identity in the new environment by integrating the cultural 
images of their ancestral land with those of the new territory.
The other type of migration is forced migration or displacement. 
Some examples of this kind are the displacement of the Crimean Tatars 
and the Chechens by Stalin in 1945, on the charge of collaboration 
with the Nazis. Two more recent examples are the displacements in 
the former Yugoslavia (1990s), as a result of ethnic cleansing, and the 
latest refugee waves out of Syria and Iraq as a result of the ongoing 
warfare. The displaced migrants feel that they have been violently 
uprooted from their land base. Therefore, the symbolic construction 
of a new identity within the new environment is highly problematic, 
especially for the first generation of the displaced. This is particularly 
true when the new land considerably differs from the old one and 
in these cases that the new land has been previously organized by 
some other community reluctant to accept the newcomers. On such 
occasions, the migrant group becomes marginalized and alienated 
inside its new environment. Another interesting incidence is that of a 
displaced group that has been resettled into a new territory, currently 
or previously, inhabited by another group regarded as hostile. In such 
cases, the resentment of the displaced group is redirected against any 
indications of symbolic or material presence of the ‘hostile’ community. 
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Under such circumstances, the prospects for the creative integration of 
the displaced group into its new environment are seriously reduced.16
Regional identity and regionalism: The case of  
Central and Eastern Europe
A commonplace bipolar opposition in European states is that between 
the centre and the peripheries/regions. Centres within states can be 
briefly defined as ‘privileged positions within a territory where key 
military/administrative/economic/cultural resource-holders most 
frequently meet; with established arenas for deliberations, negotiations 
and decision-making; with the largest proportion of the economically 
active population engaged in the processing and communication of 
information and instructions over long distances’.17 Normally, a centre 
controls the bulk of transactions among resource-holders across a 
territory; it is nearer than any alternative location to the resource-
rich areas within the territory; and is enabled to master the flow of 
communication through an array of consultative and representative 
institutions.
A minimal definition of the region is that it represents an intermediate 
territorial level between the state and the locality. Nevertheless, the 
establishment of regions in the Continent has been the by-product of 
a more complex process that involved the combination of geographic, 
historical, sociocultural, political and economic factors. On some 
occasions, regions are largely dependent on the centre, controlling 
at best only their own resources and more vulnerable to fluctuations 
in long-distance markets. Such regions are isolated from all other 
regions except the centre and do not contribute much to the total flow 
16 Zdzislaw Mach has demonstrated that the reintegration of displaced Poles from the 
former Eastern Polish territories that were incorporated by the Soviet Union in 1945, 
in Silesia (a Polish region formerly inhabited by a German community) was not very 
successful. Mach, Symbols, Conflict and Identity, 163–82.
17 S. Rokkan and D. W. Urwin, The Politics of Territorial Identity (London: Sage, 1982), 5.
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of communications. They are also often characterized by a marginal 
culture, which is fragmented and parochial. A good example of this 
kind is the cases of the Asturias and Galicia in Spain. This is not to 
say that peripheries are always marginal and impoverished backwaters. 
By contrast, certain European peripheries had not only pretensions to 
be more advanced than the capitals (wealthier, more developed, with 
a thriving intellectual scene etc.); they were also in some sense rivals 
to the capital in the nation- and state-building projects. Such were 
the cases, for instance, of the Banat and Transylvania in Romania and 
Piedmont in Italy.
Regionalism addresses a multitude of grassroots and political 
movements aiming towards the concession of ‘special’ administrative 
competencies to certain regions within a state. The popular bases of 
support, as well as the legitimization sources, of regionalist initiatives 
are remarkably diverse and have depended on the constitutional 
framework, the political history and the ethno-cultural heterogeneity 
(or homogeneity) of each state. Where the catalysts of geography, 
efficient economic lobbying, cultural distinctiveness, strong regional 
administrative institutions and territorial mobilization largely 
combine in space, we have powerful regional feelings and strong 
regionalisms (e.g. the Catalan case).18 The most extreme shape that 
the combination of the aforementioned elements can acquire is 
an open separatist threat to the integrity of the state (e.g. the case 
of Basque militant ethno-nationalism in Spain). Most recently, the 
spectrum of Spain’s economic crisis galvanized Catalan regionalist 
parties into a concrete bloc calling for independence via political 
means (referendum). Nevertheless, it is on rare occasions that regions 
seek to displace states or take over the state functions of social 
regulations and legitimization. Therefore, what we most commonly 
have to do with, on occasions of strong regionalism, is the appeals of 
18 Michael Keating, Regions and Regionalism in Europe (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2004), 
‘Introduction’.
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a region (or more) to the centre for the concession of further political 
autonomy on grounds of economic, sociocultural, functional or other 
specificities.
During the Communist era, regional and ethnic identities were 
subordinated to the overarching principle of Socialist internationalism. 
Collective rights were allocated to minority groups but no autonomous 
regional institutions were established in most Central and East 
European states. The striking exception was the establishment of 
the socialist autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in SR 
Serbia, within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The end 
of Communist rule was often accompanied by two parallel trends. 
The first was the endeavour by ‘nationalizing states’ to recentralize 
the state’s administration. The other trend was the external pressures 
towards the democratization of the political order inside the frame of 
European integration. Those pressures also called for well-organized 
administrations capable of translating central government policies into 
action at the regional and local levels.19
The European Commission regarded the enhancement of 
administrative capacities, on the regional level, as an efficient trajectory 
for managing the anticipated transfers from the Structural Funds. 
In this light, regionalist political actors across Central and Eastern 
Europe sought to legitimize their endeavours through references to the 
necessity to oppose centralizing and nationalizing projects; counter-
propose more efficient and regional alternatives which, at the same 
time, are compatible with ‘European’ standards and the EU guidelines.20 
To these, one may add the simultaneous endeavours by ethnic minority 
political actors towards the concession of ethno-territorial autonomy 
for their communities (e.g. the ethnic Hungarian parties throughout 
the Carpathian basin). Especially the persistence of ambiguities over 
19 Judy Batt and Kataryna Wolczuk, Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern 
Europe (London and Portland, OR: Frank Kass, 2002), 8–9.
20 On the case of Istrian regionalism, for instance, see J. Ashbrook, ‘Locking Horns in the 
Istrian Political Arena: Politicized Identity, the Istrian Democratic Assembly and the 
Croatian Democratic Alliance’, East European Politics and Societies 20, no. 4 (2006): 
622–58.
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questions with ethnic implications, plus the ongoing interest of kin-
states in their minorities in neighbouring countries, have often rendered 
states in this macro-region rather insecure over their territorial integrity; 
quite suspicious vis-à-vis regional autonomy as such.21 Therefore, 
an essential particularity of regional politics in Central and Eastern 
Europe is that they soon became subject to the political heritage(s) of 
the Communist era, post-Communist nationalization processes and 
European integration.
From identity to the form of the state: Centralization
There exist two standard strategies of organizing the relations between 
centres and peripheries. The one of them can be broadly defined by 
the term ‘centralization’. Within the centralized/unitary state, the 
entire structure is built up around one focal political centre, which is 
economically predominant and pursues a more or less undeviating 
policy of administrative standardization. All peripheries are treated on 
equal terms and all institutions remain under the direct control of the 
state. The unitary model is in firm line with the classical liberal model 
of the modern nation-state.
Its proponents reject the establishment of regions with a special 
administrative status through reference to ethno-cultural or historical 
criteria.22 Furthermore, pro-centralists resist the provision of special 
statuses to constituent regions, on instrumental grounds. In other 
words, they regard such initiatives as detrimental to the state’s structure, 
financially  over-demanding and time-consuming in regard to the 
execution of governmental policies. Especially when it comes to regions 
21 Michael Keating, ‘Territorial Restructuring and European Integration’, in The Regional 
Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European 
Integration, ed. Michael Keating and James Hughes (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2003), 
14–16.
22 It should be added that in certain unitary states like France, the drawing of the state’s 
regions itself has relied upon economic/‘rational’ criteria (e.g. the management of natural 
resources, the facilitation of inter-regional communication) rather than historical ones.
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inhabited by ethnic minorities, whose loyalty towards the state is 
considered ambiguous, the unitary option is rooted in arguments over the 
protection of the state’s integrity from secessionist trends. Therefore, on 
theoretical grounds, centralization is entrenched into the homogeneous 
concept of the nation.
Within the unitary state, the constituent regions are normally 
conceded the following competencies: regional administration (mainly 
the execution of regional sub-legal acts, in compliance with the state’s 
legislation); management of regional income resources, always in 
accordance with the central government’s budgetary planning; regional 
planning in accordance with the general developmental plan (e.g. public 
roads, railways, tourist industry); culture and education – the latter 
in accordance with the uniform state’s curriculum; regional policing 
duties under the command of the central police administration. The 
administrative bodies granted to the region are usually a regional 
assembly and an administrative council. One more institutional 
provision is a regional magistrate and criminal court of justice, within 
a uniform judicial system. As it becomes apparent, the regions, under 
the unitary arrangement, are merely viewed as administrative units 
and not as territories with a residual political character. Moreover, 
in regard to the equal degree of competencies granted to all regions, 
the administrative structure of the unitary state is a symmetric one. 
In practice, several European states are constitutionally designated as 
unitary (e.g. France, Greece, Ireland, Romania and Bulgaria, to name 
but a few).
It should be noted, though, that, as far as the states formally 
designated as unitary are concerned, there exist two rather common 
slight deviations from the strict centralized pattern. The one of them is 
functional decentralization. In this case, ad hoc agencies with specific 
tasks are set up as an intermediary level between central and local 
governments. This is a move conditioned by functional necessities and, 
in some cases, may also be utilized by proponents of unitarism in an 
attempt to strengthen local government institutions within regions, 
as rivals to the potential anti-centralist trends of the larger regional 
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governments. Regional agencies were used in Italy and in France in the 
1950s and ’60s, as well as Britain in the ’70s, for economic development 
and planning. The other slight deviation from the unitary pattern is the 
deconcentration of the central government’s organs. A good example 
of this variant is the system in force in France, where the regional 
prefect coordinates state functions at the regional level, as well as 
putting a check upon the work of the regional government through the 
General Secretariat for Regional Affairs. On theoretical grounds, both 
functional decentralization and deconcentration are attempts to find a 
balance between the homogeneous identity imperatives and the need 
for functional modernization.
Federalization
The other classical strategy for accommodating the relations between 
centre and periphery is federalization. In practice, there exist several 
varieties of political arrangements, which have been designated as 
federal. Across the Continent, the federal principle has been applied in 
states that consist of regions, which are inhabited by different national 
groups (e.g. Belgium, Switzerland); highly diverse on the basis of their 
historical heritages and identity (e.g. Germany, Austria). Therefore, 
federalism acknowledges historical differences within a nation, but 
also perhaps diverse national identities within an overarching civic–
political union. The top objective in all federal arrangements is the 
achievement and maintenance of both unity and diversity. The equal 
importance attached to both unity and diversity is the main reason 
why federalization cannot be interpreted through the centralization–
decentralization spectrum, but on a different continuum altogether, 
one that is predicated on non-centralization.
European federalism is anchored in an organic approach and it is 
orientated towards sharing power at the different levels of a society, 
instead of dividing it. The principle of separation of powers among the 
federal units is balanced by that of subsidiarity, especially in regard to 
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economic administration.23 In this context, federalism provides for ‘a 
constitutional distribution of powers in which each level has its own 
guaranteed spheres of competence, and neither level is hierarchically 
superior to the other’.24 In a genuine federation, all constituent units 
are equal before the federal constitution. Any conflicts of jurisdiction 
are to be resolved by a constitutional court, whereas the parliamentary 
structure comprises a Chamber of the Federated Units.25
Depending on the arrangement, the administrative bodies of the 
federated units enjoy a certain degree of ‘independent’ jurisdiction 
in regard to the enactment of legislation within their territories; fiscal 
management; judicial authority; maintaining contacts with foreign or 
international agents. Nevertheless, sectors such as national defence, 
foreign policy, social welfare, criminal law and central fiscal and 
monetary policy administration remain under the competency of the 
central government in almost all federations. Federalization represents 
one more form of symmetric organization. However, by contrast to the 
unitary state and its mono-centric structure, federalism advocates a 
polycentric system of organization.26
Regionalization: Asymmetric and symmetric
The most intriguing manifestation of the unitary state’s transformation 
with the objective to accommodate regional demands, in contemporary 
Europe, is ‘asymmetric regionalization’. This notion presupposes the 
concession of a special status to certain regions within the state. The 
23 Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998), 
114.
24 Ibid., 113.
25 In Germany, for instance, the second legislative chamber (Budensrat) is a committee 
of Land governments, voting by majority, with the larger Länder having more votes 
but not in proportion to their population. The governments of the federated units have 
representatives in the national capital and closely cooperate with federal ministries.
26 Daniel J. Elazar, ‘The Role of Federalism in Political Integration’, in Federalism and 
Political Integration, ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Federal 
Studies, 1979), 23.
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latter decision is usually legitimized through reference to factors such 
as the ethno-cultural particularities of the region(s) in question; the 
different historical experience of the given region(s) in relation to 
the rest of the state; the consideration of the geographic as well as 
economic specificities of the region(s) with the aim to manage its/
their economic and natural resources more efficiently; the growing 
dissatisfaction, encountered in certain peripheries, with the remoteness 
of the bureaucratic state and its inefficiency to meet the direct needs of 
those peripheries’ citizens. Therefore, by contrast to the centralization’s 
insistence on the homogeneous concept of the nation and the 
federalization’s acknowledgement of historical–national differences 
within a predominant civic–political union, asymmetry is based on the 
recognition of specifics within a formally unitary structure.
The concession of asymmetric statuses to certain regions has formed 
vital part of the political bargaining in certain states, with the objective to 
appease centrifugal tendencies or reduce the popular appeal of militant 
secessionist movements (e.g. the ETA in Spain). More recently, the 
application of asymmetric policies had also been spurred by the impact 
of globalization and European integration. Especially the weakening 
role of the central state as the mediator in the transactions between EU 
institutions and certain regions had encouraged the latter, the richer 
ones in particular, to vigorously demand concessions in favour of more 
‘independent’ economic policies on the regional level.27
The endowment of a region with a special status manifests on the 
institutional level through provisions such as legislative, executive 
and partially judicial authority. In certain cases, a regional assembly 
is established with the task to carry out the relevant legislative and 
executive functions. Moreover, in states where more than one region has 
been granted a special status the arrangement for a bicameral central 
27 There are plenty of inter-regional forums currently operating within the bounds of the 
EU. Some of these forums have sought to promote the cooperation among the more 
developed regions of the EU on economic issues. An example of this kind is the so-called 
‘Four Motors of Europe’ initiative, which comprises the regions of Catalonia, Rhone-
Alpes, Baden-Würtenberg and Lombardy.
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parliament, with a Chamber of Regions as its second body, can be one 
more provision. On this occasion, the adoption of a proportional electoral 
system may also be applied as a guarantee for the equal representation of 
the regions on the administrative macro-level. Another crucial provision 
is the concession of notable fiscal authority to the region(s). What is 
usually sought by the region(s) and the central government is a modus 
vivendi between the regional revenues spent on the improvement of 
regional infrastructure and the regional income channelled towards the 
centre or towards the reconstruction of the less-developed peripheries.
In the event that the region in question is characterized by ethno-
cultural heterogeneity, steps are taken towards the accommodation of 
the demands of all groups involved. The usual provisions may range 
from the official use of minority language(s) in public administration 
and the right to education in the recognized minority language(s) 
to the establishment of an advisory body for the regions’ minorities. 
In all of this, there exists a set of functions, which, in all European 
states where asymmetric policies have been implemented, remain in 
the competency of the central government. These are foreign policy, 
national defence and security, central fiscal and monetary policy 
administration, criminal law, social welfare and employment policies.
Although federalization and asymmetric regionalization rest on 
theoretically distinct premises, still the institutional provisions granted 
to federal units in the former case and the ‘special’ regions in the latter, 
make the practical distinction between the two concepts rather vague. 
The picture may become fuzzier, in the event that a greater number 
of regions within the ‘asymmetric’ state demand and gain equal or, 
at least, comparable status to that of the special ones. Therefore, as 
Michael Keating suggests, ‘rather than making a sharp distinction 
between federal and [asymmetric] regional models of government, we 
can see the latter as a continuum from the strongest [e.g. the German 
and Swiss federal systems] to the weakest ones [administrative 
deconcentration and functional decentralization]’.28 At this point, it 
28 Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, 114–15.
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would be useful to illustrate the theoretical discussion of asymmetric 
regionalism with two noteworthy examples, namely the Italian and the 
Spanish ones. Particular attention is paid to Michael Keating’s work 
on these two cases (Keating 1988, 1998), which represents, perhaps, 
the most thorough treatise of questions of regionalization in the 
Continent.
The Italian case
Since the end of the Second World War, Italy underwent a process of 
decentralization. This process was triggered by the necessity to deal 
with centrifugal tendencies,29 integrate the underdeveloped south and 
the nationally heterogeneous parts of the state (e.g. Southern Tyrol 
and Aosta Valley with their respective German and French-speaking 
populations) and respond to the phenomena of rapid economic growth, 
as well as migration from south to north, through more efficient 
regional planning.
Even though Article 5 of the Italian Constitution reads that ‘Italy 
is one and indivisible’, in 1970 some regions were granted a special 
status by certain constitutional laws, which took into consideration 
their ‘geographic, logistical and historical particularities’. These regions 
were Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Aosta Valley and Friuli-
Venezia Giulia. The new accommodation granted the five regions with 
extended competencies over the arrangement of educational curricula, 
public health, agriculture, the management of income derived from 
regional taxes and the regulation of the revenues to be directed to the 
central coffers, and the enactment of regional legislation.30 Moreover, 
any disagreements between the state-appointed commissioner and the 
29 D. V. Segre, ‘Regionalism in Italy: An International Conflict Internalized’, in Federalism 
and Political Integration, ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Federal 
Studies, 1979), 137.
30 These five regions cannot impose taxes on goods or people moving from one region to 
another, or restrict the right to work of any Italian citizen.
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regional authorities are to be resolved by the Constitutional Court. The 
regions are to be administered by a Presidente and Giunta (executive 
council) elected by the regional legislative council. The regional 
councils can be disbanded by the president of the Republic but only 
after consultation with the Senatorial and Parliamentary Commission 
for Regional Affairs (bicameral arrangement).
Despite the formal concession of wide competencies, though, 
the five regions did not enjoy their special status in full. Instead of 
passing framework laws, allowing the regions to fill in the details, the 
Parliament continued to pass detailed laws transgressing the limits of 
regional competence.31 Most importantly, the Italian elites often saw 
the devolved system as a trajectory via which to preserve political 
clientelism on the regional level, with no genuine intent to respond to 
popular pressures for regionalization or eagerness to modernize and 
reform the state.
The Spanish case
A distinctive feature of Spanish regionalization is the persistence of 
highly politicized core ethnic identities in the ‘historical regions’ of the 
Basque country and Catalonia. The concession of autonomous powers 
to Spain’s ‘historical regions’ was seen by the Spanish elites as the 
main path towards the legitimization of the state’s authority in Basque 
country and Catalonia, during the democratic transition. Therefore, 
Spanish regionalization had acquired an intrinsically political character 
from the very beginning.
At the same time, though, certain measures were taken, especially 
by the representatives of the Castilian elites, in order to ensure that the 
asymmetric status would be confined to the ‘historical regions’ and 
31 To this should be added that court decisions have often restricted the scope of regional 
jurisdiction. For more on this issue see Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, 
61–2; State and Regional Nationalism (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1988), 230–4.
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the unitary character of the Spanish state would not be imperiled.32 
Consequently, Andalusia’s attempts to make use of Article 151 and gain 
a special status proved fruitless. Nevertheless, following an aborted coup 
in 1981, a compromise was reached, which enabled Andalusia to gain 
an autonomous status.33 Since 1982, two more regions, Valencia and the 
Canaries, were given more or less the same powers as Andalusia.
The 1980s saw a change in the policies of the central government vis-
à-vis the question of autonomies. Instead of trying to restrict autonomy 
to the ‘historical regions’, Madrid would now try to place a check upon 
Basque and Catalan higher aspirations by harmonizing the statutes 
of all autonomous regions. This caused the discontent of the Basques 
and Catalans who saw their statuses imperilled. Consequently, these 
regions constantly appealed to the Constitutional Court against the 
central government throughout the 1980s. In the 1990s, though, both 
sides watered down their tones and sought a political compromise.
The Spanish constitutional provisions to the autonomous provinces 
are rather complex. Article 2 of the Constitution defines the state’s order 
as founded upon the unity of Spain and the autonomy of the nationalities 
and regions integrated in it. This is a formal indication of a compromise 
between the unitarist Spanish/Castilian nation-statist positions and the 
Basque/Catalan asymmetric approaches. The unitarist component also 
becomes manifest in the absence of a Chamber of Regions in the Spanish 
parliament and the fact that, although drafted by the autonomous 
assemblies, the statutes need the approval of the central parliament 
to be effective. On the other hand, an autonomous statute cannot be 
modified without the region’s approval, except in the event of a general 
constitutional reform. At the same time, autonomous regions enjoy a 
notable degree of decision-making capacity, through their institutions 
33 It has been assumed that this was a move that suited the political objectives of the ruling 
Socialists at that time. Andalusia was a Socialist stronghold and the then Socialist leader 
and prime minister, Felipe Gonzalez, himself, is an Andalusian native.
32 Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, 68; State and Regional Nationalism, 
223; Patricia Escobalherrero, ‘Territorial Organization of the State’, in Essays on 
Regionalization, Open University Subotica (Subotica: Agency for Local Democracy, 
2001), 60.
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of self-government (a legislative chamber, a regional government and 
a president). Moreover, the languages of the ‘historical nationalities’ 
(Basque and Catalan in particular) are granted equal status with Castilian 
Spanish in public administration and education, within their autonomous 
regions. In regards to the economy, the Basque country retained its 
concierto economico and a similar arrangement was made for Navarra. As 
a result of successful lobbying by the Catalan government, Madrid, since 
1996, concedes 30 per cent of locally raised income tax to the regions.
Spain’s democratization provided the platform for the transition 
from an extremely centralized administrative matrix to a highly 
devolved one. The gradual extension of autonomy to seventeen regions 
literally speaks in itself. Therefore, many political analysts saw Spain 
as on the way to de iuris federalization. It might well be argued that 
the Spanish precedent confirms Keating’s assessment of asymmetric 
regionalism as a political continuum, rather than a sharply contrasted 
model to federalism. Moreover, it might be argued that, at least until 
recently, the Spanish precedent has represented a fitting example of 
symmetric regionalization. This brief overview does not cover the new 
political realities that emerged in light of Spain’s latest economic crisis 
and the Catalan referendum for independence (2017).
The chapter outline of this book is as follows:
‘Vojvodina through Time: From the Habsburg Era to the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’: At the outset, this chapter outlines 
the development of modern nationalism among Habsburg Serbs 
(late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). Then, the focus shifts 
towards Vojvodina’s position within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and 
the interethnic strife under Axis occupation. This chapter underlines 
the system of autonomy within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Particular attention is paid to the constitutional provisions 
for Vojvodina and the implementation of socialist multiculturalism as 
a model for managing ethnic relations in the province.
‘Vojvodina in the 1990s: From the Termination of Autonomy to the 
Fall of Slobodan Milošević’: In the beginning, this chapter positions 
Vojvodina inside the context of Slobodan Milošević’s ‘anti-bureaucratic 
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revolution’ and the new wave of Serbian nationalism. Major attention 
is paid to the recall of regional autonomy for Vojvodina within the 
frame of the constitutional reforms. Then, the focus shifts towards 
the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Vojvodina with 
the emphasis on the impact of Serbia’s economic crisis and the influx 
of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. This chapter underlines the 
politicization of Vojvodina’s regional identity, since the second half of 
the 1990s, and its operation as a catalyst which provided a common 
ground for a variety of opposition forces in the province.
‘Vojvodina Going through Transition (the 2000s)’: This chapter 
places Vojvodina inside the broader spectrum of Serbia’s regionalization 
since the year 2000. This consists in an overview which ranges from the 
inauguration of the Omnibus law (February 2002) to the adoption of 
the new statute for Vojvodina (2009). Simultaneous attention is paid to 
Serbia’s regionalization as viewed from the perspectives of the political 
elites in the province. Then, this chapter sets in context the grassroots 
outlooks on regional identity and the state of interethnic relations in 
Vojvodina during that period. Of particular importance is to underline 
how the question of restituting Vojvodina’s autonomous competencies 
became entangled into other crucial policymaking areas for Serbia, 
namely the developments in Kosovo and the readjustment of the 
Serbian-Montenegrin relations.
‘Vojvodina Today: Between New Challenges and Opportunities’: 
This chapter situates Vojvodina inside the context of the latest 
political developments in Serbia; namely the political predominance 
of President Aleksandar Vučić and the current prospects for Serbia 
within the trajectory of European integration. This chapter also casts 
its focus on fresh developments (most notably, the recent arrival of 
war refugees from Syria and Iraq and their concentration along the 
Serbian-Hungarian border) and measures the impact that these have 
been exerting on social stability and inter-group relations in Vojvodina. 
Of particular importance is to highlight whether and how Vojvodinian 
regional identity, as a trans-ethnic substratum, can withstand the new 
challenges and benefit from the new opportunities.
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At the outset, this chapter outlines the development of modern 
nationalism among Habsburg Serbs (late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries). Then, the focus shifts towards Vojvodina’s position within 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the ethnic strife under Axis occupation. 
This chapter underlines the system of autonomy within the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Particular attention is paid to the 
constitutional provisions for Vojvodina and the implementation of 
socialist multiculturalism as a model for managing ethnic relations in 
the province.
The Habsburg era
This section outlines the Serbian historical presence in the Southern 
Habsburg lands. First, it sets in context the origins of the Serbs living 
within the Monarchy. Then, it introduces the institutional framework for 
the Habsburg Serbs and the emergence of modern Serbian nationalism. 
This section demonstrates that the Habsburg Serbs became caught 
between the traditional structures (Hungary and the sub-kingdom of 
Croatia-Slavonia) and the emperor’s absolutist/centralizing tendencies. 
A third actor that entered the fore in the nineteenth century was the 
appeal of autonomous, later independent, Serbia to the Serbs of the 
Habsburg Monarchy.
2
Vojvodina through Time: From the 
Habsburg Era to the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia
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The migration of the Serbs into the Habsburg lands
After the Ottoman defeat in Vienna (1688), the Habsburgs launched 
a counteroffensive which lasted sixteen years. The Habsburg monarch 
Leopold I appealed to the Serbs and the other Balkan Christians for 
help. In return, he promised them religious freedom, tax exemption and 
the right to elect their own vojvode (the Serbian equivalent of a military 
leader) and live by their own customs.1 The Serbs responded to the 
emperor’s call, armed themselves and Serbian vojvode were appointed in 
the Habsburg military ranks. In the beginning, the Habsburgs and their 
allies were victorious. On 6 September 1688, they captured Belgrade 
and a year later Skoplje. But the Ottomans commenced a successful 
counteroffensive and drove the invaders out of their territory. According 
to the Treaty of Karlowitz, signed between the two sides on 26 January 
1699, in modern-day Sremski Karlovci, the Ottoman sultan surrendered 
Lika, Krbava, Bačka and parts of the Banat, Slavonia and Srem to Vienna.
Meanwhile, fearful of Ottoman reprisals, an estimated number of 
35,000 Serbs led by the Peć Patriarch Arsenije III Carnojević followed 
the Austrian forces and retreated into Habsburg territory.2 These Serbs 
originated from Prizren, Peć, Novi Pazar, Priština and other parts 
of Ottoman Serbia. They settled in the areas between the rivers Tisa 
and Drava, as far as Baja, Buda, Saint Andrew and Komarno. A small 
fraction, though, settled in Northern Hungary. The newcomers are 
mentioned in the Habsburg records as ‘Servians’ or ‘Rascians’.3 This 
massive movement is being referred to in Serbian historiography as the 
first ‘Velika Seoba’ (‘Great Migration’).4
1 Wayne S. Vucinich, ‘The Serbs in Austria-Hungary’, Austrian History Yearbook 3, no. 2 
(1967): 11.
2 Ibid. Mirko Mitrović, a historian from the University of Novi Sad, raises the total number 
of migrants to 40,000. Mirko Mitrović, ‘Naseljavanje i kolonizacija Vojvodine (1690–
1945)’, Godišnjak Društva Istoričara SAP Vojvodine (1982): 197.
3 Vucinich, ‘The Serbs in Austria-Hungary’, 9.
4 Sporadic Serb movements out of the Ottoman Empire and towards the Southern 
Habsburg lands were witnessed prior to the first Velika Seoba, since mid-fifteenth 
century. The incoming Serbs settled in Buda, Saint Andrew, Komarno and Arad. 
Mitrović, ‘Naseljavanje i kolonizacija Vojvodine’, 197.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   30 30-08-2019   16:40:58
Vojvodina through Time 31
The peace between the two empires was short. The war started 
again in 1716 and a new peace treaty was signed in Passarowitz (i.e. 
modern-day Požarevac) in 1718. According to the treaty, the Ottomans 
surrendered the Banat, the entire Srem, Belgrade and most of Serbia 
proper, as far as Ćuprija. However, in the third war (1737–9), an 
overwhelming Ottoman counteroffensive pushed back the Habsburgs. 
In the final peace treaty, which was signed in Belgrade (1739), the 
Ottomans gained back Belgrade and Northern Serbia proper. The 
border between the two empires was settled along the Sava and Danube 
rivers. Once again, thousands of Serbs from Ottoman Serbia, this 
time led by Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović Sakabenta, preferred to 
migrate to the Habsburg lands than remain under Ottoman rule.5 This 
reinforced the already existing Serbian population, even though no 
exact data regarding the size of the second Velika Seoba is available.6
The institutional framework for the Serbs  
(1690–early 18th century)
In the early eighteenth century, Habsburg policies towards the Serbs 
were dictated by the military needs of the Monarchy. Since mid-
eighteenth century, though, the Serbian question was entangled in a 
bipolar antagonism of interests. On the one hand, there was Vienna’s 
attempt to consolidate its control throughout the Monarchy and, on 
the other the determination of the Hungarians to resist it. On certain 
occasions, Vienna would satisfy Serbian demands just in order to 
countervail the aspirations of the Hungarians.
The collective status of the Habsburg Serbs was initially codified 
by the so-called ‘Leopoldine Privileges’, issued in the Latin language 
5 Đorđe S. Radojčić, ‘Arsenije IV Jovanović Sakabenta’, in Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, vol. 1 
(Belgrade: SANU, 1955), 15–16.
6 Apart from the Serbs, a certain number of Catholic Clementine as well as Orthodox 
Albanians moved from Ottoman Serbia towards the Southern Habsburg lands and 
settled in certain districts of Srem (Zemun, Mitrovica and Ilok). Outnumbered by their 
fellow-Catholics, the Croats, these Catholic Albanians were Croatized in the long term. 
Mitrović, ‘Naseljavanje i kolonizacija Vojvodine’, 206.
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between 1690 and 1691.7 According to the Privilegium issued on 
21 August 1690, the Serbs were allowed to practise their religious rituals 
according to their religious calendar. The patriarch and the Orthodox 
clergy retained the same jurisdictions that they had under the Porte and 
only an Orthodox Serb elected by the sabor (ecclesiastical congress) 
could become patriarch. The patriarch had the right, as leader of the 
Orthodox Church within the Monarchy to appoint the metropolitans, 
bishops and other clerics. Moreover, the Serbs were granted the right to 
build monasteries and churches.
The Privilegium issued on 20 August 1691 enhanced the collective 
status of Serbs. This document recognized the Serbian patriarch as 
caput nationis in spiritualibus et saecularibus. The patriarch became 
the leader of all the Orthodox living within the confines of the 
Monarchy, in religious as well as in secular affairs. The patriarch, with 
his seat at Karlowitz, represented not only the Serbs but other ethnic 
groups as well, insofar as they were Orthodox (e.g. the Romanians). 
Later, on 4 March 1695, another Privilegium exempted Serbs from 
paying the imperial tithes. The swift confirmation of the Privileges 
by Leopold’s successor Joseph I (1706) and later Charles III (1713) 
was also conditioned by the loyalty that the Serbs had demonstrated 
towards Vienna in the course of Count Rakoczi’s rebellion (1703–11).8 
Consequently, the Habsburgs started considering the employment of 
Serbs as a barrier against detrimental Hungarian ambitions within the 
Monarchy as well.
Moreover, the Serbs who lived in designated zones along the 
Habsburg–Ottoman frontier (e.g. the Petrovaradin-Zemun defensive 
line along the Sava and Danube rivers in Srem) were exempted from 
feudal servitude as long as they provided the Aulic War Council 
with a quota of able-bodied men for military service. The vojvode 
8 Mitrović, ‘Naseljavanje i kolonizacija Vojvodine’, 198.
7 Jovan Radonić and Mitja Kostić, eds., Srpske privilegije od 1690 do 1792, Special edition 
(Belgrade: SANU, 1954). Also, see Dušan J. Popović, Srbi u Vojvodini, vol. 2 (Novi Sad: 
Matica Srpska, 1959), 19–20.
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elected by the Serbs would be under the direct control of the imperial 
government in Vienna.9 Since the settlement of the Habsburg–Ottoman 
borderline in 1739, the Vojina Krajina (Military Frontier) stretched 
from Transylvania in the northeast, through the Banat, towards the 
southern parts of Srem and Slavonia.10 The Military Frontier ended in 
the northeast Adriatic coast, through the highlands of Kordun, Lika 
and inner Dalmatia.
The Serbs enjoyed an exceptionally favourable status within the 
Habsburg Monarchy. No other group possessed such extensive 
guarantees of autonomy and exemption from the burdens of manorial 
land tenure. Nevertheless, one thing should be made clear. First, 
these privileges were not granted to a given number of individuals or 
social class but to an ethno-confessional collectivity, led by a patriarch 
who had negotiated with the emperor. Second, neither the imperial 
court in Vienna nor the patriarch had made any negotiations with 
representatives of the Hungarian kingdom, which now accommodated 
Serbs in compact masses. This particularly angered the Hungarian 
nobility. Later, in August 1747, Maria-Theresa established another 
representative institution for the Serbs: the Aulic Court for Transylvania, 
the Banat and Illyria. The establishment of this body was conditioned 
by geopolitical concerns which re-emphasized the vital role of the Serb 
border guards. The main concern was the danger of the reinvigorated 
Ottomans from the south. The role of the graničari was additionally 
stressed by the fact that at the same time the Habsburgs were waging 
the ‘War of the Austrian Succession’ over the possession of Silesia, 
against the Prussians (1740–8).
9 Even though the Serbs formed the backbone of the Habsburg graničari (border guards), 
the territories along the Habsburg military frontier did not attract exclusively Serbs 
(Orthodox). As long as these territories were under Vienna’s direct rule and not under 
the control of a regional aristocracy, Croatian (Catholic) peasants also came to escape the 
constraints of noble and ecclesiastical estates.
10 Of all these parts of the Military Frontier, only the Transylvanian ones reverted 
to Hungarian rule earlier than the others in 1851. Also, between 1751 and 1785, 
Petrovaradin was a ‘privileged military community’ (‘Freie Militar Communitat’). The 
inhabitants of this community were ‘free’ in that, even though they lived in the Frontier 
region, they were exempted from military duty paying a small fee instead.
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Nevertheless, there existed some confusion over the administrative 
powers of the Illyrian Court and the exact basis and extent of Serbian 
autonomy. Whereas Transylvania and the Banat of Temeszvar were 
well-defined territorial entities, ‘Illyrici’ was the collective term for the 
Serbian Orthodox subjects. Therefore, the Court was assigned with the 
task of governing two crown-lands and the Serbian ethno-religious 
group, irrespective of where its components resided. Furthermore, 
the Hungarian Chancellery always remained a vociferous bystander, 
assisted by the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The Hungarians regarded 
the privileges conceded to the Serbs as an intrusion upon the authority 
of their Diet11 mainly because of the way that they perceived the term 
‘nation’. According to the Hungarians, the natio Hungarica was a feudal 
notion embracing the landowning nobility, living within the defined 
boundaries of the Hungarian kingdom, with the right to participate 
in the Hungarian Diet. This concept was not an ethno-linguistic one 
since it could include native speakers of Slovak, Romanian or other 
languages.
By contrast, for the Serbs, the natio Illyrica was defined by the 
Orthodox Church and was not territorially rooted to a historic 
homeland within the Monarchy. This Ottoman notion of an ethno-
confessional group led by its religious leader seemed incomprehensible 
to the Hungarians who contested whether the legal status granted to 
the Serbs by Vienna should extent to all ethnic Serbs or only those 
who arrived in the 1690 migration. Keeping in mind that those Serbs 
who had entered the Hungarian kingdom before the Seoba had settled 
well to the north and the east of the then borders with the Ottoman 
Empire, the latter option would have been much more preferable to the 
Hungarians. As for the Habsburgs, they were content with the fact that 
the status granted to the natio Illyrica could be employed as a bulwark 
against the intensions of the occasionally rebellious Hungarians. The 
11 The Hungarian Diet was the focal legislative body within the jurisdiction of the 
Hungarian kingdom. Its members were responsible, among others, for legalizing the acts 
of the Habsburg Crown which were of significance to the Hungarian nation.
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simultaneous colonization of Srem, Bačka, Baranja and the Banat with 
a variety of ethnic groups was another dimension of Vienna’s strategy 
with the aim to put a check upon Hungarian ambitions.12
In the second half of the eighteenth century, changes would occur. By 
that time, the state was substituting the Church as an institution, which 
specified and enforced civil duties. Most important, the ideological and 
political developments throughout Europe (e.g. the Enlightenment) 
advocated the establishment of a novel political matrix based on the 
distinction between state and subject as well as the distinction between 
the public and the private spheres of society. Within this new matrix, 
Vienna started orientating towards the centralization of the empire, 
through the restriction of the jurisdiction enjoyed by the bodies that 
made up its mediated system of authority. A complementary goal was 
the secularization of the society. This novel orientation left negative 
connotations for the Hungarian nobility as well as the Serbian clergy. 
With regard to the latter, by 1777, Maria-Theresa dissolved the Illyrian 
Court and, two years later, stripped the Serbian patriarch of any secular 
rights. This negative situation for the Serbs was not reversed in the 
years to come, despite the sabor’s vocal protests.13
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Serbs were caught between 
monarchical centralism and the existing traditional structures. The 
latter comprised the Hungarian (also Croatian) Diet, the Roman 
Catholic Church and the bodies that made up the multilevel Habsburg 
administrative system (e.g. the Illyrian Court). The status of the 
Habsburg Serbs at that time can be described as that of a neither 
dominant nor subordinate group. Throughout that century, the 
Habsburgs provided the Serbs with institutions that offered the group 
the promise of self-government. This raised Serbian expectations 
which, when disappointed, heightened group consciousness and also 
12 By the late eighteenth century, a multitude of groups as diverse as Germans, Romanians, 
Slovaks, Ruthenes, Dalmatian Croats, Cincars (Vlachs), Catholic Bulgarians, Armenians, 
Italians, Spaniards (Basques and Catalans) and French speakers from Lorraine were 
attracted to the Southern Habsburg lands. Mitrović, ‘Naseljavanje i kolonizacija 
Vojvodine’, 199–206.
13 Vucinich, ‘The Serbs in Austria-Hungary’, 36, 39.
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led to conflicts with the Hungarians, thus again heightening group 
consciousness. The institutional predominance of the Orthodox clergy, 
though, kept this group consciousness to a rudimentary, non-secular 
and non-standardized level. In all of this, the question of the Habsburg 
Serbs’ relation to their kindred below the Danube remained vague.
The rise of modern Serbian nationalism
Since the second half of the eighteenth century, the balance of power 
in various parts of Europe started to shift from the royal courts and 
the religious hierarchies towards the growing regional bourgeoisies. 
In relation to the Habsburg Serbs, the religious and cultural autonomy 
that they enjoyed within the Monarchy encouraged the economic 
development of certain Serbian communities and the gradual emergence 
of a Serb bourgeoisie. This was particularly true for the Serbs living 
in the Banat, Bačka and Srem – the regions where the centre of Serb 
religious and educational life was based.
Influenced by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the 
Serb bourgeoisie embarked upon an economic and then a political 
struggle against the claims of the Hungarian nobility. This middle 
class assumed an active role in the promotion of Serb interests. 
It was the Serb bourgeoisie who, for the first time, advocated the 
restoration of the mediaeval Serbian Empire.14 Throughout the early 
nineteenth century, merchants and brokers from the Monarchy 
operated as a ‘bridge’ between the Habsburg and the Ottoman 
Serbs. When the Serbian insurrection against the Ottomans broke 
out in 1804, many Habsburg Serbs sent aid or actively joined the 
insurgents.15 The contacts between the Serbs north and south of the 
14 This idea was promoted by the Serb nationalist intellectual Sava Tekelija, in the course 
of the early nineteenth century. Tekelija was largely inspired by the mediaeval Serbian 
kingdom. Nikola Radojčić, ‘Sava Tekelija’, Istorijski Časopis XII–XIII (1963): 9. See also 
Roger V. Paxton, ‘Nationalism and Revolution: A Re-examination of the Origins of the 
First Serbian Insurrection 1804–1807’, East European Quarterly VI, no. 3 (1972): 343.
15 Paxton, ‘Nationalism and Revolution’, 340–3.
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Danube intensified between 1804 and 1812 when many Habsburg 
Serb intellectuals were invited to organize the governmental 
institutions in Serbia proper.16
A landmark event, which shaped the history of the Habsburg Empire 
in the nineteenth century, was the Hungarian revolution of 1848. 
This event was triggered by the Hungarian nobility’s resentment with 
Vienna’s attempts to make German the official language throughout 
the Monarchy in the early and mid-nineteenth century. Meanwhile, 
the groups who were subordinate to them exerted simultaneous 
pressures on the Hungarians. Having been denied the right to separate 
nationhood by the Hungarians, the Serbs (also the Croatian sabor17) 
joined the imperial troops in the suppression of the insurrection. In the 
beginning, Emperor Franz Joseph rewarded the Serbs by granting them 
Vojvodstvo Srpsko (the Serbian Vojvodina) in a patent of 6 November 
1849. Serbian Vojvodina, with its administrative centre in Temeszvar, 
comprised Baranja, Srem, part of Bačka and most of the Banat with the 
exception of the Military Frontier.
Nevertheless, Serb autonomy was restricted from an early stage.18 
Even worse, Vienna’s declining strength (the military defeats of 1859 
in Italy and 1866 in the Austro-Prussian war) prompted the Habsburgs 
to reach the Ausgleich (‘Compromise’) of 1867 with the Hungarians. 
As part of this process, on 29 December 1860, the emperor abolished 
Vojvodstvo Srpsko and gave its territory to Hungary. The Hungarian 
dominion now extended to Bačka and the Banat, while Srem was 
16 The most prominent example was the thinker and author Dositej Obradović. Obradović 
was the first minister of education appointed in Karageorge’s government. Ivo J. Lederer, 
‘Nationalism and the Yugoslavs’, in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. P. Sugar and 
I. J. Lederer (Washington, DC: University of Washington Press, 1969), 413.
17 The Croatian sabor (or Diet) was the focal legislative body within the Habsburg territory 
that corresponded to the old kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. The status attributed to the 
sabor was indicative of the autonomy that the subkingdom of Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed 
within the Hungarian kingdom.
18 First of all, the emperor himself was appointed the first Grand Serbian vojvoda, the 
government was placed in the hands of Austrian officials and German was made the 
language of the government. R. H. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and 
National Reform in the Habsburg Empire (1848–1918), vol. 2 (New York: Octagon, 1983), 
430; Vucinich, ‘The Serbs in Austria-Hungary’, 5–6.
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absorbed into the administrative system of Croatia-Slavonia. 
According to Seton-Watson, the history of the Habsburg Serbs after 
1860 was ‘one of slow decay’.19 Nevertheless, a more pragmatic approach 
might prove this statement to be exaggerated. Despite all difficulties, 
the Serbs continued to build schools and cultural institutions. They 
set up their credit organizations and agricultural cooperatives. They 
also organized political meetings and demanded the recognition of 
their national rights from the imperial government, without much 
success though. Most important, it was at that time when the Serbian 
urban classes expressed more vehemently than ever the desire for the 
transition from the historico-confessional Cultusgemeinschaft to the 
secular nation.
Consequently, in 1869 the Serbian National Liberal Party was 
founded, with Svetozar Miletić, a Novi Sad lawyer-journalist, as its 
key spokesman.20 The ‘Bečkerek Programme’ (adopted by the party 
in modern-day Zrenjanin in 1869) posited the rights of Serbs to 
national representation within the post-Ausgleich Hungary on secular 
foundations. No reference whatsoever was made to the Privilegium. 
Instead, full equality to all ethnic groups resident in the former 
Vojvodina and proportional representation of their interests, at all 
levels, were guaranteed. Miletić and his associates advocated neither 
separatism nor the dismemberment of Austria–Hungary in accordance 
with the ethnic principle. On the contrary, the National Liberals 
proposed the transformation of Hungary into an ‘East European 
Switzerland’; in other words Hungary’s cantonization in accordance 
with the demographic composition of each of its parts and the 
formation of territorial units with equal administrative competencies. 
Nevertheless, the National Liberals’ project did not meet with much 
success. Even worse, in 1887 the party itself split into two new parties; 
20 Nikola Petrović, Svetozar Miletić (Belgrade: SANU, 1958), 112–15, 122–5, 169–80.
19 R. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy (London: 
Constable and Co., 1911), 51.
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the Liberal (under the leadership of Mihajlo Polit-Desančić) and the 
National Radical Party (led by Jaša Tomić).
Special reference should be made to the more influential of these 
groupings, the National Radicals. A National Radical organization 
was already active in independent Serbia (1878) since 1880. The active 
cooperation between the Radical organizations above and below the 
Danube was a clear indication of independent Serbia’s powerful appeal 
to the Habsburg Serbs. Both Serbian and Vojvodinian Radicals drew 
their support from the same strata (the peasantry and the lower middle 
classes) and had similar programmes. The Vojvodinian Radicals, in 
particular, maintained the essentials of the ‘Bečkerek Programme’ 
and advocated the solution of the Habsburg Serb question within 
the confines of the Monarchy via some sort of federal or confederal 
arrangement.
The relations between the Vojvodinian Radicals and the political 
establishment in independent Serbia were more complicated. Serbia’s 
high appeal to the ‘unredeemed’ Serbs under Austria-Hungary had 
rendered the former increasingly unpopular in Vienna. Consequently, 
King Milan sought to prevent further friction with Serbia’s more 
powerful neighbour by obstructing the contacts between the two Radical 
organizations. This was perceived by Vojvodinian Radicals as a gross 
expression of Belgrade’s indifference towards their political struggle. 
Moreover, the Russophile inclination of both Serbian and Vojvodinian 
Radicals seriously clashed with the policy of compromise with Austria-
Hungary, which was pursued by King Milan and his successor King 
Aleksandar. However, as soon as the more nationalistic and Russophile 
Petar I Karađorđević took over, and the Radical leader Nikola Pašić 
consolidated his status in Serbia (1903), the communication between 
the two Radical organizations was fully restored. From that point 
onwards, the Vojvodinian Radicals’ platform started to shift from the 
Monarchy’s constitutional reorganization towards unification with the 
Serbian state.
The same period saw the powerful emergence of ‘proto-Yugoslavist’ 
tendencies in Austria-Hungary. In December 1905, a Croatian-Serbian 
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political coalition was formed and gained control of the sabor and the 
local executive in Croatia-Slavonia.21 The Yugoslavism of this initiative 
was made possible through its emphasis on liberal–democratic political 
institutions and on the universal right of nations to self-determination. 
Its call for the separation of churches from politics removed a crucial 
obstacle to Croatian and Serbian cooperation. Until the end of the 
First World War, the influence of the coalition, at least within Austria-
Hungary, on South Slav politics was greater than that of any other South 
Slav political party.
Vojvodina within the first Yugoslavia
This section examines Vojvodina as a constituent part of royal 
Yugoslavia. This concentrates on the political landscape of Vojvodina 
within the first Yugoslavia and the socio-economic conditions, as well 
as the climate of interethnic relations, prevailing in the region during 
that period. The clash between the political cultures of the Vojvodinian 
and the Srbijanci Serbs (those from Serbia proper), in light of the 
deteriorating economic situation, resulted in the transformation of the 
Vojvodinian Serb political attitudes from a pro-unitary orientation to 
the development of a certain regionalist movement.
Yugoslavia (1918–41)
The formation of Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1921 was received by 
South Slavs as the materialization of their aspirations for independent 
statehood. Nevertheless, the state’s political landscape was soon to be 
marred by the polarization between Serbs and Croats over Yugoslavia’s 
constitutional structure.
21 This alliance comprised the Party of Croatian Rights, the Croatian Progressive Party, 
the Serbian People’s Independent Party and the Serbian National Radical Party. Aleksa 
Djilas, The Contested Country (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 33–5.
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The Yugoslav political map was structured along ethnic lines. The 
two parties that garnered most of the Serbian support were the National 
Radical Party (NRP) and the Democratic Party. Both parties favoured 
a unitary structure, though from a different angle. The Democrats had 
couched their pro-unitarism in the belief that federalism and regional 
autonomies were two options required in states consisting of different 
nations and not in the case of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes 
who, in the party’s view, constituted one and the same narod (people).22 
NRP worried that Yugoslavia’s structuring along historic–national lines 
might endanger Serbia’s status within the state.23 At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, the Croatian Peasants’ Party (CPP) enjoyed the support 
of the majority of Croats. The party leader, Stjepan Radić, opposed 
the Serbian proposals for the dissolution of historic–national regions 
and counter-proposed a confederal arrangement within which Croatia 
would be in a loose union with Serbia.24 The only major party whose 
appeal transcended ethnic and regional cleavages was the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia, formed in Belgrade in 1919.
The Yugoslav Constitution (1921) enhanced the prerogative of 
the King, established a single chamber legislature and formed a 
centralized state divided into thirty-three oblasti (districts) according 
to economic–functional and not historic criteria.25 Centralism was 
the instrumental application of the principle ‘one nation-one state’ in 
the governing structures. The oblasti were granted some jurisdiction 
on social and economic matters (Article 95). Nevertheless, the state-
appointed župan (prefect) possessed the highest authority in each 
district and was to closely cooperate with the Council of State (Articles 
98–99). Also, the minister of Finance would decide over the percentage 
of each district’s budget channelled towards its regional interests 
22 ‘Govor Svetozara Pribičevića na kongresu jugoslovenskih profesora u Zagrebu’, Narodna 
Riječ, 5 October 1921, 2.
23 Nikola Pašić, ‘Radikalima i radikalnim organizacijama’, Samouprava, 9 September 1921, 
1; ‘Ko parčelira državu?’, Samouprava, 5 June 1921, 1.
24 Ivo Banać, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 231–2.
25 Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1923).
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(Article 97). The state of tension between the CPP and the Serbian 
elites persisted throughout the 1920s, despite the occasional formation 
of political alliances motivated by short-term interests. It reached its 
peak in June 1928, when Radić was assassinated by a Radical deputy 
from Kosovo in the Yugoslav Assembly. This urged King Aleksandar 
to dissolve the Assembly, invalidate the Constitution and appoint an 
extra-parliamentary government under his control (6 January 1929).
Aleksandar restored some constitutional order in 1931. This was a 
decision prompted by the impact of the economic crisis on Yugoslavia 
as well as the rising Croatian discontent with the royal dictatorship. 
According to the new Constitution granted by the monarch on 
3  September 1931, the state was re-designated into the ‘Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia’ from the ‘Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the 
Slovenes’ which was its designation in the 1921 Constitution.26 No other 
nationality except the ‘Yugoslav’ one was recognized; an indication of 
Aleksandar’s insistence on imposing Yugoslavism from above. The King 
retained the highest authority and the state was reorganized into nine 
larger units (banovine). As in the previous Constitution, these units 
were drawn in accordance with instrumental instead of historic criteria 
and their jurisdiction was restricted (Articles 83, 92, 93, 95).
The inauguration of the new Constitution did not appease the radical 
anti-establishment trends. These culminated with the assassination 
of King Aleksandar in Marseilles (9 October 1934).27 After 1935, the 
Yugoslav government started to tolerate political activity and the 
principle of single-nation Yugoslavism was no longer emphasized. 
Most important, Yugoslavia’s centralized structure started to adjust 
into a novel matrix with the aim to accommodate a broad range of 
national and regional demands. This resulted in the asymmetric status 
granted to Croatia, following the Sporazum (‘Agreement’) of August 
26 ‘Ustav Kraljevine Jugoslavije’, Službene Novine, 3 September 1931.
27 This assassination was carried out by the Croatian Ustaše (‘Insurgent’) movement. The 
Ustaše were largely influenced by Fascism and orientated towards Croatian independence 
by all means. The movement was launched by Ante Pavelić from abroad and sheltered 
by Hungary and Italy who used the Ustaše as a pressure force against the Yugoslav 
government.
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1939 between the then Yugoslav Premier Dragiša Cvetković and the 
CPP leader Vladimir Maček.28 However, the long-term viability of royal 
Yugoslavia’s confederalization would never be assessed, since the Axis 
invasion of April 1941 put an end to the state as such.
Vojvodina (1918–41): The political context
The question of the Habsburg lands under Hungarian jurisdiction was 
settled after the First World War by the peace treaty between the Entente 
and Hungary, signed at Trianon on 4 June 1920. Yugoslavia acquired 
Croatia-Slavonia and a considerable portion of the former Habsburg 
Vojvodina. The annexed lands included Bačka and Baranja and two 
areas near the confluence of the Mur and Drava Rivers (i.e. Prekomurje 
and Međumurje). As for the Banat, it was divided between Romania 
and Yugoslavia.29 The new borderline brought within the confines of 
Yugoslavia a large number of minorities, especially Hungarians and 
Germans (Table 1). Also, the division of the Banat brought within 
Yugoslavia a considerable number of Romanians (Ibid.). According 
to the 1921 Constitution, historic Vojvodina was divided into four 
administrative departments: Srem was represented almost in its 
entirety within the homonymous department; Western Bačka and 
Baranja formed one unit with Sombor as its capital; Eastern Bačka and 
Northern Banat were assigned to the department of Belgrade whereas 
Southern Bačka and Southern Banat to that of Smederevo.
In the beginning, the Vojvodinian Serb elites set as top priority their 
political unification with their southern kindred and demonstrated 
a positive disposition towards a unitary arrangement. This was 
particularly the case with the Vojvodinian branch of the National 
Radicals who demonstrated a more pronounced pan-Serbianism than 
28 Ljubomir Boban, Sporazum Cvetković-Maček (Belgrade: SANU, 1965), 403–4.
29 C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937).
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their Srbijanci kindred.30 This reflected the Vojvodinian Serbs’ anxious 
desire to transit from the status of a subordinate group to that of a 
dominant one. Vojvodinian Serbs also feared that any model other than 
the unitary might imperil their status in Srem, Bačka and the Banat 
where they constituted only a relative majority (37.7 per cent of the 
total population). Indeed, the NRP triumphed in Vojvodina at the first 
Yugoslav elections.31 The Vojvodinian branch of the Democrats equally 
adhered to the central party’s Yugoslavist and pro-unitary platform.
Soon, a swing of mood occurred in the Vojvodinian political 
map. The dominant Srbijanci bureaucracy was accused of inadequate 
qualifications, a drive towards clientelistic attitudes and the maintenance 
of semi-feudal mentalities.32 The Vojvodinian bourgeoisie started 
30 According to the Vojvodinian Radical leader, Jaša Tomić, even if the Serbo-Croat 
disagreements rendered the establishment of a South Slav state unworkable, ‘Serbia, 
comprising the predominantly Serbian parts of the Western Balkans, could still exist on 
its own’. Jaša Tomić, Krajnje je vreme da se razumemo (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1919), 
8–15.
31 Banać, The National Question in Yugoslavia, 388.
32 B. Hrabak, ‘Borba demokrata za samosvojnost Vojvodine (1919–1928)’, Zbornik 
Istorijskog Instituta Slavonski Brod, broj 1 (1982): 82–3.
Table 1 The ethnic structure of the population of Vojvodina in 1921
Source: Vladimir Đurić, Slobodan Čurčić and Saša Kicošev, ‘The Ethnic Structure of the 
Population of Vojvodina’, in The Serbian Question in the Balkans, University of Belgrade-
Faculty of Geography (Belgrade, 1995).
Ethnic groups Figures
Serbs 526,134 [34.7%]
Hungarians  370,040 [24.4%]
Germans  333,272 [22.0%]
Croats   122,864 [8.1%]
Slovaks    58,273 [3.8%]
Romanians    65,197 [4.3%]
Ruthenes    13,644 [0.9%]
Others    25,182 [1.7%]
TOTAL 1,514.426 [100.0%]
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to contend that their more ‘up to date’ and ‘European’ qualifications 
would be of a better use for the state’s administration, especially in their 
native region. Economic grievances were voiced too. It is estimated that 
by 1924–5 Vojvodina was paying approximately twenty-two different 
kinds of taxes, including the particularly heavy dohodarina.33 To this 
should be added the dissatisfaction with the failure of the agrarian 
reform in the region.
The emergence of a Vojvodinian regionalist alternative was 
accelerated by the royal dictatorship of 1929. The first attempt to 
summarize Vojvodinian grievances was concretized in the ‘Sombor 
Resolution’ of July 1932, which was drafted by local Radicals, Democrats 
and Agrarians on a multiparty basis. This document deplored the 
territorial alteration of Vojvodina by the 1921 and 1931 constitutions34 
and called for the staffing of regional administration with local cadres 
as well as the revision of the taxation system.35 Later, in December 1932, 
the ‘Novi Sad Resolution’ (also drafted on a multiparty basis) placed 
the Vojvodinian question within the project for constitutional reform 
endorsed by the anti-dictatorship opposition. This document, actually 
an expansion of the ‘Zagreb Declaration’36 on Vojvodina, went a step 
further than the ‘Sombor Resolution’ and demanded that Yugoslavia 
is reorganized as a federation and Vojvodina is granted the status of a 
federal unit.
The ‘Novi Sad Resolution’ polarized the Serbian political landscape. 
The Radicals, as well as the Democrats of Serbia proper, insisted on 
33 Ibid., 37–8.
34 According to the 1931 Constitution, most of Vojvodina together with Srem and some 
north-central districts of Serbia proper became part of the Danube banovina with its seat 
in Novi Sad.
35 Ranko Končar, Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929–1941 (Novi Sad: Matica 
Srpska, 1995), 88–92.
36 According to the ‘Zagreb Declaration’, issued between 5 and 7 November 1932, by the 
Independent Democrats (a secession from the Democratic Party) and the Croatian 
Peasants, Yugoslavia was to be divided into seven regions, on the basis of their ‘past 
experience of sovereign statehood’ (Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro) as well as their 
‘cultural-historic particularities’ (Vojvodina, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Slovenia). Each unit was to enjoy extensive budgetary, legislative and cultural autonomy. 
Ibid., 93–7.
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the ‘common political struggle of all Serbs for democratization’ and 
castigated ‘parochial’ initiatives which divided Serbs into prečani37 and 
Srbijanci. This, however, did not discourage the regionalists in Vojvodina. 
The formation of the ‘Vojvodinian Front’ in July 1935 signalled the 
standardization of the regionalist initiative. As recommended by the 
Vojvodinian Radicals, the Front was not launched as a separate political 
grouping but as a think tank where Vojvodinian regionalists retained 
their party identities and formulated proposals on Vojvodina’s status 
within Yugoslavia. The Vojvodinian Radicals possibly assessed that the 
launching of a separate Vojvodinian party might restrict regionalist 
initiatives to a parochial extent and raise undesirable parallels, among 
the Srbijanci elites, with ‘quasi-secessionist’ groups such as the CPP. 
By contrast, the organization of the Vojvodinian Front as a multiparty 
forum might prove a more effective move, since this would enable 
the Vojvodinian regionalists to promote the Front’s resolutions to the 
influential circles in Belgrade.
The Front underlined that Vojvodina, encompassing Bačka, Baranja, 
Srem and the Banat, should gain the status of a unit in a federally 
restructured Yugoslavia.38 All units would be equal, enjoy legislative as well 
as budgetary autonomy and their assemblies have some main areas under 
their jurisdiction (e.g. internal administration, education, the regional 
judiciary).39 The Vojvodinian Front found support among the bourgeois 
strata who were particularly affected by regional mismanagement and 
the failure of the agrarian reform: landowners, bankers and traders. 
The Front vocally expressed Vojvodinian grievances between 1935 and 
1938. Still, its endeavours were in vain since Yugoslavia’s restructuring, 
in the minds of the Serbian elites, remained a synonym of the need to 
reach a modus vivendi with the Croats. The 1939 Sporazum legitimized 
the prevalence of the ethnic over the regional criterion. This had a 
37 This is a term used to denote the Serbs resident above the Sava, Drava and Danube rivers, 
within the old Habsburg realm.
38 The other units proposed were pre-war Serbia (including Vardar Macedonia), Croatia, 
Montenegro with Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia.
39 The fields reserved for the central government were citizenship, state security and the 
military, foreign policy and macroeconomic issues.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   46 30-08-2019   16:40:59
Vojvodina through Time 47
particularly negative impact on Vojvodina, since Baranja and parts of 
Western Srem were conceded to the enlarged Croatian banovina on 
grounds of their demographic structure.
However, the regionalist endeavours of the interwar Vojvodinian 
bourgeoisie possess particular significance. On that occasion, some 
Vojvodinian Serbs appealed for autonomy not to an alien power 
but to their fellow-nationals in Belgrade. This was the first time that 
demands for autonomy were expressed by the Vojvodinian bourgeoisie 
on a regional and not a national basis, as was the case prior to the 
establishment of Yugoslavia. The Front’s platform is recalled up to date 
by Vojvodina’s autonomaši (pro-autonomy) groupings. Nevertheless, 
this does not imply any sort of linear continuity in regard to Vojvodinian 
regionalism. The demands for autonomy, expressed in Vojvodina in 
different periods, were and still are predominantly conditioned by the 
prevailing political and socio-economic circumstances.
Socio-economic conditions
A socio-economic development of primary importance, which was 
undertaken after the formation of Yugoslavia, was the expropriation 
of the formerly Ottoman and Habsburg land estates. Promises of land 
reform had already been made by the pre-war Serbian government 
as well as the Zagreb National Council during the war. The Yugoslav 
government immediately established a special Ministry for the 
Agrarian Reform and set out the instructions for the process in an 
interim decree. In short, large estates were to be broken down and 
redistributed. Landowners would receive compensation in state bonds 
and all those who obtained land were to repay the state after a period 
of thirty years. Sharecropper land was to be handed over to tenants.40
40 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia: The History behind the Name (London: Hurst & Company, 
2002), 119.
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The objectives of the reform were to calm the revolutionary potential 
of the landless peasants, eliminate the foreign landowning class linked 
to the empires and reward war veterans. With regard to the latter 
aim, the period after the end of the war saw the planned settlement of 
landless peasants from the Dinaric parts of Yugoslavia (Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lika) in Vojvodina. Many of the settlers had 
fought during the war in the Serbian and Montenegrin armies or legions 
(the so-called dobrovoljici/volunteers). Their presence in Vojvodina 
was necessary for the establishment of a northern frontier consisting of 
‘reliable national elements’.41 The colonists were given 8.5 yokes apiece. 
The dobrovoljici took their land for free and were exempted from 
repaying the state over a thirty years period. By the end of 1928, 12,625 
families of war veterans had received 100,689 yokes; 4,730 families of 
other colonists had received 30,088 yokes and 58,193 families of local 
applicants 171,950 yokes.42 Much of the land granted to the colonists 
previously belonged to Hungarian or German large landowners.43
According to Pavlowitch, ‘politically unavoidable, socially desirable, 
the reform in the northern regions turned out to be economically 
doubtful’.44 In contrast to Dalmatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 
Vojvodina we did not have to do with remains of feudal relationships 
but with large private estates. The liquidation of all agricultural estates 
above 100 hectares, as provided by the law, led to the formation of very 
small holdings while the new owners lacked both capital and experience 
of modern agricultural techniques. The break-up of the estates caused 
a decrease in labour demand in exactly these areas where labour supply 
was more than sufficient, since there was not much expropriated land 
to go around. Meanwhile, the departure of quite a few dobrovoljici from 
41 Most volunteers settled in Bačka and the Banat where Hungarian and German presence 
was particularly compact. By 1939, Bačka accommodated 3,268 volunteer and 1,195 
other colonist families. Also, by 1941, 6,238 volunteer and 2,146 other colonist families 
lived in the Banat. Mitrović, ‘Naseljavanje i kolonizacija Vojvodine’, 216–17.
42 Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, 401.
43 It is estimated that some 40,000 hectares were lost by German large landowners in the 
1920s, as a result of the land expropriation. A. T. Komjathy and P. Stockwell, German 
Minorities and the Third Reich (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), 129.
44 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London: Ernest Benn, 1971), 55–6.
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Vojvodina shed doubt about the success of the colonization as well. 
The crisis facing the agricultural producers in Vojvodina was somehow 
alleviated through their transactions with Hungary and later Germany.45
The state of interethnic relations
The Trianon Treaty included certain clauses for the protection of 
national minorities. According to Article 9 of the Yugoslav minority 
protection treaty, in these areas where a significant percentage of their 
inhabitants belonged to a minority, the government had to provide 
elementary education for their children in their mother tongue. The 
state and local authorities were also obliged to allocate from their 
budgets proportionate subsidies to the minorities for educational and 
religious purposes. Even though the Trianon Treaty had established 
basic principles, it was up to the Yugoslav state to fill in the details of 
its minority legislation. The applicability of Article 9 was restricted to 
these areas acquired by the Yugoslav kingdom after 1 January 1913.46
A major political concern of the Yugoslav government, in regard 
to its minority policies in Vojvodina, was the necessity to dissolve 
the Hungarian-German bond. According to the state’s officials, this 
could be achieved through the assumption of a lenient stance towards 
Vojvodinian Germans and the ensuing cultivation of loyalty to the 
Yugoslav kingdom. Consequently, quite a few formerly Hungarian 
schools were converted into schools with parallel German classes in 
the 1920s. Moreover, by 1927, the number of ethnic German teachers 
employed at all levels of education in Vojvodina was satisfactory.47
45 Yugoslavia exported to Hungary wood and agricultural products whereas Hungary 
exported to Yugoslavia industrial products. Since 1934, Germany became a steady 
purchaser of Vojvodinian wheat, maize and livestock. Vuk Vinaver, ‘O Jugoslovensko-
Mađarskoj Trgovini (1933–1941)’, Zbornik Matice Srpske za Istoriju, broj 1 (1970): 37–78.
46 Jozsef Galantai, Trianon and the Protection of Minorities (New York: Atlantic Studies on 
Society and Change No.70, 1992), 73–7.
47 By that year, 259 Vojvodinian German teachers were employed in Bačka and 60 more in 
Podunavlje. By 1927, the number of German students in Bačka was 13,022 and in Podunavlje 
2,504. Goran Nikolić, Društvena obeležja nemačke nacionalne manjine u periodu 1918–1929 
godine (magistrarski rad), Matica Srpska archives (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1992), 220.
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The Yugoslav government demonstrated a relatively lenient attitude 
towards more institutionalized forms of German representation as well. 
On 20 June 1920, the Schwabisch-Deutscher Kulturbund was founded in 
Novi Sad by local Völksdeutsche (ethnic Germans). The Bund was set up 
with the aim to safeguard the cultural–linguistic identity and promote 
the economic activities of the German minority in Yugoslavia.48 At 
the same time, it pledged its loyalty to Yugoslavia and worked for the 
abandonment of any pro-Magyar sympathies among the Völksdeutsche. 
In the long term, the emergence of pro-Nazi sympathies among the 
Völksdeutsche backfired against the ‘state-sponsored’ reinforcement 
of ethnic German identity.49 The radicalization of the Völksdeutsche 
alarmed many Serbs who interpreted it as one more indication that 
the Srbijanci bureaucrats did not know how to handle Vojvodina’s 
particularities properly.
By contrast, the Yugoslav officials remained suspicious of Hungarian 
irredentism and this had a negative impact on their policies towards the 
Hungarian minority. By 1934, the Hungarians possessed 132 parallel 
sections at elementary schools. This figure suggests a steady decline in 
comparison to the 645 Hungarian elementary schools that operated in 
Vojvodina before the war.50 As for higher education in the Hungarian 
language, this was practically non-existent. The discrimination against 
Hungarians in education fuelled anti-Yugoslav tendencies within that 
group. As far as the Vojvodinian Romanians were concerned, a reciprocal 
Romanian-Yugoslav agreement, signed in the summer of 1933, allowed 
them to open at their own expense their private elementary schools 
under state’s supervision but with the examinations conducted and the 
certificates issued by Romanian teachers. Relations between Serbs and 
Romanians remained positive on the grassroots level and to this helped 
the religious affiliation as well as the similar social status of the two 
48 Ibid., 195–6.
49 By mid-1940 the balance of power within the Bund had decisively shifted towards the 
pro-Nazi faction. Sepp Janko, the then Bund leader, was no doubt a Nazi sympathiser 
whereas similar tendencies were witnessed among other high-rank Völksdeutsche. 
Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 130–40.
50 Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, 419.
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groups. The state’s policies towards Vojvodina’s minor Slavic groups 
(e.g. Slovaks, Ruthenes) were equally positive.51
Vojvodina under Axis occupation
In this section, the focus shifts to the situation in Vojvodina during 
the years of Axis occupation. Particular attention is paid to the 
administrative system and the state of interethnic relations in the 
region over that period. Certain ‘particularities’ of the occupation in 
Vojvodina facilitated the long-term healing of the war wounds, despite 
the state of interethnic strife that prevailed between 1941 and 1945.
Yugoslavia 1941–5
Yugoslavia capitulated to the Axis on 17 April 1941. The country was 
partitioned among the Axis partners and their regional allies (Hungary 
and Bulgaria). Meanwhile, Pavelić’s Ustaše were allowed to proclaim 
their Nezavisna Država Hrvatske (‘Independent State of Croatia’) 
extending over 40 per cent of the former kingdom of Yugoslavia; 
ranging from inner Croatia, across Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the gates 
of Belgrade.
Resistance to the occupation forces was coordinated by two political 
and military organizations. One of them was the Communist Partisans 
under the leadership of the Croat Josip Broz ‘Tito’. In November 1942, 
the Communists set up the ‘Anti-Fascist Council for the National 
Liberation of Yugoslavia-AVNOJ’ in Bihać, Northern Bosnia. The 
Bihać manifesto envisaged the establishment of a broad democratic 
51 Throughout the interwar era, the educational and cultural life of Slovaks in Vojvodina 
flourished. With regard to the Ruthenes, since 1921 this group was enabled to write 
in their standardized Ruthene language with its own alphabet. Some information on 
this issue was disclosed to the author in the course of his field research in Vojvodina 
(Interview with Ruthene journalist at RTS Novi Sad; 22 April 2002); On the Slovaks, see 
Jan Sirački, ‘Slovaci u Vojvodini kao Istorijsko-Etnografski Fenomen’, Zbornik za Istoriju, 
broj 102–103 (1997): 115.
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government that would recognize the rights of all national groups 
in Yugoslavia. At its second meeting (29 November 1943; Jajce), the 
AVNOJ declared itself the supreme legislative and executive institution 
in Yugoslavia – a provisional government.52 The other resistance 
movement was the Chetniks, whose leader was the former minister of 
War, Dragoljub ‘Draža’ Mihailović. The Chetniks drew predominantly 
Serbian support and until 1943 had the backing of Britain. Mihailović 
was convinced that the Axis was bound to lose the war. So the Chetniks’ 
main aim would be to fight the internal competitors for the post-war 
leadership of Yugoslavia, the Communists, until the Western allies 
would be there to assist the general uprising against the Axis.
Nevertheless, by mid-1943, the course of the war had changed in 
favour of the Partisans since the Allies had found out that the latter were 
doing more damage to Wehrmacht than the Chetniks. Moreover, the 
Partisans had managed to recast Yugoslavism in a new fashion and use it 
as a unifying and defensive ideological tool during the war. Consequently, 
people from all ethnic groups were attracted to their ranks. In line with 
these developments, on 24 May 1944, Churchill announced to the House 
of Commons that the supply of arms to Mihailović had ceased and the 
largest possible supplies would be sent to Tito. Later, on 20 October 
1944, the Soviet Red Army marched triumphant in Belgrade and forced 
the Chetniks of uža Srbija (Serbia proper) to capitulate. This was the 
final act that paved the way to Tito’s victory and the establishment of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Vojvodina 1941–5: The administrative system
In April 1941, the Banat was placed under German administration. 
This decision was taken after a Romanian refusal to claim the Yugoslav 
Banat or let Hungary have it. By 14 June, an agreement was reached 
52 ‘Državnopravno konstituisanje Nove Jugoslavije’, in Istorija Socijalističke Jugoslavije, 
knjiga prva, ed. Branko Petranović and Cedomir Štrbac (Belgrade: Radnička Štampa, 
1977), 23–6.
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between the Banat Völksdeutsche leadership and the Serbian quisling 
government: the Banat was formally included to the administrative–
legal system of occupied Serbia. At the same time, the Banat Germans 
were conceded extensive rights in local administration.53
The Vizebanus, a Nazi official, was to become the bearer of the 
highest civil authority in the Banat and supervise the function of 
the autonomous administration. Sepp Janko became the leader of the 
German Völksgruppe in Serbia and the Banat. The major governing 
body of the Banat’s Völksdeutsche was the local administration 
(Landesleitung) based in Petrovgrad (modern-day Zrenjanin). Through 
this institution the Völksdeutsche enjoyed administrative autonomy in 
a variety of fields (fiscal management, legal affairs, education).54 Soon 
tensions arose between the Nazi authorities and the Völksdeutsche over 
the military duties of the latter. Many Völksdeutsche refused to serve in 
the local police force, especially after the latter started to be deployed 
against Serbian civilians.55 These tensions heightened when the local 
police force was transformed into the SS Division Prinz Eugen in spring 
1942. The atrocities committed by Prinz Eugen against Serbian civilians, 
in combination with the fact that the Völksdeutsche never felt compelled 
to actively protest at the exploitation that they suffered at Nazi hands, 
rendered Banat Serbs extremely hostile towards the German community.
The official incorporation of Bačka and Baranja to Hungary was 
accomplished on 14 August 1941. Leo Deak, an intellectual from 
Sombor, was appointed major governor of Bačka-Baranja with his seat at 
Sombor. Soon agrarian and economic reforms were initiated, which had 
a particularly negative effect on Serbs and Jews. As a result of the land 
reform, which took place between mid-1941 and early 1942, land was 
53 On this issue, see the ‘Verordungsblatt der Völksgruppenführung’ (number 3) of August 
1941, as cited in Petar Kačavenda, Nemci u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade: Institut za Savremenu 
Istoriju, 1991), 32.
54 The broad autonomy enjoyed by the Völksdeutsche leadership can be summarized in 
this official statement: ‘All instructions for legal administration, education and the 
appointment of local officers are issued by us, and only us, in concordance with the 
occupation forces.’ Ibid., 34.
55 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 144.
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given to 13,158 Hungarian families, 770 Croatian families, 34 German 
families, 4 Slovene families and only 6 Serb families.56 The group that 
profited the most from the reform was the newly arrived Hungarian 
settlers; mainly Szekely Hungarians from Bukovina and elsewhere.57 The 
agrarian reform and the colonization process were part of the broader 
plan to alter the ethnic structure of Bačka-Baranja and Magyarize the 
county.
Srem was a region with a Serb majority. When Italy annexed Dalmatia, 
Srem, with its rich Central Danube basin, became a bone of contention 
between Völksdeutsche and Ustaše. Hitler found a modus vivendi: Srem 
would formally pass under Croat control but Ustaše administration would 
function in coordination with the Völksdeutsche leadership. In April 
1941, a series of laws were enacted in the NDH, all of which were directed 
against Serbs, Jews and their properties. Even though the Ustaše and the 
Völksdeutsche agreed on these laws, tensions began to surface over the 
distribution of the properties confiscated by Serbs and Jews. At the same 
time, Milovan Zanić, a member of Pavelić’s apparatus, had provoked 
Srem’s Völksdeutsche by saying that ‘Srem is Croatian and villages will 
be filled with Ustaše’.58 When Ustaše atrocities became horrendous this 
provoked a wave of revolt among Nazis themselves. Consequently, in 
September 1942, the Ustaše-Völksdeutsche condominium ended and the 
Germans assumed full control of the region. They kept the Special Courts 
and all existing legislation but without further harassing the Serbs.
Interethnic strife
In the years of occupation, certain events occurred that either alienated 
one ethnic group from the other(s) or fomented an atmosphere of explicit 
hatred. On the one hand, the occupation forces implemented a series 
58 Novi List, 3 June 1941.
56 Josip Mirnić, Denacionalizorska politika mađarskog okupatora u jugoslovenske 
zemlje-1941 (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1967), 145.
57 P. Lorinc, Hacban a Foldert (Budapest: Akademia Kiado, 1981), 181.
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of repressive measures, directed against Serbs and Jews in particular, 
which ranged from population deportations to mass executions. On the 
other hand, reprisals against Germans and Hungarians took place after 
liberation. War crimes in Axis-occupied Yugoslavia have been a field 
of major disagreement among historians. Different historians, often 
originating from different groups, have produced highly controversial 
and disparate accounts of the atrocities committed in the Second 
World War. Also, much evidence has been concealed or destroyed. 
Nevertheless, it is not the aim of this work to assess the credibility of 
the sources available. The primary aim is to estimate the degree to 
which the memory of these atrocities has affected group identity and 
interethnic relations in present-day Vojvodina. The sources regarding 
the war crimes are mainly Yugoslav state reports.
In the Banat, the first mass executions were carried out as early as 
April 1941.59 At the same time, the confiscation of the properties of 
the Serbian interwar colonists was initiated. Later, on 22 June 1941, a 
series of concentration camps were built.60 By the time of liberation, 
approximately 56,000 Banat civilians had lost their lives in the 
concentration camps based in the Banat and abroad.61
In Bačka and Baranja, rapid Magyarization became the priority of 
the Hungarian administration. As early as 25 April 1941, an order for 
the deportation of the Serbian and Montenegrin interwar colonists 
was issued and a series of prison camps were set up. The transfer of 
Hungarian colonists to Bačka was planned in due time. By 18 June 
1941, 2,921 Szekely families consisting of 13,200 members had settled 
in the county.62 The Szekely families took over the houses and the 
59 On these executions, see the relevant report of the Yugoslav state’s committee for the 
investigation of the crimes committed during occupation as cited in Istorijski arhiv PK 
SK Vojvodine, Novi Sad, br. A.K. 7992, 3-21. Also, see IA PK SK Inv. Br. A.K. Reg. Br. 7388, 
7913.
60 The central concentration camp, which soon became the major symbol of Nazi terror 
in the Banat, was opened in Petrovgrad, on 20 July 1942. On this issue, see IA PK SK 
Vojvodine, Fond A.K. br. 7550.
61 Sandor Veg, ‘Sistem nemačke okupacione vlasti u Banatu’, Zbornik Matice Srpske za 
Društvene Nauke, broj 35 (1963): 92.
62 Aleksandar Kasas, Mađari u Vojvodini (1941–1946) (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1996), 40.
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land previously owned by Serbian settlers. The favourable conditions 
offered to the Szekely caused the discontent of local Hungarians and 
Germans alike.63 By 1942, the Hungarian officials needed to create 
Reich authorities the impression that the ‘Southern Hungarian lands’ 
were threatened by a joint ‘Communist-Zionist’ uprising, so that Hitler 
would cease his pressures for more Hungarian soldiers to be dispatched 
to the Eastern front. This caused the radicalization of Hungarian 
policies towards Serbs and Jews. The worst came in January 1942, 
when the Great Racija (Persecution) commenced in Novi Sad. When 
it ended, on 30 January 1942, the Racija had claimed the lives of 4,000 
civilians, mostly Serbs (2,578) and Jews (1,068).64
Things were even worse in Srem. All Serbs and Jews from 15 to 50 
years of age were forced to perform labour from 6 a.m. to 8 a.m. In his 
speech, delivered in Vukovar on 14 August 1941, Pavelić threatened 
that ‘Srem is now part of the NDH and must be permanently cleansed 
of Serbs and Jews’.65 By the time that the Ustaše-Völksdeutsche 
condominium in Srem ended, around 15,000 Serbs and Jews had been 
executed through summary procedures.66
By 7 November 1944, the Völksdeutsche leadership, in conjunction 
with the German Ministry of Interior, had completed the evacuation 
process of Yugoslavia’s German community to Germany. The Germans 
who did not manage to flee Yugoslav territory were taken to concentration 
camps by the Partisans. There exists evidence that the treatment of the 
inmates was not always proper.67 On 1 December, though, the release of 
64 Ibid., 91. For a thorough account of the Racija and other wartime atrocities in Bačka see 
the full report of the Yugoslav Committee for the Investigation of War Crimes: Zločini 
okupatora u Bačkoj 1941–44 (Novi Sad, 1948), 121–33, 166–79, 240–7.
65 Edmond Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia (1941–1945) (Chicago: The American 
Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1961), 184.
66 For a thorough account of the Ustaše atrocities in Srem, see the full report of the Yugoslav 
Committee for the Investigation of War Crimes: Zločini okupatora u Sremu (1941–44) 
(Novi Sad, 1948), 40–9, 112–19, 128–33, 204–13, 299.
67 On this issue see the relevant Yugoslav report: AJ, F 153, k.25, III-3/138. Also, the Military 
Administration order, issued on 1 December 1944, admitted that in certain places the 
treatment of the incarcerated Germans and Hungarians was improper. On this issue see 
AVII, VO, k. 1661, f. 1, d. 1.
63 Ibid., 65.
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Hungarians from concentration camps was decreed. There exists some 
speculation that a certain number of Germans were killed in reprisals, 
between October and November 1944. However, there does not exist 
any reliable evidence in the official state’s archives.68 Some indications 
exist that a certain number of Hungarians were killed in reprisal 
attacks.69
In all of this, one thing must be born in mind: most of the wartime 
atrocities in Vojvodina were perpetrated by outsiders. In Bačka, honved 
(militias) from Hungary proper played a leading part in the Racija 
and other atrocities.70 Quite similar was the case in Srem, where many 
leading Ustaše were not locals, whereas many reprisal attacks were 
carried out by Partisans who came from other parts of Yugoslavia. 
This clearly contrasts with what was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
where the atrocities were largely committed among locals and negative 
memories persisted for the years to come, even though restricted to the 
family level. Consequently, the healing of the war wounds in Vojvodina 
would be quicker and more effective in comparison to the other parts 
of Yugoslavia.71
68 One source which comprises a brief account of such events is Zoran Janjetović’s book: 
Between Hitler and Stalin: The Disappearance of the Ethnic Germans from Vojvodina 
(Belgrade: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2000). For more details, see Janjetović, ibid., 
213–19.
69 Some Hungarian sources suggest an exaggerated number of around 40,000 Vojvodinian 
Hungarians who died in acts of reprisal between October and early December 1944. 
On this issue, see Robert Aspalagh, ‘Trianon Dissolved: The Status of Vojvodina 
Reconsidered?’, Yearbook of European Studies 5 (1992): 127. Tibor Cseres gives a slightly 
lower number: 39,941. For this figure, see Janjetović, Between Hitler and Stalin, 220.
70 Some information over this issue was disclosed to the author in the course of his field 
research in Vojvodina (Interview with sociologist at the University of Novi Sad; 13 March 
2001).
71 A similar observation was made by Judy Batt in the course of her fieldwork in another 
multiethnic East European region, Transcarpathia in Ukraine. Most of the Nazi-
occupation atrocities, as well as the Soviet reprisals, were committed in that region by 
outsiders. Consequently, the healing of the wounds inflicted by interethnic strife was 
more effective in that Ukrainian region as well. Judy Batt, ‘Transcarpathia – A Peripheral 
Region at the “Centre of Europe”’, Regional & Federal Studies 12, no. 2 (2002): 155–77.
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Vojvodina within the Socialist Federal  
Republic of Yugoslavia
In autumn 1944, the Communist Partisans emerged as the victors of 
the internal power-contest in Yugoslavia. This development saw the 
establishment of a new order in what was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia: 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This section highlights the 
system of regional administration, the socio-economic aspects and the 
management of interethnic relations. Even though the establishment 
of Vojvodina as an autonomous province was dictated from above, 
in the long term, Vojvodina’s successful economic performance 
stimulated a powerful popular commitment to Vojvodinian regional 
identity and its system of autonomous administration among Serbs 
and ‘others’ alike.
The ideological content of Socialist Yugoslavism and the 
constitutional framework of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia
According to Article 2 of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia72 (31 January 1946), the new federation 
was to comprise the socialist republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Five Yugoslav 
narodi (peoples) with an equal status were recognized: the Serbs, the 
Croats, the Macedonians, the Montenegrins and the Slovenes. Serbia 
was to comprise the autonomous pokrajina (province) of Vojvodina 
and the autonomous oblast (district) of Kosovo and Metohija. The 
Constitution stated that ‘Yugoslavia is a community of nations equal 
in rights who, on the basis of the right of self-determination, including 
72 The initial designation of the new federation in the 1946 Constitution was Federativna 
Narodna Republika Jugoslavije (‘Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia’). The state was 
officially renamed into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the text of the 1963 
Constitution. Throughout this text, the ‘second’ Yugoslav federation will be referred to as 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
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the right of secession, have expressed the will to live together in a 
federative state’.73
Despite its federal structure, the Yugoslav state was, in its 
concentration of real power, a unitary mechanism. The Presidium 
of the Federal Assembly combined the functions of a parliamentary 
coordinating and standing committee and those of a corporate Head 
of State. Supreme in theory, the role of the Assembly was limited to 
the approval of the bills submitted to it by the executive. Even though 
the Constitution made no formal mention of the Communist Party, 
yet all power emanated from the Party at the head of which was its 
Secretary-General Tito, assisted by Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Djilas and 
Aleksandar Ranković. Tito was head of the government, minister of 
Defence, commander-in-chief, member of the Presidium and head of 
the Popular Front. At that early stage, federalization of the state did not 
equal federalization of the party apparatus. The CPY was organized 
according to the Stalinist model, leaving little room for regional 
loyalties. Centralization of authority was prompted by the need for 
Yugoslavia’s rapid reconstruction after the war and the necessity for 
the new regime to consolidate its status first against the remaining 
pockets of anti-Communist resistance and, following the Stalin–Tito 
rift in 1948, the possible machinations of pro-Moscow circles within 
the CPY.
The brand of Yugoslavism, which was promoted by the CPY 
after the war, was characterized by: anti-nationalism (opposition to 
particularistic nationalisms within Yugoslavia); patriotism (adherence 
to the principles of the Partisan movement); internationalism (primacy 
of ideology over nationality in the universal struggle for a social 
revolution). The CPY favoured an integral version of Yugoslavism, 
according to which a Yugoslav nation was in the process of making and 
all particularistic affiliations would wither away. The federal system was 
interpreted as a temporary measure dictated by national heterogeneity.
73 ‘Ustav Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije’, in Petranović and Štrbac 1977, 
Dokumenti I, knjiga druga, 116ff.
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Soon, innovations were introduced on the structural level. Following 
the successful break with Moscow, the Yugoslav leadership aimed at the 
formulation of an ideological anti-model to the Soviet one. Consequently, 
the new Constitutional Law of 1953 introduced a multilevel pattern of 
political and economic administration, that consisted of the People’s 
Committees of Municipalities and Districts, the workers’ and the 
producers’ councils. Self-management (samoupravljanje) was seen as an 
efficient alternative to the Soviet ‘bureaucratic’ model and the instrument 
through which old sectional, regional and ethnic interests would be 
absorbed and the state itself would wither away when the process 
of the establishment of a classless society was complete. In line with 
these developments, the Party’s designation was changed to League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia in an attempt to demonstrate that members 
were to fulfil their responsibilities as Communists, not through the Party 
as an organization, but as volunteering individuals within the institution 
where they were employed. Similarly, the Popular Front was renamed 
into the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia.
The new Yugoslav Constitution promulgated in April 1963 introduced 
the framework for one of the most complicated political systems in 
existence at that time.74 The focal constituent part of the Federal Assembly 
would be the Chamber of Representatives (120 deputies). The Assembly 
comprised the Chamber of Nations (10 delegates from each republic 
and 5 from each autonomous province). The latter provision codified 
the practice of a balanced republican representation within the Federal 
Executive Council. Certain concessions were made to the component 
republics. The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia was introduced with 
its counterparts in the republics. This body would be responsible to 
examine republican appeals against federal laws that infringed on the 
republics’ jurisdiction as well as federal appeals against their legislation. 
Later, in 1967, a series of constitutional amendments were introduced. 
The competencies of the Chamber of Nations were extended to comprise 
74 Union of Jurists’ Association of Yugoslavia, The Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (A Preliminary Draft), English-language edition (Belgrade, 1962).
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all issues affecting the interests of the republics, rendering the body in 
question a largely independent agent within the Assembly. Some further 
amendments, added in 1971, introduced the institution of collective 
presidency which would comprise three delegates from each republic 
and two from each autonomous province (Amendment 35).
The federalization of the Party and government was prompted by 
certain factors. The federal officials might have assessed that the Chamber 
of Nations could function as a forum where the clashes between the 
regional leaderships or conflicts with nationality implications would be 
resolved more effectively than it was the case until then in the central 
party leadership.75 The expansion of the competencies enjoyed by the 
Chamber of Nations, as well as the increase of republican/provincial 
control over its decisions, left a clear implication that the need for the 
government to achieve inter-republican consensus on federal policy 
prior to its submission to the Assembly had increased. Therefore, 
Socialist Yugoslavism, since the mid-1960s, embraced the following 
principles: full endorsement of the particularities of all nations and 
nationalities and their right to cultural self-determination; affirmation 
of dual consciousness – that is, national consciousness combined with 
Yugoslav consciousness; rejection of both unitarism and separatism as 
perilous deviations.
The relaxation of federal control was accompanied by an emphatic 
display of discontent with the status quo. The opposition to the 
established order also acquired quasi-nationalist overtones, the most 
notable example of this kind being the Croatian crisis of 1967–72. 
Throughout that period, the Croats had become increasingly insecure 
over the cultural, economic and demographic future of their narod and 
republic. When the crisis aggravated in autumn 1971, Tito handled it 
by means of expulsion of thousands of members from the Croatian LC 
and the imposition of long prison terms to others.76
75 Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making 
since 1966 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 66.
76 Pedro Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia (1963–1983) (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984), 138–40.
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As became obvious in the new Yugoslav Constitution inaugurated 
in 1974, the Croatian crisis did not affect the drive towards Yugoslavia’s 
‘confederalization’. The new Constitution set up as the imperative 
an electoral system to the various legislative assemblies based on 
delegations drawn from occupational and interest groups. The Federal 
Assembly consisted of a 220-strong Federal Chamber (comprising 
30 members from each of the 6 republics and 20 from each of the 
autonomous provinces) and an 88-member Chamber of Republics and 
Provinces (comprising 12 members elected by the republican and 8 by 
the provincial assemblies). The strict order of rotation was not applied in 
Tito’s case, who was elected president of Yugoslavia for an unlimited term 
of office. The new Constitution enhanced the role of the military in that 
it increased the number of army officers in the governing bodies of the 
LCY. In this way, the LCY and the Yugoslav People’s Army, both agents of 
federal rather than republican authority, were mutually reinforced.
The Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 outlined the rights, obligations 
and interactions of a multitude of organizations. The proper function 
of this system, however, was to rely on the civic consciousness and 
political idealism of all individuals involved in it, from the top-level 
Party officials down to ordinary citizens.77 On 4 May 1980, Tito passed 
away in Ljubljana. Tito’s absence as a decisive single man factor, who 
could exert vast informal power and impose order when necessary, 
became manifest in the 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, the deteriorating 
economic situation was accompanied by the virulent awakening of 
particularistic nationalisms all over the federation.
Vojvodina as a socialist autonomous province:  
The administrative system
The carving out of the autonomous provinces in Serbia was justified on 
grounds of their ethno-cultural heterogeneity. Vojvodina and Kosmet 
77 Union of Jurists’ Association of Yugoslavia, The Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, English-language edition (Belgrade, 1974).
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were two regions inhabited by a multitude of ethnic groups. Therefore, 
the most effective way, the Party officials contended, to safeguard the 
collective rights of all groups resident in those regions was to promulgate 
the administrative autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosmet.78
However, this decision should be better viewed in line with the 
establishment of SR Macedonia and SR Montenegro as republics: Both 
policies aimed to weaken the political status of Serbs within Yugoslavia 
and allay fears of ‘renewed Serbian predominance’ in the other republics 
and among other ethnic groups. At the same time, the demands by some 
Dalmatian Communists for the concession of autonomy to their region 
within Croatia, as well as the appeals by Moša Pijade and other Serbian 
Communists for the establishment of a Serb autonomous area in inner 
Dalmatia (the areas around Knin) were rejected by the CPY.79 The 
motives behind this decision are not difficult to discern, considering 
that towards the end of the war the CPY urgently needed to gain the 
support of the Croatian masses.
The prevalence of the Communists over their domestic rivals saw 
the marginalization of the national–liberal current among Vojvodinian 
Serbs. A certain percentage of Vojvodinian national–liberals fled 
abroad following the victory of the Partisans. There can also be made 
speculations that a strain within the pre-war national–liberal generation 
modified their previous positions, joined the Communist structures 
and continued to exert some political influence in the province, even 
though subordinated to the Party line. Still, little information about the 
post-war purges and the fate of the pre-war national–liberal elites in 
Communist Vojvodina is available.
According to Article 4 of the ‘Law on the Constituent Assembly’ 
(August 1945), the citizens of Vojvodina could elect fifteen 
78 ‘Zaključak plenuma GNOO Vojvodine o priključenju Vojvodine Federalnoj Srbiji’, 
as cited in Jelena Popov, ‘Glavni narodnooslobodilački odbor Vojvodine 1943–1945’, 
Istraživanje, broj 4 (1974), 411. The CPY decided to give Baranja to Croatia on grounds 
of its demographic composition. Vojvodina within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia comprised most of historic Srem, Bačka and the Banat.
79 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi priloži za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, vol. 3 (Mladost: Rijeka, 
1981–1984), 172; Djilas, The Contested Country, 172.
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representatives to the Chamber of Nations and those of Kosmet ten. 
Vojvodina was endowed with its Supreme Court and Assembly but 
Kosmet was not. These early policies on Kosmet aimed at keeping a 
check upon the unreliable elements among the ethnic Albanians. In the 
1950s, both provinces were little more than administrative divisions of 
Serbia. Their status was further marginalized when the Constitutional 
Law of 1953 relegated the Chamber of Nations to a component part of 
the Federal Chamber, with little legislative competence. With regard to 
Vojvodina, in the period between 1947 and 1963, a few acts apart from 
the provincial statute were passed by its assembly. In most cases, these 
were sub-legal acts of Serbian laws that focused on matters of minor 
significance.80 The status of the provinces in the 1950s may be partially 
interpreted as consequence of the drive towards the integral version 
of Socialist Yugoslavism. It was also a necessity dictated by external 
factors, namely the rift with the Soviets. In Vojvodina, the local Party 
committee had gathered evidence that some ethnic Hungarians were 
influenced by Cominform’s anti-Yugoslav propaganda.81
The status of the autonomous provinces was upgraded with the 
transition from integral to ‘organic’ Socialist Yugoslavism in the 1960s. 
The 1963 Constitution did not introduce any changes in regards with 
Vojvodina’s status.82 Nevertheless, by the second half of the 1960s, 
Kosmet and Vojvodina were urging for a more equal treatment 
within the federation. Some of these desiderata were granted by the 
amendments that were passed between 1967 and 1968. Amendment 7 
formally recognized Vojvodina and Kosmet as constitutional elements 
of the federation. Moreover, Amendment 18 (Paragraph 3) guaranteed 
that the boundaries of the provinces could not change without the assent 
of their assemblies. This guarantee was incorporated into the Serbian 
Constitution in 1968. The same amendment (Paragraph 2) upgraded 
80 Milivoj Kovačević, ‘Normativna Funkcija Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine u Razdoblju 
1945–1968. Godine’, Zbornik za Društvene Nauke, broj 58 (1973): 114–16.
81 Paul Shoup, Communism and the National Yugoslav Question (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968), 137.
82 In the case of Kosmet, the province was now officially designated as autonomna pokrajina 
just as Vojvodina, and granted its Assembly and Supreme Court.
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the statutes of Vojvodina and Kosovo to constitutions. This enabled 
the establishment of constitutional–judicial branches of the Supreme 
Courts of Vojvodina and Kosovo that could perform the same duties 
as the republican constitutional courts.83 Amendment 18 (Paragraph 4) 
also upgraded the legislative power of the provincial assemblies and 
specified that any changes to the provincial legislation should have had 
the assent of both the provincial and the republican supreme courts.
Finally, in late 1967, Vojvodina and Kosovo had gained the right to 
independent representation in the Chamber of Nations, after a change 
permitted each republic to send twelve delegates to this body and each 
autonomous province eight, while leaving the procedural law intact. 
By the late 1960s, the secretary general of the Vojvodinian LC was 
Mirko Čanadanović. Alongside Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović at 
the Serbian LC, Čanadanović and his team were anti-centralist liberals 
and proponents of structural decentralization. The constitutional 
amendments of 1967–71 were largely introduced, with respect to the 
provinces, with the intention to reach a compromise at least with the 
legitimate demands of the Albanians in Kosovo.84 The 1971 amendments 
granted additional legislative and judicial powers to the provinces, which 
now enjoyed almost the same degree of autonomy as the republics. 
The Vojvodinian and Kosovan assemblies were enabled to introduce 
amendments to their constitutions without consultation with SR Serbia.
This is not to say that no restraints were placed on the Vojvodinian 
organs. In 1972, the LCY accused the Vojvodinian LC of promoting its 
younger and better-educated cadres to positions of responsibility up to 
then monopolized by older representatives of the Partisan generation. 
Consequently, in December 1972, certain provincial cadres (including 
Čanadanović) were removed from their posts. These changes were 
largely prompted by the Croatian crisis.85 At that time, the LCY 
83 The official establishment in the autonomous provinces of the constitutional courts did 
not take place before 1972.
84 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 302–4.
85 Savka Dabcević-Kućar, the then dissident leader of the Croatian LC, maintained 
particularly positive relations with Čanadanović and his team.
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adopted the medium of the so-called democratic centralism. This tactic 
consisted in the maintenance of the decentralized system but, at the 
same time, the appointment of trusted individuals to key posts. Apart 
from Vojvodina, an effective check was placed upon vocal liberals in 
the Serbian Committee. The concession of extensive competencies to 
Vojvodina and Kosovo was codified in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. 
Article 244 specified that the common interests within the state would 
be served: through federal agencies, with participation on the basis of 
equality and responsibility of the republics and autonomous provinces in 
these agencies and in the formulation and execution of foreign policy; 
through federal agencies and organizations on the basis of decisions 
or agreement by the republics and autonomous provinces; through 
direct cooperation and agreement among the republics, the autonomous 
provinces, communes and other socio-political communities.
In its Constitution, Vojvodina was designated as ‘part of SR Serbia 
and constitutional element of the Yugoslav socialist federation’. It was 
clarified that ‘SAP Vojvodina participates in decision-making in the 
federation, on the principles of consensus among the republics and 
autonomous provinces … in the organs of the federation on a basis of 
equality’. The Supreme Court of Vojvodina was the highest judicial organ 
in the province. According to Article 292, Vojvodina was empowered to 
make contacts and enter into agreements with ‘organs and organizations’ 
of foreign states.86 The broad autonomy enjoyed by the two provinces 
was rendered a target of criticism by the Serbian LC in the early 1980s, 
especially following the Kosovan riots in 1981. Progressively, a dispute 
arose between Vojvodina and SR Serbia over provincial autonomy, 
especially in the realms of national and civil defence, the economy and 
foreign trade. In the beginning, Vojvodina succeeded in defending its 
political gains. Nevertheless, the aggravation of interethnic tensions in 
Kosovo soon took its toll on Vojvodinian autonomy.
86 SAP Vojvodina, Ustav Socijalističke Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine (Belgrade: 
Savremena Administracija, 1974).
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   66 30-08-2019   16:40:59
Vojvodina through Time 67
Socio-economic aspects
The end of the Second World War found Vojvodina in a state of 
devastation. Around 800,000 hectares of land had been abandoned, 
while 10,138 buildings had been destroyed or severely damaged.87 
Most of the damage was inflicted on Srem, the centre of the Partisan 
movement in the province.88 There was also an extreme shortage in 
petrol and other primary resources.
On the very early days after liberation, the Vojvodinian Party 
Committee, in conjunction with the Central Committee, had started 
planning the reconstruction of Vojvodina. Urgent attention was paid to 
the reconstruction of the system of agricultural production. By June 1945, 
the agricultural campaign had been completed. Approximately 2,200.000 
hectares of land (i.e. 95 per cent of the total arable land in Vojvodina 
by then) had been cultivated. This was the first major step towards 
Vojvodina’s economic integration to the new federation. Even though 
ravaged itself, Vojvodina contributed considerable support to the other 
parts of Yugoslavia after liberation.89 This assistance was soon repaid in a 
different kind. After the war, Vojvodina suffered from a shortage in labour 
force, qualified and unqualified one alike. Apart from the volunteers from 
the other parts of Yugoslavia, some temporary solution to that problem 
was offered, between late 1944 and early 1945, through forced labour 
performed by Völksdeutsche and Hungarian prisoners in labour camps.90
The situation called for more drastic measures. At that time, 
many peasant families associated with the Partisan movement had 
been left landless in Western Yugoslavia (e.g. in Banija, Sinjsko 
87 Jelena Popov, ‘Prilog proučavanja pomoći Vojvodine ratom opustošenim krajevima 
Jugoslavije (novembar 1944–novembar 1945)’, Zbornik za Društvene Nauke, broj 48 
(1967): 55; ‘Jedno svedočanstvo o problemima Vojvođanske poljoprivrede neposredno 
posle oslobođenja 1945’, Zbornik za Društvene Nauke, broj 47 (1967): 176.
88 Arhiv APV Sremski Karlovci f.GNOOV-a – Odeljenje građevinsko-tehniko, Pregled 
ostecenih zgrada u Vojvodini, 4 October 1944.
89 Popov, ‘Prilog proučavanja pomoći Vojvodine …’, 64–6.
90 Aleksandar Kasas, ‘Ekonomske mere vojne uprave za Banat Bačku i Baranju 
(17 oktobar–15 februar 1945)’, Zbornik za Društvene Nauke, broj 47 (1967): 178.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   67 30-08-2019   16:40:59
National Identity in Serbia68
Polje, Montenegro, Lika, Kordun, Bosnia-Herzegovina). The CPY, in 
conjunction with the Vojvodinian Committee, made arrangements for 
their transfer to Vojvodina (spring–summer 1945). The restoration of 
the landless families to the province was aimed at two directions: the 
manning of the deserted German estates with qualified and unqualified 
staff; the reward of the Partisan families from Western Yugoslavia for 
their contribution to the war effort.91 According to the Land Reform 
Act of 23 August 1945, 400,000 hectares were given to the families from 
Western Yugoslavia.
The majority of the post-war colonists in Vojvodina were Serbs 
and Montenegrins. Nevertheless, there also existed some Croatian 
families associated with the Partisan movement (mainly from Lika, 
Kordun and Sinjsko Polje) who moved to Vojvodina. It is estimated that 
60,000 Croats settled in Vojvodina.92 In total, by 1948, 36,430 families 
consisting of 216,306 members had moved to Vojvodina from other 
parts of Yugoslavia. It is estimated that 62.9 per cent of all colonists 
(8.3 per cent of Vojvodina’s population at that time) originated from 
the Bosnian and Croatian hinterlands. Overall, in 1948, 13.2 per 
cent of Vojvodina’s 1,640,757 inhabitants were novodošeljenici (‘new 
newcomers’).93 Their majority settled in Bačka where most deserted 
estates existed.94 Like the post–First World War settlers, those colonists 
were characterized by a deep sense of loyalty towards the state and the 
new Yugoslavism.
During the early post-war period, priority in Vojvodina was given 
to the reorganization of agricultural production and the development 
and expansion of the basic industries. No major industrial plants 
92 Fred Singleton, Yugoslavia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1976), 232.
93 The term novodošeljenici is used in contrast to the došeljenici/newcomers of the 1920s. 
For statistical information see Vojvođanski Arhiv, Fond 184 (Sremski Karlovci, 1953).
94 It is estimated that in 1948, 125,769 colonists had settled in Bačka, 74,465 in the Banat 
and 11,162 in Srem. Ibid.
91 As Moša Pijade put it, ‘The restoration of the families and the orphans of the fighters 
fallen in combat was bestowed as a great national duty on their comrades in the Yugoslav 
army and the various Partisan units, after the completion of the national-liberation 
struggle.’ Moša Pijade, Agrarna reforma (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1948), 17.
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were built. Even by 1966, a rough majority of Vojvodina’s labour force 
was engaged in agriculture, largely owing to the province’s farming 
resources.95 However, as a result of the development of light industry, 
the percentage among Vojvodina’s workforce engaged in agriculture 
declined by 1977.96 The gradual development of agricultural and 
industrial production corresponded to an improvement in Vojvodina’s 
living standards. By 1970, Vojvodina was at third place in Yugoslavia, 
in regard with per capita income, while the illiteracy rate was low.97 
Also, between 1971 and 1977, an increased investment in industry took 
place.98 However, the problem of demographic stagnation persisted.99
Vojvodina’s stance on federal economic policies was characterized 
by a more liberal orientation. The Vojvodinian officials favoured 
decentralization of the economic mechanism, lower federal taxation 
of republican–provincial enterprises and a more positive attitude 
towards laissez-faire economics. At the same time, the Vojvodinian 
officials were cautious so as not to transgress certain prerogatives 
regarding Yugoslavia’s economic administration. Indeed, at the 
escalation of the Croatian crisis in the early 1970s, the Vojvodinian 
representatives rejected the Croatian arguments over that republic’s 
alleged economic exploitation. In the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s, Vojvodina made active use of Article 292 of its Constitution. 
Large quantities of agricultural products were exported to other East 
European states (e.g. Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia). The 
relegation of Vojvodina’s Constitution to a statute, in line with the 
1990 Serbian Constitution, had a definitive impact on its independent 
economic policies.
95 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statistički godišnjak (1947–66) (Belgrade, 1968).
96 Momir Čečez, ‘O efikasnosti društvenih sredstava u privredno nedovoljno razvijenim 
područjima’, Pregled 70, no. 1 (January 1980): 34–5; Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 
Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1981), 438.
97 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1972).
98 Stevan Bek, ‘Vojvodina’s Economy Today’, Review of International Affairs 29, no. 666 
(5 January 1978): 35.
99 Nicholas R. Lang, ‘The Dialectics of Decentralization’, World Politics 27, no. 3 (April 
1975): 332; Slobodan Stanković, ‘Yugoslavia’s Census-Final Results’, Radio Free Europe 
Research Report, 10 March 1982, 2.
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The spectrum of interethnic relations:  
Institutional provisions
According to Article 13 of the 1946 Constitution, ‘national minorities 
in the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia shall enjoy all rights 
and all kinds of protection over their cultural development, and they 
shall be able to use their languages freely’. Even though established on 
grounds of national heterogeneity, the autonomous provinces were not 
regarded as areas where the national minorities could enjoy a homeland 
analogous to that available to the Yugoslav narodi.100 They were thought 
of as areas of ethno-cultural diversity that required special status in the 
light of the problem of adjusting relations among different national 
groups. The Party officials expected that the new arrangement would, 
at a first phase, encourage an atmosphere of interethnic understanding 
and cooperation and then lead to the progressive disintegration of 
particularistic national affiliations in line with Marxist historicism.
During that early period, the Vojvodinian Party Committee 
was dominated by Serbs (Table 2). The disproportionate under-
representation of ethnic Hungarians in the 1950s partially reflected 
a mistrustful attitude on behalf of the CPY apparatchiks towards 
unreliable tendencies within the Hungarian community. In contrast, 
the favourable attitude towards South Slav groups, such as the 
Montenegrins, can be explained on grounds of their high commitment 
to the new Yugoslavism and as a reward for their contribution to the 
resistance movement. The Serbian preponderance in the Vojvodinian 
Committee, in the 1950s, was also subject to an internal specificity. 
The majority of the urban population in Vojvodina was Serbs. The 
majority of Montenegrins and other colonists had also settled in the 
province’s urban centres where new complexes had been built in order 
to house them. Party membership was always higher in the urban parts 
of Vojvodina and Yugoslavia in general. By contrast, the majority of 
100 Officially, the recognized narodi were based in Yugoslavia whereas nacionalne manjine/
national minorities (later narodnosti/nationalities) were overspills from narodi based in 
other, mostly neighbouring, states.
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ethnic Hungarians, at that time, resided in rural areas where Party 
membership was considerably lower.
More favourable conditions to Vojvodina’s minorities were offered 
from the mid-1960s onward, as consequence of the decentralization 
process. A formal indication of this trend was the reformulation of 
national minorities to ‘nationalities’ in the 1963 Constitution. In line 
with the relaxation of tension in the Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the 
LCY, at its 8th Congress (1964), referred to Vojvodina and Kosmet 
as ‘bridges and not barriers with the neighbouring states’, whereas 
Yugoslavia as a whole was defined as a ‘multinational community’.101 
Later, in 1972, Vojvodina over-represented its Hungarian minority vis-
à-vis the Serbian majority in the Yugoslav Presidency.102
The strategy of the Yugoslav government in regard with the 
management of interethnic relations, at that time, can be summarized 
as follows: the new representative structure was expected to isolate the 
radical nationalists in the republics and autonomous provinces by making 
it clear that a genuine attempt was being made to equally represent the 
components of the federal state in its administrative apparatus. The new 
directive referred to the republics and the autonomous provinces and 
101 Dušan Bilandžić, Istorija SFRJ (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1979), 301.
Table 2 Membership of the League of Communists of Vojvodina, 1953–8
Source: Paul Shoup, Communism and the National Yugoslav Question (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968), 72.
Nationality 1953 1958 Percentage of nationality in 
Vojvodina’s population, 1953
Serbs 74.6 73.5 51.1
Croats 5.6 5.9 7.5
Macedonians 1.4 1.2 0.7
Hungarians 7.4 8.4 25.4
Montenegrins 6.1 6.4 1.8
102 In 1972, the one of the two Vojvodinian representatives in the collective presidency was 
Hungarian (21.7 per cent of Vojvodina’s population at that time was Hungarian).
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not to nationality as such. Nevertheless, the federal policies introduced 
in the 1970s had a definitive impact on the representation of the 
nationalities in the provincial and federal bodies of authority and the 
improvement of their collective status in all fields of socio-political 
activity. Yugoslavia was no longer the ‘land of the South Slavs’ exclusively; 
it was transforming into that of fifteen or so nations and nationalities.
The Vojvodinian Constitution of 1974 codified a series of provisions 
to the nationalities (Articles 4 and 194). The same document recognized 
the equal status of five languages and six alphabets: the Serbo-Croatian 
and Croato-Serbian languages and alphabets and the Hungarian, 
Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian languages and alphabets. In line 
with these provisions, provincial laws, resolutions, declarations, the 
social plan, recommendations and other texts were published in all 
recognized languages. Minority-language education was provided from 
the elementary to the high, or technical, school level.103 Each nationality 
had its own publishing house and a state-subsidised newspaper (e.g. 
the Hungarian Magyar Szo, the Slovak Hlas Ludu and the Romanian 
Libertatea). The extent of the concessions made to Vojvodina’s 
minorities can be comprehended by reference to this example: There 
existed minority-language elementary schools for the 30,000 Ruthenes 
resident in Vojvodina but not for the 50,000 Serbs (members of a 
Yugoslav narod) who lived in SR Macedonia.104
The grassroots dimension
The Soviet-Yugoslav rift took its toll on interethnic relations in Vojvodina 
on the early days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
ethnic Hungarians, for instance, were associated by Serbs, on the one 
hand, with the Axis occupation and, on the other, with the pro-Soviet 
103 Hugh Poulton, ‘The Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians and Rysyns/Ukrainians of the 
Vojvodina’, in Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Minority Rights 
Group International, 1993), 27.
104 Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, 357–8.
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regime in Budapest. The collective vindication of an ethnic group was a 
deviation from the proclaimed principles of Socialist Yugoslavism and 
prohibited. However, a state of segregation was tangible.
The arrival of the colonists impacted on interethnic relations. 
The adaptation of the colonists to the new environment was initially 
hindered by tensions between them and the old settlers. These became 
subject to the competition for jobs between the two groups, as well 
as the fact that quite a few colonists proved incompetent to perform 
the work that they had been assigned.105 Consequently, both groups 
remained introvert and little indication of interaction between them was 
observed in the early 1950s.106 This was reminiscent of the old settler-
colonist segregation during the interwar period.107 The integration of 
the colonists to the new environment accelerated since the mid-1950s. 
Through their mutual participation in agricultural cooperatives and 
socio-political groupings, the old settlers and the colonists would get to 
cooperate with each other in a variety of activities and get to know and 
understand each other better.
The industrialization and urbanization process also served as a long-
term leveller of the group divide between old settlers and colonists, 
especially those who were resident in rural communities. The bridging 
of the gap between the two groups became manifest in the conclusion 
of mixed marriages.108 It might well be argued that in the course of the 
interaction between the old settlers and the colonists, it was the ways 
of the former that exerted a powerful influence on the latter and not so 
much the other way around. The extended households broke down and 
transformed into nuclear family units, while some local rituals were 
105 Borislav J. Dimković, ‘Neki aspekti sociološkog proučavanja starosedelaca i kolonista u 
Rumi posle Drugog Svetskog Rata’, Zbornik za Društvene Nauke, broj 48 (1967): 135–9.
106 Sava N. Živkov, ‘Oblici socijalne integracije u dva kolonistička sela u Banatu: Stajićevo 
i Lukićevo’, in various authors, Priloži za poznavanje naselja i naseljavanja Vojvodine 
(Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1974), 128–9.
107 M. Erić, Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji (1918–1941) (Sarajevo: Akademija Nauke i 
Umjetnosti Bosne i Herčegovine, 1958), 411.
108 Vladimir Đurić, Najnovije naseljavanje Bačke kolonistama iz Hrvatske (Novi Sad: 
Matica Srpska, 1960), 17–18, 33–4, 77, 90; Živkov, ‘Oblici socijalne integracije u dva 
kolonistička sela u Banatu’, 152–4.
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adopted by colonists. In a way, ‘the Pannonian plain slowly devoured 
many of the newcomers’.109 This is not to say that the colonists’ emotional 
links to the old territory were in any way severed.110
One notable dimension of the colonists’ group solidarity was their 
almost unconditional support to the CPY. This attitude did not have 
solely ideological undertones. It was also a pragmatic speculation 
since in this way those colonists hoped that their group interests 
would be served more effectively. Indeed, quite a few Party officials, 
as well as individuals employed in the police and other institutions 
in Communist-era Vojvodina, came from a colonist background. 
However, it remains true that the chasm between old settlers and 
colonists was drastically levelled during the Communist era. This was 
particularly true in the urban areas (e.g. Novi Sad) where the frequency 
of intermarriage between the two groups was high.111 Consequently, the 
second generation of colonists started to perceive themselves as ‘locals’. 
Especially when it comes down to self-definition, the question ‘who 
is precisely an old settler/colonist?’ cannot be offered a genuine and 
thoroughly accepted answer in Vojvodina since the mid- to late 1970s.
By the late 1960s, Vojvodina was the Yugoslav region where inter-
group relations were more positive than in any other ethnically 
diverse part of the country (Table 3).112 The positive interethnic 
climate in Vojvodina over that period was highly subject to the 
following intersection: the constitutional concessions to the national 
minorities; the grass-roots interaction between Serbs and ‘others’ in 
the self-management organizations; Vojvodina’s successful economic 
performance. The prevalence of positive inter-group relations in 
Vojvodina became additionally manifest through the high frequency 
of ethnically mixed marriages. The offspring of mixed marriages would 
109 Milivoje Milosavljević, ‘Kolonizacija Banatskog Aranđelova, Malog Sigeta i Podlokanja 
(1921–1941)’, in Priloži za poznavanje naselja i naseljavanja Vojvodine, 105–6.
110 Đurić, Najnovije naseljavanje Bačke kolonistama iz Hrvatske, 15–16.
111 Pokrajinski Zavod za Statistiku, PSDS 1981.godine (Novi Sad: Knjiga III, 1983), 320; 
Dragoljub Bugarski and Saša Kicošev, Stanovništvo Srema (Novi Sad: GIS Institute, 
1999), 46.
112 Singleton, Yugoslavia in the Twentieth Century, 234.
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often declare themselves ‘Yugoslavs’. But even in these cases that they 
would grow up to attain a Serbian national consciousness (e.g. in Novi 
Sad and other urban centres) still the personal consciousness of the 
mixed parentage would function as a catalyst for the development of a 
more tolerant outlook on other groups.
Vojvodina’s prosperity led many Serbs and ‘others’ to believe more 
firmly that their province must have its own say over its administration, 
especially in regard to the management of economic facilities and 
resources. This strengthened popular commitment to Vojvodinian 
regional identity. This was reinforced by the high frequency of 
mixed marriages as well as the long-standing tradition of grassroots 
cohabitation among populations with different origins. To these 
should be added the emphasis given on Vojvodina’s cultural plurality 
and different historic experience, in relation to the rest of Serbia, in 
the provincial schooling curriculum.113 This, however, in no way did 
ever correspond to the encouragement of crypto-secessionist trends. 
In short, Vojvodina was one part of Yugoslavia where the Titoist slogan 
‘bratstvo i jedinstvo’ (‘brotherhood and unity’) found its practical 
implementation to a very large extent.
Table 3 Opinions concerning relations among nations and nationalities in 
Yugoslavia, in per cent
Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Jugoslovensko javno mnenje, A-3 (Belgrade, 1964), 66 
(Sample size: 2,527 respondents).
Opinions Total BiH Mont. Cro. Mac. Slo. Ser. Kos. Voj.
Good 73.0 78.7 72.1 73.8 87.0 56.6 67.3 74.4 75.9
Satisfactory  8.0  8.0  6.0  8.8  1.8 18.7  9.5  3.6  6.9
Poor  5.3  4.1  3.8  6.7  2.6 12.6  3.7  1.8  8.0
Unknown 13.7  9.2 18.1 10.7  8.6 12.3 19.5 20.2  9.2
113 Some information on this issue was disclosed to the author in the course of his field 
research in Vojvodina (Interview with historian at the University of Novi Sad; 13 March 
2001).
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In the beginning, this chapter positions Vojvodina inside the context of 
Slobodan Milošević’s ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ and the new wave of 
Serbian nationalism. Major attention is paid to the recall of provincial 
autonomy for Vojvodina within the frame of the constitutional reforms. 
Then, the focus shifts towards the deterioration of the socio-economic 
situation in Vojvodina with the emphasis on the impact of Serbia’s 
economic crisis and the influx of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. This 
chapter underlines the politicization of Vojvodina’s regional identity, 
since the second half of the 1990s, and its operation as a catalyst which 
provided a common ground for a variety of opposition forces in the 
province.
The termination of Vojvodina’s autonomy
This section centres on the suspension of Vojvodina’s autonomy as 
part of the constitutional reforms implemented within the frame of 
Slobodan Milošević’s ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’. By the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the ideological vacuum caused by the dissolution of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in combination with the 
failure of the self-management system, generated much collective 
insecurity among Vojvodinians. At a first instance, this manifested in 
the support that Vojvodinian voters expressed towards the nationalist 
and re-centralizing agenda endorsed by the new Serbian elites.
3
Vojvodina in the 1990s: From the 
Termination of Autonomy to the Fall  
of Slobodan Milošević
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The rise of Slobodan Milošević and Serbia’s new multiparty 
landscape
Under the leadership of Ivan Stambolić, the Serbian LC had become 
highly vocal over the state of interethnic relations in Kosovo and the 
increasing political sovereignty of its Albanian population. Serbian 
fears intensified after the troubles of 1981 and the ethnic harassment of 
Kosovo’s Serbs and Montenegrins. Moreover, the high birth rate of the 
Kosovan Albanians boosted anxieties over the prospects of the Kosovan 
Serbs’ ‘demographic extinction’. Quite a few Serbian grievances did 
bear legitimacy. The problem of resurgent Albanian nationalism in 
Kosovo was a living reality. So was the plight of the province’s Serbs 
and Montenegrins, many of whom emigrated from Kosovo not solely 
on grounds of the deteriorating economic situation but also under 
harassment.
The crucial problem was that, even well into the mid-1980s, 
there was little indication that the LCY apparatus would make any 
compromise with regard to the reorganization of the self-management 
system, let alone a constitutional revision. This irritated many in 
Serbia, encouraging the cultivation of nationalist tendencies. Even 
Serbia’s dissent was channelled through the structures of the Serbian 
Party bureaucracy. Therefore, there always remained a possibility that 
the Serbian Party elites might take advantage of their self-assigned 
role as ‘defenders of the Serbian national interests’ in order to gain 
popular legitimacy and cement their status in the transitional phase 
to come. Public grievances were soon voiced more concretely on the 
governmental level. Slobodan Milošević, an Ivan Stambolić protégé, 
was the then chairman of the Serbian LC. Until that time, Milošević 
fit into the category of the conformist bureaucrat and was no prone 
at all to nationalistic deviations.1 Nevertheless, he soon discovered the 
benefits of the tactical employment of nationalist rhetoric as a means of 
mass mobilization and legitimization of authority.
1 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, CT 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 160.
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On 22 September 1987, at the 8th Session of the Serbian LC, 
Milošević called a no-confidence vote and deposed his former mentor, 
Stambolić. Popular support to Milošević’s programme largely sprang 
from the dissatisfaction with the 1974 system of provincial autonomies 
(mainly on Kosovo) among many in Serbia. This interceded with the 
discontent of many Serbs over the fact that several politicians and 
senior administrators had been able to enrich themselves and evade 
accountability by means of short-term service. In mass rallies held 
throughout Serbia (događaji naroda/‘happenings of the people’), 
Milošević castigated the Party foteljaši (‘sitters in armchairs’) who 
were so distanced from the problems of the ordinary people and so 
self-centred in their ambition to maximize political profit.2 The rise of 
the Milošević phenomenon heightened the tension between Serbia and 
the other republics. This culminated at the 14th Congress of the LCY 
(January 1990), when the Slovene delegates left the session, followed 
by the Croats. The ensuing development, following the end of the LCY, 
was the official affirmation of political pluralism across the country. 
Nevertheless, having to choose between ethnos and demos as a source 
of legitimization of their authority, the emerging elites throughout 
Yugoslavia opted for the former.3
On 16/17 July 1990, the Serbian LC merged with the Socialist 
Alliance of Working People of Serbia into the Socijalistička Partija 
Srbije (Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS). The congress affirmed Slobodan 
Milošević’s role as the president of the new party. SPS declared that 
Serbia must be a united (jedinstvena) republic within Yugoslavia. It 
was added that ‘the autonomous provinces cannot have the attributes 
of states; only some form of territorial autonomy’ and that ‘those 
2 The peak-point was Milošević’s speech to an estimated crowd of 1 million Serbs 
on 28  June 1989, at Gazimestan, Kosovo (the Vidovdan celebration and the 600th 
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo). This speech was an amalgamation between older 
strands of national myth and legend and socialist-style slogans about socio-economic 
prosperity. Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s (London: Hurst 
and Company, 2000), 50.
3 Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1993), 88–107; R Lampe John, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2000), 357–64.
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competencies typical of a state must be exercised by the republican 
organs throughout the entire territory of Serbia’. SPS stressed that it was 
its obligation to secure the return and safety of the evicted Serbs and 
Montenegrins to Kosovo, whereas Vojvodina’s experience of peaceful 
multiethnic cohabitation was proposed as an example to be used in the 
case of Kosovo.4
Later, in 1992, the party designated Vojvodina as ‘an indivisible part 
of Serbia, with all its historical and other specificities’.5 Regarding the 
province’s national minorities, SPS specified the following rights: the 
right to education and public information in their mother tongues; 
the right to preserve their cultural heritage and develop their cultural 
identity; and the right to equal participation in political life. SPS 
underlined that they would fight against all political forces that opted 
for the division of Vojvodina or its separation of Serbia (without 
naming them). The party stated that it would respect the economic 
particularities of Vojvodina but underlined that ‘these particularities 
must always be viewed in relation to the wider spectrum of the republic’s 
economic policies’.
The formation of parties with little or non-existent affiliation to 
the Communist legacy became manifest in 1990. The most notable 
of them was the Srpski Pokret Obnove (Serbian Renewal Movement, 
SPO), founded in August 1990 by Vuk Drašković, a Banat-born 
dissident writer and journalist. The party’s programme reflected an 
idiosyncratic amalgamation between selected elements from Western 
European Christian Democracy and Serbian neo-traditionalism. It 
combined features of classical liberalism, neo-traditionalism (e.g. SPO’s 
allusions to the monarchy and the Chetnik movement) and moderate 
nationalism.6 Further to the right stood Srpska Radikalna Stranka 
6 SPO condemned the atrocities committed by all sides in the interethnic conflicts and 
demonstrated a flexible attitude over the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, during the first 
half of the 1990s. Program Srpskog Pokreta Obnove (http://www.spo.org.yu).
4 Programske osnove Socijalističke Partije Srbije, Prvi Kongres (16 jula 1990. godine, 
Beograd).
5 Osnove programa Socijalističke Partije Srbije (Drugi kongres, 23/24 oktobra 1992.godine, 
Beograd).
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(Serbian Radical Party, SRS), formed on 23 February 1991, under the 
leadership of Vojislav Šešelj.7 The Radicals promoted an overarching 
notion of Serbian national identity which was to overshadow any 
societal/ideological cleavages and prioritized the unification of all Serb-
inhabited territories in the former Yugoslavia.8
A different initiative, in comparison to SPO and SRS, was undertaken 
by the Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party, DS), formed on 
12 December 1989. The party leadership designated the DS as ‘a civic 
party of liberal orientation’ and, programmatically, espoused new norms 
of political engagement such as individualism and secularism, consensus 
politics, respect to private ownership and social egalitarianism.9 The 
Demokratska Stranka Srbije (Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS) was a 
conservative right-wing party that sprang from the bosom of the DS 
in July 1992. The party leader, Vojislav Koštunica, is a constitutional 
theorist and publisher of certain works with a critical attitude towards 
the structures and operation of the old Yugoslavia. Koštunica and his 
team had departed from DS on grounds of tactical disagreements.10
The first multiparty elections in Serbia, in December 1990, were won 
by the Socialists and Milošević amid charges of media manipulation by 
the opposition. The international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
April 1992 brought about groundbreaking developments. On 27 April 
1992, the allied leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro agreed on the 
formation of a joint state under the designation the ‘Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia’. The hurried way that the first federal elections were 
scheduled caused the main opposition parties to boycott the poll in an 
act of protest. SPS gained an easy victory, followed by the Radicals. The 
dissolution of the old federation was accompanied by the imposition of 
7 The Serbian Radical Party was formed by the merger of the smaller Serbian Chetnik 
Movement and the equally small National Radical Party. Vojislav Šešelj is a Sarajevo-born 
lawyer who, during the 1980s, had been repeatedly sentenced to prison on accusations of 
nationalist activities.
8 Program Srpske Radikalne Stranke (http://www.srs.org.yu).
9 Politički Program Demokratske Stranke (http://www.ds.org.yu).
10 ‘Kad jaganci utihnu’, Vojislav Koštunica interviewed by Bogdan Ivanišević, in NIN, 
3 April 1992.
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sanctions on the ‘third’ Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council (30 May 
1992)11 which took a devastating toll on the economy.
The ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in Vojvodina:  
Actors and developments
Although the situation in Kosovo possessed a focal locus in the 
rhetoric of the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, it was the other 
autonomous province, Vojvodina, which felt the impact of this political 
phenomenon first. Slobodan Milošević had called for a revision of the 
autonomies system, as early as in the mid-1980s.12 Soon words matched 
with deeds. Between July and September 1988, groups of Kosovan 
Serb protesters travelled to Novi Sad in order to voice their plight 
under ethnic harassment to the Vojvodinian public.13 In the course of 
the demonstrations, the Vojvodinian LC were castigated as ‘lopovi i 
izdajnici’ (‘thieves and traitors’) and the imposition of urgent measures 
for the protection of the Serbian population in Kosovo was demanded. 
The protesters were welcomed by the local clergy and the workers in 
certain Novi Sad firms (e.g. Jugoalat).
By that time, the Vojvodinian Central Committee comprised figures 
such as Boško Krunić, former general Petar Matić, Đorđe Stojšić and 
Milovan Šogorov. The Vojvodinian leadership’s initial reaction to the 
impending developments was to condemn the organization of mass 
rallies and the accusations directed against it by the Serbian leadership 
as ‘the escalation of the Serbian nationalist and bureaucratic struggle for 
the unscrupulous violation of the Constitution’.14 Đorđe Stojšić went a 
step further and accused Milošević of preparing the soil for a civil war 
14 Statement by Živan Berisavljević (a member of the Vojvodinian Central Committee) in 
NIN, on 5 July 1988. Boarov, Politička Istorija Vojvodine, 214.
11 Jovan Teokarević, ‘Neither War nor Peace: Serbia and Montenegro in the First Half of 
the 1990s’, in Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, ed. 
D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda (London and New York: Longman, 1996), 185–6.
12 Boarov Dimitrije, Politička Istorija Vojvodine (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 2001), 213–14.
13 The first major ‘narodni događaj’ was organized on 9 July, the second on 25 September.
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in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Vojvodinian LC was powerless and its 
popularity in the province was remarkably low. This had resulted from the 
countrywide disappointment with the deficiency of the administrative 
mechanism, the malfunction of the self-management system and 
the ensuing deterioration of the economy and the living standards. 
Consequently, a declining percentage among the Vojvodinian population, 
especially the youth, wished to join the LCY by the late 1980s.15
On the top level, the Vojvodinian leadership could not seek support 
from the other federal units (let alone Kosovo’s predominantly Albanian 
leadership) in its antagonism with the Serbian Party apparatus, since 
this would not have positive repercussions for the leadership on 
Vojvodina’s Serbian majority. The powerlessness of the provincial LC, 
in combination with Vojvodina’s Serbian national majority, was the 
major factor that made the ‘anti-bureaucratic’ experimentation most 
likely to commence from the Serbian north. The peak point of the 
‘anti-bureaucratic’ happenings was the narodni miting organized in 
Novi Sad on 5 October. The leading part was played by Mihalj Kertes, 
an ethnic Hungarian and secretary of the Party Committee in Bačka 
Topola. Kertes was joined by Radovan Pavkov and Nedeljko Sipovac. 
In the course of the so-called ‘yogurt revolution’,16 an approximately 
100,000 strong crowd marched through the streets of the Vojvodinian 
capital. As a result of the mounting pressure, the Vojvodinian Party 
Committee resigned on the following day. The first battle of Milošević’s 
‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ had been won.
At this point, it might be interesting to make a reference to the 
Yugoslav leadership’s stance vis-à-vis the Vojvodinian crisis. On 
30 July, the Federal Presidium issued a statement according to which 
‘illegal narodni mitinzi such as those organized in Novi Sad should 
be prevented as far as possible’.17 The Presidium, however, equally 
15 Srečko Mihajlović, ‘Od dobrih podanika ka pluralizmu’, in Pregled Rezultat Istraživanja, 
ed. Nadezda Bogdanović (Belgrade: Savez Socijalističke Omladine Srbije, 1990), 21.
16 This ‘narodni događaj’ was nicknamed ‘the yogurt revolution’ because the protesters 
repeatedly pelted with yogurt the headquarters of the Vojvodinian LC.
17 Politika, 31 July 1988.
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criticized the Vojvodinian LC for not having received a delegation 
from the demonstrators and not having engaged in ‘a broad discussion 
with them’. Even further, the Presidium recommended that certain 
‘constitutional reforms’ should be initiated within Serbia. In other 
words, the Presidium’s statement gave Milošević the green light he 
needed in order to carry on with his objectives.
First of all, one might argue that the LCY’s position was conditioned 
by ideological catalysts. At that time, the head of the Federal Central 
Committee was Stipe Šuvar, a Croat and a committed Communist. 
By the late 1980s, Šuvar and other high-rank federal officials had 
started getting increasingly worried with the way that the authority 
of the federal organs and the cohesion of the federation as such had 
deteriorated in the process of Yugoslavia’s ‘confederalization’. In the 
Vojvodinian case, Stipe Šuvar and his associates possibly saw the 
extended jurisdiction enjoyed by Serbia’s autonomous provinces as 
detrimental to the function of the federal mechanism. This assumption 
is reinforced through reference to the criticism levied towards the 
Kosovan leadership in the same statement for ‘not having cooperated 
adequately with the Serbian Central Committee over the Kosovan 
question, as specified by the Federal Central Committee’. Therefore, one 
might contend that a common ground was found by default between the 
worries of federal officials over the lack of cohesion within Yugoslavia 
and Milošević’s direct objectives within Serbia.
According to a complementary assumption, one might argue that the 
LCY’s stance was prompted by tactical considerations. The emergence 
of the Milošević phenomenon and the fashion that the Serb grievances 
were forthrightly voiced might have warned the federal officials of the 
wider dynamics of the Serb resentment within Yugoslavia. Despite 
the fact that Vojvodina was constitutionally granted its independent 
representation at the federal presidency, the federal officials might have 
preferred to treat the issue of the autonomous provinces as an ‘intra-
Serbian’ matter so as to appease the virulent new leadership in Serbia. 
In the case of Vojvodina, the adoption of this approach might have been 
facilitated by the fact that the Vojvodinian Central Committee consisted 
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predominantly of Serbs as well as by the fact that the province’s national 
majority was Serbian. Therefore, the clash between the republican and 
the Vojvodinian elites might appear as an ‘internal’ clash between two 
essentially Serbian bureaucracies. This argument is reinforced by the 
fact that the federal leadership held almost the same stance in regard 
with the developments that took place a little bit later in Serbia’s ‘sister-
republic’, Montenegro.18 Finally, the absence of a ‘single-man factor’ (e.g. 
Tito) who could handle the situation in a more drastic manner might 
have additionally urged the federal leadership towards the adoption of 
a more compromising stance on Vojvodina.
Popular bases of support and the impact of the  
‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in Vojvodina
The ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in Vojvodina found broad support 
among pro-Milošević functionaries such as Mihalj Kertes. These 
individuals, regardless of whether they were old settlers, colonists 
or even belonged to one of the province’s ethnic minorities, saw the 
emergence of the new order in Serbia as a fine opportunity for their 
social and political advancement. The ‘anti-bureaucratic’ movement 
was regarded from a positive angle, as was the case all over Serbia, by a 
younger generation of functionaries who saw themselves marginalized 
within the provincial Party structures by the representatives of the 
Partisan generation.19 Following the resignation of the Vojvodinian 
LC in October 1988, Milošević took advantage of the internal cleavage 
between the younger and the older generations and recruited his loyalists 
within the ‘reformed’ Vojvodinian LC mainly from the former segment.
18 The installation of Momir Bulatović as Party chief in Montenegro, in December 1988, 
was not compatible to the established procedures, according to which such appointments 
were to be made locally and not in Belgrade.
19 By early 1988, younger people made up a mere 14 per cent of the participants in the 
Vojvodinian LC. Dubravka Stankov, ‘Kretanja ka socijalno-klasnoj i nacionalnoj 
strukturi SKJ’, Komunist, 1 January 1990, 14–15.
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When it comes to the popular bases of support of the ‘anti-
bureaucratic’ revolution in Vojvodina, the question becomes more 
complicated. One thing that is for sure is that the province’s minorities 
did not see from a positive angle the curtailment of Vojvodinian 
autonomy since this would imperil the constitutional rights, which 
they had enjoyed so far. As far as the Serbian national majority was 
concerned, it is quite difficult to assess whether their either positive 
or negative disposition towards the ‘yogurt revolution’ was decisively 
conditioned by the old settlers/colonists fragmentation. Sociological 
surveys conducted in Vojvodina over the late 1980s had observed 
the emergence of pro-authoritarian and ‘messianic’ trends among the 
populace. Largely prompted by the malfunction of the administrative 
system, a notable percentage of Vojvodinians longed for the advent 
of an ‘honest and powerful leader’ who could impose the law and 
reform the system’s ills with no hesitations.20 There was also felt a 
necessity for essential changes in the political landscape.21 Under these 
circumstances, there was always a possibility that the emergence of a 
movement such as the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, claiming to heal all 
aforementioned ills, would gain some popular support in Vojvodina, at 
least at an initial stage.
Nevertheless, other surveys conducted in Vojvodina over the 
same period hint towards a high percentage of colonists in the 
1988 narodni mitinzi.22 It is not difficult to assess why the ‘anti 
bureaucratic revolution’ might appeal to quite a few colonists. As 
previously mentioned, the colonists had generally enjoyed political 
and social benefits in Vojvodina, as a result of theirs, or their families’, 
participation in the Partisan movement. Therefore, in the face of the 
20 Molnar Aleksandar, Osnovna Prava Čoveka i Raspad Jugoslavije (Novi Sad: Visio Mundi 
Academic Press, 1994), 101.
21 Interview with sociologist at the University of Novi Sad; 13 March 2001.
22 According to a joint research carried out by the political analysts Sava Kerčov, Jovo 
Radoš and Aleksandar Raić, only two out of the twenty-eight narodni mitinzi in total 
were held in Vojvodinian localities with a majority old settler population. By contrast, 
most of these events were organized in urban or rural communities where a significant 
percentage of colonists resided. Sava Kerčov, Jovo Radoš and Aleksandar Raić, Mitinzi u 
Vojvodini 1988. godine-rađanje političkog pluralizma (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1990).
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deterioration of the administrative structures and the slow dissolution 
of the federation, it is certain that a considerable portion among the 
colonists felt that all their benefits would evaporate in case a radical 
change in the political status quo took place. Consequently, the ‘anti-
bureaucratic’ revolution’s programmatic adherence to the values of the 
Partisan movement would appear to quite a few colonists as an, if only 
formal, guarantee that their erstwhile gains would not be lost in the 
uncertain transitional era.
In regard to the old settlers, there can be made some assumptions 
that this segment might be more sensitive towards the prospect 
of their province being stripped of its competencies. First, the pre-
‘yogurt revolution’ elites in Vojvodina consisted predominantly of 
Serbian old settlers. Moreover, Vojvodina had taken advantage of 
quite a few post-1974 constitutional guarantees, especially economic, 
and the province’s population enjoyed living standards higher than 
the Serbian average. Consequently, any possible harmonization 
of the province’s economic planning with that of the rest of Serbia 
would be potentially detrimental to the living standards enjoyed by 
Vojvodinians so far.
However, there is evidence that the nationalist upheaval of the late 
1980s and the early 1990s also had repercussions among Vojvodina’s 
old settlers. Quite a few old settlers started taking pride again in the 
fact that Vojvodina was the cradle of the modern Serbian national 
movement. This attitude manifested on a popular as well as on an 
elite level (e.g. political circles, academics) during that period. The 
Novi Sad sociologist Lazar Vrkatić offers a specific explanation 
regarding the emergence of that trend among Vojvodina’s old settlers. 
Vrkatić claims that the ideological touchstones of ‘brotherhood 
and unity’ and self-management were replaced in Serbia by an 
adherence to some equally collectivist but peculiarly Serbian ethno-
cultural concepts which find their full manifestation in the spirit of 
the nineteenth-century Načertanje. With regard to Vojvodina’s old 
settlers, Vrkatić contends that ‘they were soon entangled in a renewed 
obsession with traditionalist beliefs (e.g. Eastern Orthodoxy) as well 
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as a feeling of nostalgia for the 19th century romantic ethno-cultural 
ideals’.23
In accordance with this trend, the post-1974 system of autonomies 
was not viewed from a positive angle. It might be argued that, just 
like Ljuba Jovanović did in 1918, quite a few old settlers came to see 
autonomy for a predominantly Serbian-populated region within Serbia 
as unnecessary.24 Consequently, regardless of their stance towards the 
rising Serbian apparatus, these old settlers did not see from a negative 
perspective the termination of Vojvodina’s autonomy. The following 
excerpts from a work published in 1991 by the historian Čedomir 
Popov (an old settler himself) summarize the earlier described trend 
among Vojvodina’s old settlers. According to Popov, ‘there does not exist 
any historical evidence for the affirmation of a distinct “Vojvodinian 
identity” as contrasted to the Serbian one … this was a fairly recent 
endeavor by Kardelj and the Comintern in their attempt to weaken the 
status of Serbs and Serbia within Yugoslavia’.25 The author adds that it 
was in Vojvodina where ‘the Serbian narod acquired for the first time a 
modern national consciousness and flourished culturally through the 
establishment of its schools, cultural institutions and the development 
of its literature and arts … this is where the contribution of Vojvodina 
to the entire Serbian nation lies’.26
The ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ resulted in the swift removal of key 
employees from their posts.27 No structural changes in the system of the 
administrative bureaucracy were introduced. Milošević kept the existing 
system almost intact and appointed a more loyal staff at the various 
posts. As was the case all over Serbia, the changes came from within the 
25 Čedomir and Jelena Popov, Autonomija Vojvodine-Srpsko Pitanje (Novi Sad: Matica 
Srpska, 1991), 66–70.
26 Ibid.
27 Boarov, Politička Istorija Vojvodine, 217–18.
23 Lazar Vrkatić, ‘Srbi u Vojvodini i njihov državno-pravni osnov’, Sociološki Pregled 
XXXIV, no. 3–4 (2000): 129.
24 Ljuba Jovanović, a Vojvodinian National-Radical, had stated in 1918 that ‘the Serbian 
idea in Vojvodina did not imply its independence in relation to its south but it 
meant independence from Budapest and the Magyars only’. Boarov, Politička Istorija 
Vojvodine, 247.
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former Communist bureaucracy and the newly appointed staff normally 
originated from the younger strata within that bureaucracy. Even more 
crucial was the external significance of Milošević’s ‘revolutionary’ 
experimentation in Vojvodina. Following the purge of the Vojvodinian 
elites, the rising apparatus could focus on the next target, namely 
Montenegro. Although a constituent republic and not an autonomous 
province, just as in Vojvodina the national majority was Serbian, in 
Montenegro it was Montenegrin, a narod akin to the Serbs. Therefore, 
the rhetoric of the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in regard to the plight 
of the Kosovan Serbs and Montenegrins could gain a mass appeal, also 
bearing in mind that Montenegro possessed its own, still unreliable, 
Albanian minority. As soon as 7 October 1988, crowds as large as those 
in Novi Sad gathered in Titograd in order to demand the resignation 
of the Montenegrin leadership. By the end of 1988, the Montenegrin 
LC was staffed by figures loyal to the Belgrade apparatus (including the 
future chief engineer of Montenegrin independence, Milo Đukanović).
Vojvodina and Kosovo: A comparison
Having dealt with the Vojvodinian and the Montenegrin cases 
successfully, Milošević could aim at the ‘heart of the matter’, Kosovo. A 
specificity that would not render the mass mobilization tactic fruitful in 
Kosovo was the demographic preponderance of its Albanian population 
(90 per cent by 1991). In this case, the provincial leadership was replaced 
by means of pressures from behind the scene and the reinforcement 
of the policing mechanism. As an initial indication of this strategy, in 
May 1988, the vocal Azem Vllasi was replaced in the leadership of the 
Kosovan LC by the less vocal, though no Milošević protégé, Kaqusha 
Jashari. More crucial developments occurred in November 1988, when 
the entire Kosovan leadership was forced to resign, due to its opposition 
to Belgrade’s proposals for a revision of the status of the autonomous 
provinces, and Rahman Morina was appointed the new chairman. At 
the same time, an additional 400 police was brought in from outside 
the province.
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Soon after the replacement of the Kosovan leadership, a notable 
difference between the Vojvodinian and the Kosovan cases became 
manifest. Whereas in the former case, mass mobilization was employed 
as a means to depose the provincial leadership, in the latter case the 
deposed elites made use of the same tactic in order to reclaim their 
lost status. In late 1988, Kosovan Albanians were mobilized through 
happenings such as the student rallies in Priština and the miners’ 
hunger strike in Trepća. On 27 February 1988, Morina and his team 
were forced to resign as a result of public pressures. Nevertheless, 
following the Federal Presidium’s announcement for the imposition of 
special measures in Kosovo, the policing of the province intensified. On 
2 March, Vllasi was arrested on charges of ‘counterrevolutionary activity’ 
and the provincial assembly accepted the proposed amendments 
(24 March). A Serb, Tomislav Sekulić, became the new Kosovan Party 
chief. Since then, Kosovo was marked by the imposition of a chronic 
state of alert in the province by Belgrade, the gradual reduction of 
Albanian cultural and educational activities, as well as the organization 
of ethnic Albanians within ‘parallel’ structures.
Another crucial qualitative difference between Kosovo and 
Vojvodina was the historic–cultural dynamics of the former. The 
renewed emphasis attached on Kosovo as the symbolic capital of 
Serbdom resulted in the gradual elevation of the province to the status 
of a ‘sacred territory’ and a master symbol of the new wave of Serbian 
nationalism.28 This process was facilitated by the intelligentsia and the 
re-elaboration of highly romantic interpretations of the history of 
the  Serbian narod, in terms of martyr-images often emanating from 
the symbolism of the medieval battle at Kosovo Polje (e.g. the ‘Serbian 
Golgotha’). The latter touched a sensitive chord among Vojvodina’s 
old settlers as well, many of who would collectively view the first Serb 
settlers in Vojvodina as the glorious continuation of the, evicted from 
the ‘sacred territory’, Velika Seoba generation.
28 Kosovo was the cultural heartland of the medieval Serbian Empire and home to cultural 
and religious monuments of primary significance to the Serbs (e.g. the Patriarchy of Peć, 
the monasteries of Dečan and Gracanica).
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The major qualitative difference between the two cases was that in 
Kosovo ethnicity was rendered the main determinant in the contested 
claims between Belgrade and Priština. The Albanian LC elites defended 
Kosovo’s autonomy by reference to the constitutional right granted to the 
Albanian narodnost to self-determine within the province. Following 
the developments in 1989, Albanian demands were forthrightly voiced 
by reference to the ‘historic right’ of the Albanian population to self-
determine within Kosovo where it constituted the local majority. In 
turn, Belgrade responded with accusations of separatism and its formal 
adherence to a civic interpretation of the right to self-determination 
whereby Albanians constituted the local majority in Kosovo but a 
minority within Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the right 
to self-determination was vested to the entirety of the ‘people’ (the 
citizens) of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia and not to national minorities on 
ethno-territorial grounds.29
In Vojvodina, the dispute between Belgrade and Novi Sad could in no 
way be couched in an ethnic phraseology. Contrary to Kosovo where the 
Albanian community was compact and demographically preponderant, 
in Vojvodina not only was the regional majority Serb (Table 4) but the 
43 per cent of the population that was not Serb belonged to a multitude 
of ethnic affiliations, with an uneven territorial distribution, that had 
no common ground with regard to their aspirations. The antagonism 
between Novi Sad and Belgrade was of an essentially ideological 
character, focusing on the structural organization of Yugoslavia. In 
short, it was a case of ‘reformists versus neo-integralists’. Although at 
the various sessions of the LCY, over the 1980s, the viewpoints of the 
Serbian and Vojvodinian apparatuses had clashed, it seems very unlikely 
that a predominantly Serb provincial committee would ever engineer 
the separation of a predominantly Serbian province from the rest of the 
republic. The intercultural substratum that manifested as ‘Vojvodinian 
identity’ over the Communist era served, among others, as a catalyst that 
facilitated the development of positive inter-communal relations on the 
29 The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974, Articles 1–3.
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grassroots level. It never evolved to a trans-ethnic notion of identification 
that could challenge the established Serbian identity and generate fears 
of potential secession, as was the case with Kosovo and its Albanian 
elites’ aspirations that were entrenched in the core notion of their ethnos.
There also exist qualitative differences in the way that Belgrade 
managed ethnopolitics in Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the former case, 
the method employed by the Serbian authorities in order to handle 
the issue of ethnic Albanian nationalism fits within the scope of 
‘hegemonic control’. This can be defined as coercive and/or co-optive 
rule with the aim to prevent an ethnic challenge to the state’s order.30 
The means for preventing such a challenge are the monopolization 
of certain institutions (e.g. the police, the judicial system) and the 
30 J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Cases of Protracted 
Ethnic Conflicts (London: Routledge, 1993), 35–7.
Table 4 The ethnic structure of the autonomous province of Vojvodina 
according to the 1991 national census
Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Popis stanovništva 1991, knjiga 3 
(Belgrade, 1993).
Ethnic groups Figures Percentages
Serbs 1,143.723 56.79
Hungarians 339,491 16.86
Croats 74,808 3.71
Slovaks 63,545 3.16
Romanians 38,809 1.93
Montenegrins 44,838 2.23
Ruthenes 17,889 0.9
Albanians 2,556 0.13
Yugoslavs 174,295 8.65
Roma 24,336 1.21
Muslims 5,851 0.29
Others 83,718 4.14
TOTAL 2,013.889 100.00
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practice of discrimination in employment allocation, public housing 
and education against the ethnic minority by the dominant group.31 In 
Kosovo, Belgrade pursued a policy of positive discrimination towards 
Serbs and Montenegrins in the police, the educational sector and the 
health services. Moreover, a tangible reduction of public information 
in the Albanian language was observed.
In Vojvodina, no such direct action was taken. No minority 
publications were banned or closed down and the RTS Novi Sad 
broadcasts in Vojvodina’s minority languages were not seriously 
obstructed. The ruling apparatus remained cautious so as not to 
create the impression of generalizing when denouncing the ‘separatist 
tendencies’ among Vojvodina’s national minorities. Such accusations 
were normally brought forward in a ‘personalized’ manner, directed 
against specific Hungarian or Croat interest groups. Also, the SPS 
officials stressed the participation of non-Serb nationals in the party’s 
Vojvodinian branches, as a means to fight back on domestic and 
international accusations of nationalism.
There is a variety of explanations that can be offered with respect 
to SPS’s policies on Vojvodina’s national minorities. The one of them 
is that the apparatus’s policies were largely conditioned by the absence 
of an imminent irredentist threat to the state’s order, deriving from any 
of the province’s national minorities. The other is that the generally 
satisfactory interethnic relations prevailing in Vojvodina might serve the 
regime in the propaganda field, domestically as well as internationally. 
On the domestic level this could serve in two ways. First, it could be 
used in order to convince Serbia’s citizens that the regime knew how to 
manage interethnic relations. Even further, this would enable the regime 
to juxtapose those minorities and their political elites that pursued 
their aspirations through participation in the mainstream political 
arena (e.g.  Vojvodina’s Hungarians) to others that abstained or tried 
to sabotage the operation of mainstream political structures (namely, 
31 One typical example of hegemonic control was the British policies in Northern Ireland 
between 1970 and 1972 in favour of the Unionist majority against the Republican 
minority – i.e. ‘majoritarian’ version of hegemonic control.
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the Kosovan Albanians). In regard to the international dimension, 
this would enable the governing apparatus to capitalize on Vojvodina’s 
multiethnic example in order to countervail international criticism on 
the situation in Kosovo and the rise of Serbian nationalism. In addition, 
this would enable the regime to contrast the situation of non-Serb ethnic 
groups in Vojvodina to the maltreatment of the ethnic Serbs resident 
elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia (most notably, Croatia).
Vojvodina in the early 1990s: Other  
sociopolitical aspects
Opinion polls witnessed particularly strong pro-federal tendencies 
among Vojvodinians.32 On the one hand, this may serve as indication 
of worries that the strengthening of Belgrade’s jurisdiction in 
Vojvodina might have a negative impact on the use of economic 
resources and the management of interethnic relations in the 
province. A somewhat complementary explanation might be given 
with regard to Vojvodina’s Serb majority. In other words, many 
Vojvodinian Serbs presumably saw the enforcing power of the federal 
organs as the main guarantee that the collective rights of Serbs 
outside Serbia (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia) would not be 
transgressed by the rising nationalist elites in the other republics. 
This explanation is highly valid in the case of the colonists, many of 
who had a ‘personalized’ interest in the fate of kin and friends in the 
old territory as well as a traumatic and easily manipulated collective 
memory of the Ustaše terror. The equation of powerful federal 
institutions with the protection of the collective rights of those Serbs 
outside Serbia seems to have been the case with the public opinion in 
uža Srbija and Montenegro as well.
32 Stefica Bahtijarević and Goran Milaš, ‘Reakcija javnost na mere i politiku SIV-a’, in 
Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici, ed. Liljana Bačević (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih 
Nauka, 1991), 97–8; Savezno Izvršno Veće, Šta Misli Jugoslavija (Belgrade: Federal 
Executive Committee, 1990), 31.
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Finally, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the reversion of 
Yugoslavia’s citizens towards their ethno-cultural affiliations and 
Vojvodina was no exception to that trend.33 Nevertheless, as becomes 
obvious in certain surveys, the frequently mixed ethnic background of 
quite a few Vojvodinians, as well as their residence in ethnically mixed 
localities functioned as catalysts for the development of a more flexible 
outlook towards ‘others’ and their cultural idiosyncrasies.34 This factor, 
among others, facilitated maintaining positive intercultural relations in 
Vojvodina, always in comparison to what was the case elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia over the 1990s.
Vojvodina inside the new constitutional order  
of Serbia and the ‘third’ Yugoslavia
The new Serbian Constitution was passed by the Serbian Assembly on 
28 September 1990.35 In regard to the autonomous provinces, Article 6 
clarified that ‘the Republic of Serbia includes the Autonomous Province 
of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, 
these being the forms of territorial autonomy’. Article 108 specified that 
‘the autonomous provinces have been formed in accordance with the 
particular national, historical, cultural and other characteristics of their 
areas’. It added that ‘the territory of an autonomous province shall be 
determined by republican law’. This latter clause clearly contravened 
Article 5 of the 1974 Constitution.
The provisions of the 1990 Constitution stripped the autonomous 
provinces of their legislative and judicial competencies. From that point 
33 Molnar 1994, 91.
34 According to an opinion poll carried out by the ‘Belgrade Institute for Political Studies’, 
a mere 5.4 per cent of the Vojvodinian respondents stated that they regarded their 
national group as ‘sacred’. Marija Obradović, ‘Vladajuća stranka: Ideologija i tehnologija 
dominacije’, in Various authors, Srpska strana rata (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999), 494. 
Also, by 1991, 8.4 per cent of Vojvodina’s inhabitants identified themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’, 
still the highest percentage throughout the crumbling federation. Especially in eight of 
Vojvodina’s municipalities, individuals declaring that identity made up 10 per cent or 
more of the local population. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Nacionalni sastav stanovništva 
po opštinama (Belgrade: Federal Agency for Statistics, 1992).
35 ‘Ustav Republike Srbije’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, broj 1/90.
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onward, the main competencies of the provincial assemblies would be to 
appoint executives to the local government and enact sub-legal acts of a 
provincial jurisdiction, always in accordance with republican legislation. 
The relegation of their constitutions to statutes clearly signified that the 
autonomous provinces would no longer be constitutional parts of the 
crumbling federation in any sense. The 1990 Constitution defied the 1974 
arrangements and amounted to a ‘sovereignty declaration’ for Serbia. As 
defined in Article 135, ‘The republican authorities are empowered to 
adopt acts seeking to defend the interests of the republic, should Serbia 
faces threats to its rights and duties from either the Socialist Yugoslav 
federation or other republics.’ The removal of the legislative and judicial 
competencies from the autonomous provinces was the first and major 
step towards this direction. As Miodrag Jovičić put it, ‘Serbia’s new 
constitution is not conceptualized as the constitution of a federal unit, 
but as the constitution of an independent state.’36
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
promulgated shortly after the state’s formation on 27 April 1992.37 The 
new Constitution no longer made any formal reference to the status of 
Serbia’s autonomous provinces within the federation. Article 6 specified 
that ‘a member republic shall be a state in which power is vested to 
its citizens … a member republic shall be sovereign in matters which 
under the present Constitution are not reserved to the jurisdiction of FR 
Yugoslavia’. This clause placed, if only subtly, the administrative statuses 
of Vojvodina and Kosovo firmly inside the new arrangement stipulated 
in the 1990 Serbian Constitution. The Constitution of FR Yugoslavia 
established a loose union between Serbia and Montenegro. Political 
power remained within the component republics and into the hands 
of their presidents. Throughout the 1990s, this arrangement suited the 
objectives of the then allied Serbian-Montenegrin elites but, later, it 
evolved into a boomerang for Belgrade as a result of the centrifugal 
tendencies in Montenegro.
36 Miodrag Jovičić, ‘Konfederacija vodi u haos’, Stav, 2 November 1990, 20–3.
37 ‘Ustav Savezne Republike Jugoslavije’, Službeni List Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, 
27 April 1992.
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Serbia’s ‘lost decade’ and its impact on Vojvodina
The early and mid-1990s were particularly turbulent times for Serbia 
and the ‘third’ Yugoslavia. This section critically outlines the political 
landscape, as well as the socio-economic realities, in Vojvodina during 
that period. Then, it assesses the state of interethnic relations. The 
economic sanctions, in combination with domestic mismanagement, 
resulted in the decline of living standards and the relative deterioration 
of inter-group relations in Vojvodina.
Serbia in turmoil: The SPS–SRS condominium and the 
political ramifications of the UN sanctions
The informal partnership between the Socialists and the Radicals 
marked Serbia’s political landscape throughout the early 1990s. This 
manifested in their joint no-confidence vote against the Yugoslav PM 
Milan Panić and the Yugoslav President Dobrica Ćosić in winter 1992 
and spring 1993. These individuals were deposed on the accusation of 
pursuing policies ‘detrimental to the Serbian national interests’. Both 
parties had adopted the same strategy in regard to the developments 
in the former Yugoslavia. SRS, as well as SPS, favoured the territorial 
division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia along ethnic lines and the 
secession of Republika Srpska and the ‘Serbian Republic of Krajina’ from 
each republic, as internationally recognized by then. The two parties 
derived their support from similar social layers. These were the urban 
working class, the lumpen proletariat, pensioners and the residents in 
certain rural communities.38 The economic programmes of SPS and 
SRS lured these target-groups to the two parties.39 Both adhered to the 
principle of solidarity to pensioners and other ‘endangered’ groups. 
These standpoints exerted much influence on the lower strata that 
38 Vladimir Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998.-Volja građana ili izborna manipulacija 
(Belgrade: CESID, 2001), 95.
39 Ekonomski i socijalni program SRS (1992), (http://www.srs.org.yu).
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saw their status imperilled in the event of application of the liberal 
programme espoused by the opposition.40
During the December 1992 campaign for the Yugoslav and Serbian 
elections, the regime exerted much informal influence through media 
manipulation and voting irregularities.41 Under these circumstances, 
the SPS won 1,478,918 votes and 73 seats at the Federal Assembly’s 
Chamber of Citizens. The Radicals garnered 1,024,980 votes and 
47  seats,  whereas the DEPOS coalition finished third (809,731 
votes/20 seats) and DS fourth (280,183 votes/5 seats). As for the Serbian 
parliamentary elections, SPS garnered 28.8 per cent of the votes and 
40.4 per cent of the seats, SRS won 22.6 per cent of the votes and 29.2 
per cent of the mandates, whereas DEPOS occupied the third place with 
16.9 per cent of the votes and 20 per cent of the seats. Even though Milan 
Panić had managed to secure 1,516.693 votes (32.1 per cent), Slobodan 
Milošević was the winner of the presidential race with 2,515,047 votes 
(53.2 per cent).
Soon changes were triggered by the reinforced sanctions and their 
impact on the economy. Popular discontent with the socio-economic 
crisis was the key factor that made SPS emphasize its Socialist 
side instead of the nationalist one. Slogans of social egalitarianism 
and interethnic tolerance dominated the party’s rhetoric. As for 
the opposition coalition (DEPOS),42 its slogans were once again 
characterized by calls for strengthening the democratic institutions in 
Serbia as well as the necessity to reach an internationally acceptable 
solution over the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. DSS 
was the only party, together with SRS, that maintained a hard line on 
the ‘national question’ as a result of their discontent with the allegedly 
unfavourable terms offered to the Bosnian Serbs by the Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan.
40 Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998, 88.
41 Borislav Džuverović et al., Izborna upotreba medija (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, 
1994), 3. On the electoral irregularities, see the relevant report by the OSCE in Borba, 
18 January 1993.
42 DEPOS consisted of SPO and the smaller parties of the Citizens Alliance of Serbia (GSS) 
and the New Democracy (ND).
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In the 1993 urgent Serbian elections, the Socialists won 36.7 per cent of 
the vote and 123 seats (49.2 per cent). Nevertheless, they were three seats 
short of commanding an absolute parliamentary majority. As for SRS, 
they suffered an utter defeat, garnering only 13.8 per cent of the votes and 
thirty-nine seats in the parliament (15.6 per cent). DEPOS secured 16.6 
per cent of the votes and forty-five seats (18 per cent), DS 11.6 per cent 
of the votes and twenty-nine seats (11.6 per cent) and DSS 5.1 per cent 
of the vote and seven seats at the Serbian parliament (2.8 per cent). SPS 
managed to form a government with the support of the New Democracy’s 
six representatives who decided to depart from DEPOS. The results of the 
1993 elections signalled the gradual ‘de-radicalization’ of the electorate. 
This was prompted by the dominant belief within the society that the 
deteriorating socio-economic situation was primarily a by-product of 
the embargo.43 Therefore, the adoption of a more flexible policy vis-à-vis 
the international community on the Yugoslav crisis came to be seen as the 
most viable option for the improvement of the situation. Serbia’s electorate 
had shifted from ideological voting to ‘issue voting’. The latter term regards 
the prevailing socio-economic situation as the definitive criterion for the 
choice of a party or candidate. In this light, voters opt for the parties that 
come closest to their micro-level interests and personal priorities.
Political participation in times of crisis:  
Elections in Vojvodina
The results of the Yugoslav/Serbian elections held in December 1992 
and the urgent Serbian elections in December 1993 demonstrated the 
marginal preference of the Vojvodinian electorate, first, towards the 
Socialists and, to a secondary extent, the Radicals. These two parties 
were followed by DEPOS, DS, DSS and regionalist and minority parties 
43 According to a public survey, conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Politics and the 
Media and involving 1,000 respondents throughout Serbia, a rough majority of 35.7 per 
cent stated that Serbia’s deteriorating socio-economic situation had resulted from the 
‘unjust UN sanctions regime’. Politika, 7 December 1993.
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(Tables 5, 6 and 7). These results were, on the one hand, subject to 
‘objective’ variables relevant throughout the whole of Serbia. One of 
them was the collective insecurity caused by the collapse of the old 
order within the former Yugoslavia, as well as certain policies by the 
international community towards the ‘third’ Yugoslavia (namely, the UN 
sanctions). Vojvodina’s proximity to the war zone of Eastern Slavonia 
and the arrival of the first Serb refugees from Croatia intensified the 
anxieties of the province’s Serb majority.
This insecurity generated a renewed emphasis on the importance 
of national solidarity as a means to overcome the crisis. This trend was 
communicated on the political level through support to parties with a 
Table 5 The results of the Serbian parliamentary elections in Vojvodina, 
December 1992
Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statistički Godišnjak Savezne Republike Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 
1993).
SPS 284,685 votes  22.86 % 17 mandates 30.35% of the mandates
SRS 281,688 votes  22.62 % 17 mandates 30.35% of the mandates
VMDK 140,825 votes   11.3 %  9 mandates 16.07% of the mandates
DEPOS 191,603 votes 15.38 % 11 mandates 19.64% of the mandates
DS and 
RDSV
 71,865 votes 5.77 %  2 mandates  3.57% of the mandates
Table 6 The results of the Yugoslav parliamentary elections in Vojvodina, 
December 1992
Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Izbori ’92 (Belgrade, 1992).
SPS 305,117 votes 24.45% 8 mandates 33.33% of the mandates
SRS 243,021 votes 19.47% 6 mandates   25% of the mandates
DEPOS 179,302 votes 14.37% 4 mandates 16.66% of the mandates
LSDV 
and NPP
 35,943 votes 3.2%
DS, 
RDSV 
and GSS
159,379 votes 12.8% 3 mandates 12.5% of the mandates
VMDK 106,036 votes 8.4% 3 mandates 12.5% of the mandates
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Table 7 The results of the early Serbian parliamentary elections in Vojvodina, 
December 1993
Source: Republički Zavod za Statistiku, Prevremeni izbori za narodne poslanike u Narodnoj Skupštini 
Republike Srbije (Belgrade, 1994).
SPS 340,227 votes 31.02% 23 mandates 41.07% of the mandates
DEPOS 134,230 votes 12.24%  9 mandates 16.07% of the mandates
SRS 168,937 votes 15.40% 11 mandates 19.64% of the mandates
DS 129,109 votes 11.77%  8 mandates 14.92% of the mandates
DSS  34,891 votes  3.18%
VMDK 112,456 votes 10.25%  5 mandates 8.93% of the mandates
Democratic 
Coalition for 
Vojvodina
 41,097 votes  3.75%
more vocal ‘national’ agenda, namely SPS and SRS. The success of the 
Socialists was facilitated by the favourable disposition of the provincial 
media towards SPS during the pre-electoral period.44 It is needless to 
add that, just as it was the case elsewhere in Serbia, the Socialists had 
inherited almost intact the organizational structure of the Vojvodinian 
LC while the managers of the provincial firms (e.g. Jugoalat and 
the petrochemical industry in Novi Sad and Pančevo) were overtly 
sympathetic to SPS.
As far as the opposition parties are concerned, the objective variable 
that proved detrimental for the Serbian ‘democratic opposition’ in 
Vojvodina was its high degree of fragmentation. In December 1992, 
the opposition parties and coalitions (e.g. DEPOS, the LSDV–National 
Peasants’ Party alliance and the DS–Reformist Party of Vojvodina 
[RDSV] coalition) secured altogether 30.37 per cent of the provincial 
vote. One year later, in December 1993, DS, the DSS, DEPOS and 
Koalicija Vojvodina (the latter comprising LSDV, RDSV and the 
National Peasants’ Party) garnered altogether 30.94 per cent of the vote. 
Nevertheless, it was the lack of a common ground that prevented these 
44 D. Valić and B. Kostić, ‘Samo budala veruje’, Nezavisni, broj 40, 1993.
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parties from forming a compact block against the Socialists in Vojvodina 
and taking advantage of the proportional electoral system. Another 
objective catalyst that affected the electoral landscape in Vojvodina 
was the remarkable degree of the electorate’s abstention from voting. 
Approximately 21 per cent of the province’s voters abstained from 
the republican and the federal elections held in December 1992. This 
percentage jumped to 31 per cent in December 1993. In regard to SRS, 
the Serbian electorate’s swing towards less nationalist options, also took 
its toll on the Radicals’ performance in the 1993 elections in Vojvodina.
Apart from these objective variables, the persistence of regional 
particularities played a pivotal part; most importantly the cleavage over 
the question of Vojvodina’s autonomy. This brought about a clash of 
prerogatives between the autonomaši circles and the representatives 
of the larger, Belgrade-based, opposition parties in Vojvodina. 
Throughout the early and mid-1990s, SPO ruled out any prospects for 
regional cooperation with either LSDV or RDSV on the grounds that 
the need to bring an end to the Socialists’ rule in Serbia, as a whole, 
and resolve the interethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia must take 
precedence over the autonomaši’s allegedly ‘parochial’ insistence on 
Vojvodina’s status.
This is not to say that no common ground was found between the 
regionalist elites and the representatives of the Belgrade-based parties 
in Vojvodina. A suitable example was the conclusion of a regional 
alliance between DS and the Reformists in the December 1992 Serbian 
elections. On that occasion, the DS’s provincial representatives turned 
out to be flexible and underlined the necessity for regionalization in 
Serbia, thus securing the backing of Vojvodina’s second largest pro-
autonomy party. However, the participation of a rival pro-autonomy 
coalition in the same elections, comprising the National Peasants’ 
Party and LSDV, demonstrated that programmatic affinity cannot 
always provide common ground among political actors. By contrast, 
what became transparent was that the micro-level interests of party 
leaderships can often take precedence over any sort of programmatic 
or ideological affinities.
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The formation of a solid opposition block to SPS in Vojvodina 
was equally hampered by the ‘ethnic’ factor; namely the Democratic 
Community of Vojvodina’s Hungarians (Vajdasagi Magyarok 
Demokratikus Kozossege, VMDK) and their aspirations. Even though 
this party had delivered a decent performance in the early and mid-
1990s, its insistence on the concept of ethno-territorial autonomy for 
Vojvodina’s Hungarians stood as a primary obstacle in forging any 
alliance with the opposition parties. DS, DSS and DEPOS rejected 
VMDK’s concept, on the basis that it would generate ethnic segregation 
and interethnic tensions in Vojvodina. The autonomaši criticized the 
party’s ethno-territorial concept on the grounds that it contravened 
their civic orientation towards an ‘autonomous Vojvodina for all’.
Political preferences in Vojvodina: The grassroots and 
socio-psychological dimensions
In both the December 1992 and December 1993 elections, the Socialists 
and the Radicals secured several votes among the urban proletariat 
resident in Vojvodina’s industrial centres such as Novi Sad, Zrenjanin, 
Pančevo and Kikinda (Table 8). Empirical research demonstrates that 
the support of the lower strata towards these two parties interweaved 
with symptoms of ethno-cultural introversion. According to a survey 
conducted in Vojvodina during the early 1990s, by the sociologists 
Vladimir Ilić and Slobodan Cvejić, the ongoing developments across the 
former Yugoslavia somewhat reinforced the ethnic cleavages between 
Serb workers and their colleagues belonging to other nationalities, 
especially Croats and Hungarians.45
45 Vladimir Ilić and Slobodan Cvejić, ‘Vojvođani i nacionalizam’, Sociologija XXXV, broj 4 
(1993): 545.
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Table 8 Electoral results by number of votes at selected municipalities in 
Vojvodina (including break-up by occupational, social and ethnic structure)
Novi Sad
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 76,315 32,543 40,451 38,643
SRS 43,009 32,222 27,524
DEPOS 31,608 30,590 17,898
DSS 5,793
DS 21,210
DS–RDSV 19,454
DS–RDSV–GSS 24,445
NPP 1,253
VMDK 5,676 5,950 4,139
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
71,995
Others 15,594 26,112 26,159 25,721
Social sector Industry 
and mining
Trade Education 
and culture
Private 
entrepreneurs
99,855 
employees
25,880 
employees
12,428 
employees
12,920 
employees
14,367 
employees
Occupational structure
Total population: 265,464 residents
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 36,796 19,737 17,390 22,131
SRS 16,621 18,216  9,199
DEPOS 19,778 17,352 14,763
DSS  3,715
DS 12,098
Pančevo
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Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
DS–RDSV 3,143     6,323
DS–RDSV–GSS
NPP   762
VMDK 1,319       874     726
DEPOS-Milan Panić 30,800
Others 6,336 9,772 11,599 5,000
Occupational structure
Social sector Industry and 
mining
Trade Education 
and 
culture
Private 
entrepreneurs
36,591 
employees
18,568 
employees
2,720 
employees
1,878 
employees
2,655 
employees
Total population: 125,261 residents
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian  
1993
SPS 40,580 20,190 18,211 23,862
SRS 20,706 21,744 12,694
DEPOS 13,596 9,176 8,471
DSS 2,990
DS 12,147
DS–RDSV 5,483 15,923
DS–RDSV–
GSS
NPP 1,033
VMDK 4,783 1,716 3,374
DEPOS-
Milan Panić
31,771
Others 7,552 11,015 10,066 7,143
Zrenjanin
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Occupational structure
Social sector Industry 
and mining
Trade Education 
and culture
Private 
entrepreneurs
38,958 
employees
16,326 
employees
3,984 
employees
2,631 
employees
2,871 
employees
Total population: 136,778 residents
Stara Pazova
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 18,449  7,182 9,228 9,229
SRS 10,326 7,104 6,944
DEPOS  6,020 6,074 5,053
DSS 1,293
DS 3,153
DS–RDSV  1,397
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 33,226 14,293 17,738 16,493
SRS 17,323 12,351 10,559
DEPOS 8,294    8,778    6,226
DSS    1,260
DS    5,262
DS–RDSV 2,276
DS–RDSV–GSS    3,229
NPP 1,176
VMDK 309     348     109
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
14,153
Others 5,168 6,357    7,409    5,453
Sremska Mitrovica
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Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
DS–RDSV–GSS 2,126
NPP  563
VMDK  248  271   81
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
11,151
Others  2,702 4,925 5,798 3,026
Sombor
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 30,107 14,448 17,714 17,618
SRS 14,904 10,826  8,328
DEPOS  7,064  7,741  4,812
DSS  2,407
DS  5,899
DS–RDSV
DS–RDSV–GSS  3,871  5,305
NPP   685
VMDK  5,778  5,796  4,476
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
22,761
Others  4,561  8,643  8,212  5,598
Municipalities Sremska 
Mitrovica
Stara 
Pazova
Sombor
Number of refugees 
out of the total 
population
12,485 out of 
85,238 residents
16,177 out 
of 57,291 
residents
25,311 out 
of 96,105 
residents
Percentage of colonists in the total population (as in the 1981 census):
Sombor: 19.4 per cent Sremska Mitrovica: 27.4 per cent Stara Pazova: 
32.6 per cent
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Temerin
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 7,570 2,883 2,464 3,229
SRS 4,515 4,804 3,483
DEPOS 1,720 1,295 1,065
DSS  322
DS  790
DS–RDSV  445 2,000
DS–RDSV–GSS
NPP   57
VMDK 4,833 3,837 4,451
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
7,666
Others  755  999 1,062  717
Ratio of Serbs/Montenegrins and 
Hungarians in the local population
Serbs and 
Montenegrins
Hungarians
% 52.99 38.68
Total population: 24,939 residents
Subotica
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 17,618  9,928  8,959 12,586
SRS  8,421  8,943  4,938
DEPOS 12,484  8,329  5,696
DSS  1,248
DS  5,482
DS–RDSV 5,435 23,118
DS–RDSV–GSS
NPP  699
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Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
VMDK 29,113 19,089 25,098
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
64,725
Others  4,752 17,256 15,236 14,203
Ratio of Serbs/Montenegrins and 
Hungarians in the local population
Serbs and 
Montenegrins
Hungarians
% 16.00 42.70
Total population: 150,534 residents
Čoka
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 2,988 1,299 1,178 1,963
SRS 1,659 1,761   808
DEPOS   848   572   610
DSS   125
DS   488
DS–RDSV   213 2,531
DS–RDSV–GSS
NPP   107
VMDK 4,332 2,756 3,508
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
6,357
Others  678 1,077   763   887
Ratio of Serbs/Montenegrins and 
Hungarians in the local population
Serbs and 
Montenegrins
Hungarians
% 33.12 56.47
Total population: 15,271 residents
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Ada
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS  1,353  591  545  814
SRS  885  910  502
DEPOS 1,079  746  724
DSS  116
DS  400
DS–RDSV  491 3,691
DS–RDSV–GSS
NPP   72
VMDK 8,792 6,493 7,286
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
11,418
Others   547 1,093  605 1,380
Total population: 21,506 residents
Ratio of Serbs/Montenegrins and 
Hungarians in the local population
Serbs and 
Montenegrins
Hungarians
% 15.45 77.30
Kovin*
Parties Yugoslav  
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 11,004 6,492 6,115 7,200
SRS 4,035 4,371 2,097
DEPOS 5,094 4,887 4,631
DSS  650
DS 2,852
DS–RDSV  749 1,900
DS–RDSV–GSS
NPP  708
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Parties Yugoslav  
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
VMDK  932  646  525
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
9,141
Others 1,529 2,468 2,643 1,760
*Approximately 86 per cent old settler populated.
Total population: 38,263 residents.
Alibunar**
Parties Yugoslav 
Presidential 1992
Serbian 
1992
Yugoslav 
1992
Serbian 
1993
SPS 6,858 3,707 3,301 4,355
SRS 2,922 3,236 1,503
DEPOS 3,083 3,273 4,671
DSS  665
DS 1,357
DS–RDSV
DS–RDSV–GSS  469 1,145
NPP  575
VMDK  172   153   40
DEPOS-Milan 
Panić
7,451
Others 1,204 3,803 3,667 1,305
**Approximately 90 per cent old settler populated.
Total population: 26,535 residents.
Source: http://www.cesid.org.
Qualified labourers appeared keener on a nationalist orientation 
than unqualified ones.46 In regard to qualified labourers of Serb 
nationality, they generally displayed a tendency to interlink national 
solidarity and their dominant status in the province with the desire 
46 Ibid., 542.
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to secure their posts. The latter observation gains higher significance, 
taking into account the unemployment crisis and the harsh economic 
realities for Serbia. Especially as far as the Socialists were concerned, the 
promotion of the party’s standpoints at the workplace, by the managers 
of the companies and the leaders of the trade unions, assisted the SPS 
in securing more votes there.47
Vladimir Ilić’s research demonstrates that the assumption that 
Vojvodina’s colonists might be keener on a nationalist orientation than 
the old settlers is rather unsubstantiated. The former segment did not 
seem to be less inclined towards mixed marriages or the ethnically 
mixed composition of the workplace than the latter.48 Nevertheless, 
quantitative data demonstrates that, especially in the December 1992 
elections, the Radicals had managed to establish a stronghold in Srem’s 
municipalities where a notable presence of colonists is resident (e.g. 
Sremska Mitrovica, Stara Pazova; Table 8), whereas the same party 
performed quite well in colonist settlements in Bačka (e.g. Sombor; 
Ibid.). To this should be added that, during the military mobilization 
throughout the early 1990s, quite a few colonists joined the regular as 
well as irregular Serbian units operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia.49 In regard to SRS, this party’s activity in Republika Srpska and 
the ‘Serbian Republic of Krajina’ might have attracted additional votes 
for the Radicals from the colonist segment in Vojvodina.50
Lazar Vrkatić mentions that ‘a notable percentage of colonists are 
receptive to nationalist ideas as demonstrated by their “disciplined” 
voting for nationalist options’. In the author’s own words, ‘Throughout 
the whole of Serbia one cannot find such a newly-established emphasis 
on pseudo-patriarchal customs as it is the case with Vojvodina’s 
colonists.’51 In all of this, however, it should be taken into account that 
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 538–9, 540.
49 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 
1992), 122.
50 Some information on this issue was disclosed to the author in the course of his field 
research in Vojvodina (Interview with SRS functionary, Novi Sad; 1 April 2002).
51 Vrkatić ‘Srbi u Vojvodini i njihov državno-pravni osnov’, 129.
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there were some predominantly colonist-populated localities where 
the Radicals never managed to elect a single candidate throughout 
the 1990s.52 Such instances suffice in order to show that, in spite of the 
positive disposition among a certain percentage of colonists towards 
the Radicals, the strict categorization of colonists as a group with a 
nationalist orientation would be imprecise.
As far as DEPOS, DS and DSS are concerned, they became quite 
popular among the younger generation of students, the academics and 
the entrepreneurs of various kinds resident in Vojvodina’s urban centres 
(Table 8). These parties and the regionalists augmented their popularity 
in some predominantly old settler municipalities (e.g. Alibunar, Bački 
Petrovac, Vršac, Kovačica, Kula and Novi Bečej; Table 8). Although a 
certain sub-group among the old settlers did not see from a negative 
angle the curtailment of Vojvodina’s autonomy, they still did not harbour 
positive sentiments towards SPS which they viewed as continuers of 
the Communist legacy (e.g. the employment of Partisan symbolism and 
Socialist slogans). Meanwhile, the Radicals’ informal partnership with 
SPS did not render this party a credible option to the eyes of these old 
settlers either.
On the other hand, the successful performance of the DS–RDSV 
coalition at certain old settler municipalities in December 1992 may 
serve as an indication that a strain among the old settlers had started 
becoming more conscious over Vojvodina’s administrative status (e.g. 
Kovin, Alibunar, Vršac; Table 8). The popularity of the same coalition 
in municipalities with an ethnically mixed population is an indication 
that its non-nationalist agenda appealed to the inhabitants of these 
communities, many of whom came from a mixed family background 
(e.g. Subotica, Kovačica and Bački Petrovac; Table 8). The successful 
performance of the DS–RDSV alliance in predominantly Hungarian 
districts may serve as evidence that a certain percentage of ethnic 
Hungarians preferred a pro-autonomy option focusing on a ‘Vojvodina 
for all’ to the ethnically minded agenda of the VMDK (e.g. Subotica, Ada, 
52 Interview with SRS representative; Novi Sad, 1 April 2002.
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Bečej, Čoka, Kanjiza and Senta; Ibid.). It is an interesting coincidence that 
the DS–RDSV alliance was rather powerful, in the same elections, in two 
districts with a dense Slovak population (Bački Petrovac and Kovačica).
Vojvodina’s political landscape during the early and mid-1990s 
was characterized by the paradox of a population largely voting 
for a multitude of opposition groupings and a ruling party (SPS) 
maintaining its position, thanks to the fragmentation in the opposition 
ranks. Therefore, more than two-thirds of the representatives at the 
Vojvodinian assembly were elected from the SPS’s ranks. Meanwhile, 
the representatives of the ‘democratic opposition’ in Vojvodina did 
not add any particularly regional dimension to their agenda. The only 
exceptions were the cases of the Reformists and LSDV and the tactical 
move by DS in the December 1992 federal elections. As far as DEPOS 
and the larger opposition parties are concerned, their Vojvodinian 
representatives did not adopt a distinctly different agenda from that of 
their counterparts elsewhere in Serbia.
Vojvodina’s society and economy in crisis
Vojvodina immediately sensed the impact of the UN embargo. With 
the imposition of the economic blockade, the export of the province’s 
agricultural produce to the neighbouring and other East European states 
reached its nadir. Only some limited trading activity with Hungary was 
maintained, thanks to the absence of a visa barrier between Hungary 
and FR Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, it was basically Hungary that profited 
from all this, since the import–export ratio between Serbia and Hungary 
remained unfavourable to the Vojvodinian/Serbian side.53
The prohibition of cargo transport through FR Yugoslavia had an 
additionally negative impact on Vojvodina. Owing primarily to its 
location, at the meeting point between Southern and Central-east 
53 Even in 2001, Serbian exports to Hungary amounted to $65 million whereas Hungarian 
imports into Serbia to $194 million.
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Europe, the province was one of the main links in the transportation of 
cargo from Northern and Central Europe towards Greece and Turkey. 
The transit of cargo and the passage of tourists from Northern Europe 
through the province was an additional source of exchange currency. 
With the imposition of the sanctions and the outbreak of the conflict in 
adjacent Croatia all this changed. Some Vojvodinians sought a way out 
of the crisis through the formation of informal trading networks with 
foreign partners along the borderline. Such networks were often set up 
according to the black market principle and involved the smuggling 
of petrol and other primary goods (e.g. medical items) into Serbia, 
from Hungary and Romania. Soon, quite a few rural communities 
in the Romanian Banat, in the proximity of Timisoara, became rich 
‘overnight’ through sanctions-busting activities.
Grey economy accounted for the remarkable influx of German 
marks into Vojvodina and the greater Belgrade area. This caused the 
dinar to devalue and inflation to soar in the poorer southern areas such 
as Leškovac and Vranje. This differential inflation further underlined 
Serbia’s north–south divide since the poorer southerners expressed 
their grievances in regard to non-transparent economic activities in the 
Serbian north. Moreover, the accumulation of considerable amounts 
of wealth in the hands of a few sanction-busters (also war-profiteers) 
generated cleavages and boosted corruption within the society. 
Meanwhile, the unemployment crisis worsened and Vojvodina’s 
regional income decreased.54
The gradual shift from industrial to agricultural production had 
some positive repercussions for Vojvodina.55 Its agricultural wealth 
and developed food industry helped the province have a less traumatic 
experience, in comparison to the other parts of the country, during the 
54 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statistički Godišnjak 1996.godine (Belgrade, 1996), 92, 96, 
128 and 156.
55 Michael Palairet, ‘Economic Retardation, Peasant Farming and the Nation State in the 
Balkans: Serbia 1830–1914 and 1990–1998’, in Economic Change and the Building of the 
Nation State in History, ed. A. Teichova and H. Matis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000).
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embargo.56 Nevertheless, this was the one side of the coin. The drive 
towards agriculture was not generally met with success. Vojvodinian 
farmers soon started to retreat from the market and consume their 
produce on a household basis. This was the outcome of two combined 
factors. The first was the fact that much of the cash income from 
output marketed by private farmers was devoted to the payment of 
high agricultural taxes and the purchase of indispensable material 
inputs (e.g. diesel oil, seed and fertilizer). The second, and perhaps the 
major, cause of farmers’ hardships was the unrealistically low prices 
paid by the state for their output. This contributed to the inflation 
crisis, since the bankrupt government, lacking the funds to pay the 
farmers, constantly asked the central bank to print new money in 
order to finance them.57
Agricultural and other production in Vojvodina were equally 
hampered by infrastructural deficiencies. Agriculture was damaged 
by under-investment in water management. The state-owned drainage 
systems in the province remained neglected for a long period of time 
and by 2000 their maintenance spending had fallen to approximately 
5 per cent of the customary standard. This rendered Vojvodina’s crop 
production highly vulnerable in the, not so rare, event of floods.58 
Vojvodina’s metal and petrochemical industries were heavily affected by 
the UN sanctions. The technical equipment in many factories remained 
out of date since the import of new machinery was not possible. 
Petrochemical industry, in particular, was affected by the shortage in 
natural gas supply and other primary resources.59
57 Palairet, ‘Economic Retardation, Peasant Farming and the Nation State in the Balkans’.
58 This reached its peak in spring 2000, when massive floods caused DEM 230 million of 
damage in Vojvodina.
59 Pavle Tomić and Jovan Romelić, ‘Industry in the Yugoslav Part of the Banat’, in Geographic 
Monographs of European Regions: Banat, ed. University of Novi Sad, West University of 
Timisoara and Jozsef Attila University Szeged (Novi Sad: GIS Institute, 1997), 169–81.
56 According to 1994 figures, Vojvodina enjoyed an average per capita income of 2,519 
dinars (Serbian average: 1,621 dinars) and had an average number of 282 employed 
citizens in every 1,000 citizens in total (Serbian average: 229 out of 1,000). Republički 
Zavod za Statistiku, Opštine u Republici Srbiji (Belgrade, 1996).
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The influx of refugees: Legal definition  
and demographic aspects
According to the definition issued by the UNHCR in 1967, a refugee 
is a person who, under serious fear of persecution because of his/her 
race, religion, national/social affiliation, or political convictions, resides 
outside the state of which he/she is a citizen; a person who does not 
hold citizenship of the state where he/she previously resided and which 
he/she fled under fear of persecution and cannot or, because of the 
aforementioned fear, does not want to return to his/her native place 
of origin.60 The legal framework of FR Yugoslavia, however, provided a 
case-specific distinction.
First, there were those refugees in the international legal sense. 
These were persons who had fled the war zones of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina after those two states’ official recognition by the UN 
and did not possess any valid documents regarding their citizenship. 
On the other hand, there were the displaced persons or ‘prognanena/
raseljena lica’ according to the Serbian terminology. These were people 
who had fled to FR Yugoslavia before those two states’ international 
recognition. Those persons held documents that made them eligible for 
Serbian/Yugoslav citizenship, so they could not be regarded as refugees 
in the international legal sense.61 The first wave of refugees consisted 
of ethnic Serbs fleeing Baranja and Eastern Slavonia in early 1991. 
More ethnic Serbs from the other parts of Slavonia, Baranja, Kordun, 
Lika and Croatian urban centres (e.g. Zagreb) arrived in the province 
by the end of the same year.62 The influx of refugees from Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina continued over the next couple of years. In mid-
60 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Census of Refugees and Other War-
Affected Persons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UNHCR High Commissioner 
for Refugees in the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade: UNHCR High Commissioner for 
Displaced Persons in the Republic of Montenegro, 1996), 113.
61 According to the 1996 UNHCR data, 29,908 out of the 259,719 refugees stationed in 
Vojvodina by that time fit into the category of displaced persons.
62 According to the Serbian Bureau for Statistics, approximately 151,512 persons of Serb 
ethnicity fled Croatia towards Serbia throughout 1991.
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1993, 497,000 refugees were based in FR Yugoslavia, most of them in 
Vojvodina (Table 9).63
The turning point was the operations Bljesak (‘Dazzle’) and Oluja 
(‘Storm’) conducted by the Croatian military in Western Slavonia 
(May 1995) and Krajina (August 1995).64 More ethnic Serbs came 
from Bosnian districts around Sarajevo after the signing of the Dayton 
Agreement.65 According to the estimation, by the Humanitarian 
Centre for Integration and Tolerance, a Novi Sad-based NGO, 293,823 
refugees were stationed in Vojvodina by mid-August 2000. This means 
that approximately 50 per cent of the total number of refugees stationed 
in Serbia at that time was accommodated in the province.
Table 9 War-displaced persons accommodated in the territory of FR 
Yugoslavia
Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Census of Refugees and Other War-
affected Persons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees 
in the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade: UNHCR High Commissioner for Displaced Persons in the 
Republic of Montenegro, 1996).
Area Refugees % Evicted 
persons
% Total Total 
population 
(%)
Serbia 537,937 95.0 79,791  100 617,728  6.3
Central 
Serbia
282,022 51.0 48,801  61.2 337,830  5.8
Vojvodina 229,811 40.6 29,908  37.5 259,719 12.9
Kosovo  19,097  3.4  1,082   1.3  20,179  1.0
Montenegro  28,338  5.0      0    0  28,338  4.5
FR 
Yugoslavia
566,275 100.0 79,791 100.0 646,006  6.2
63 International Migration Bulletin, No. 3 (1993): 27–8.
64 It is estimated that over 200,000 ethnic Serbs from those two territories sought refuge 
to Serbia. Branislav Đurđev, Problem izbeglistva u Jugoslaviji (monografska publikacija) 
(Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1997), 307.
65 134,125 Serbian refugees from Croatia (58.36 per cent) and 91,129 more from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (36.69 per cent) were stationed in Vojvodina by mid-1996. 
UNHCR, Census of Refugees and Other War-Affected Persons in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 9.
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66 In Srem the majority of refugees originated, just like the colonists, from the Croatian 
Krajina. Also, in the municipality of Bačka Palanka (western Bačka) most refugees, as 
well as colonists, are Bosnian Serbs.
67 By 2000, 62.6 per cent of the refugees accommodated in Srem originated from Croatia.
The majority of refugees settled in Bačka and Srem. Two basic factors 
affected the refugees’ choice of their places of resettlement. The first was 
the frequency of colonists, among whom they had friends and relatives, 
in the Vojvodinian municipalities (Table 10).66 By contrast, refugees, just 
like the colonists, made up a low percentage of the population in those 
communities that are predominantly inhabited by national minorities 
(Table 11). The second factor was the economic infrastructure of the 
places of resettlement and their proximity to the major urban centres 
(Novi Sad and Belgrade). Consequently, a dense concentration of refugees 
was encountered in the industrially and economically more developed 
areas of Southern Bačka and the Southern and central Banat. The same 
thing may be argued for Srem, an area rich in farming resources and 
with a developed agricultural industry. A third factor, related to refugees 
from Croatia, is the proximity of the refugees’ places of resettlement to 
their former hearths. Therefore, a dense concentration of Croatian Serb 
refugees along the Croatian border was encountered in Srem and Western 
Bačka.67 In the case of those refugees from Eastern Slavonia and Baranja, 
their resettlement along the border might facilitate their contacts with 
the kin and friends left behind and future repatriation plans.
The social integration process
The migration of the displaced Bosnian and Croatian Serbs towards 
Vojvodina fit under the category of forced migration. Forced migrations 
cause a variety of psychological traumas to the migrants, which hinder 
their adaptation to the new environment. In Vojvodina, this was 
particularly the case with the older refugees from the mountainous 
parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The non-regulated refugee 
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status of many refugees emerged as an additional factor that aggravated 
their psychological tension.
As a result of their collective insecurity, the majority of refugees 
developed a powerful attachment to Serbia. On some occasions, 
the psychological frustration involved in the loss of the homeland 
encouraged the adoption of nationalist and militant political options 
by some refugees. For instance, the results of the first round of the 2002 
Serbian elections demonstrated that Vojislav Šešelj had established a 
power base in those municipalities of Srem and Western Bačka where 
a dense concentration of refugees and colonists is encountered.68 
Moreover, a notable participation of young refugees in the Vojvodinian 
SRS youth committee plus certain groupings with a militant nationalist 
orientation (e.g. Obraz) had been witnessed. Nevertheless, it is not an 
easy task to assess precisely the voting patterns of the refugee population, 
since many refugees were yet not entitled to vote. In addition to political 
options, psychological frustration took its toll on other group aspects 
Table 11 Number of refugees in municipalities with a dense or a majority 
Hungarian and other ethnic minority population (1996)
Source: http://www.cesid.org.
Ada 438 out of 21,506 residents
Bačka Topola 3,816 out of 40,473 residents
Bečej 3,541 out of 42,685 residents
Kanjiza 905 out of 30,668 residents
Mali Idoš 194 out of 14,394 residents
Senta 620 out of 28,779 residents
Subotica 4,091 out of 150,534 residents
Temerin 1,732 out of 24,939 residents
Čoka 493 out of 15,271 residents
68 This was the case with the municipalities of Apatin, Odžaci and Bačka Palanka in 
Western Bačka, plus the seven municipalities of Srem. ‘Predsednički Izbori 2002’ (http://
www.cesid.org).
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of the refugees. A survey conducted in Srem demonstrated that the low 
birth rate of the refugee population in that part of Vojvodina, between 
1991 and 1996, was highly subject to psychological factors.69
The second major obstacle in the path of the refugees’ social 
integration was legal complications. The displaced persons of the early 
1990s usually possessed passports of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and were duly granted citizenship of FR Yugoslavia, a state 
regarded as the continuation of the crumbling federation. As for those 
refugees originating from Republika Srpska, their recognized citizenship 
by the Serbian/Yugoslav authorities was that which they were earlier 
granted by the Bosnian Serb authorities. However, the Croatian Serb 
refugees who arrived in the mid-1990s made up another category. The 
official norm for the solution of the refugee issue, adopted by the Serbian/
Yugoslav government by then, became the repatriation of the refugees 
to their native places of origin. The most notable consequence of this 
policy on the Croatian Serb refugees was a prolonged lack of citizenship, 
which corresponded to the restriction, even deprivation, of basic civil 
rights (e.g. the right to vote, the right to social security).70 Meanwhile, the 
Croatian authorities rendered the acquisition of Croatian citizenship, by 
the evicted Serbs, a complicated and long legal procedure. Consequently, 
many Croatian Serb refugees remained stateless for a long period of time.
Furthermore, the social integration of the newcomers was hindered 
by the socio-economic circumstances. During the mid-1990s, 
only small-scale humanitarian support could be provided by the 
Vojvodinian NGOs and the Serbian emigration centre.71 Instances of 
friction between refugees and locals for the allocation of scarce job 
opportunities were soon witnessed.72 Unemployment obstructed the 
utilization of a well-qualified labour potential among refugees for 
70 According to UNHCR data, by December 1999, a mere 40,000 out of the total 340,000 
Serb refugees from Croatia stationed in Serbia possessed Serbian/Yugoslav citizenship.
71 Đurđev, Problem izbeglistva u Jugoslaviji, 312–13.
72 According to UNHCR 1996 data, 74.1 per cent of the refugees stationed in the territory 
of FR Yugoslavia were unemployed.
69 D. Madžić, S. Petaković, D. Malobabić and V. Solarević, ‘Utičaj izbegličke populacije na 
kretanje nataliteta u Sremu’, Zbornik za Društvene Nauke, broj 91 (1997): 201–3.
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the benefit of the Vojvodinian society. These were usually refugees 
originating from the economically developed, with a greater experience 
in laissez-faire economics regions of Baranja and Slavonia.73
Finally, the successful integration of refugees to the regional environment 
was obstructed by cultural factors. The drive towards ethnocentrism, 
as it became manifest in the Serbian and Croatian societies during the 
1990s, took its toll on the social integration of refugees. This ethnocentric 
drive frequently resulted in the identification of the western Serbo-Croat 
variant spoken by the newcomers (ijekavica – also their more frequent 
use of the Latin alphabet) with Croatia and the Croats. Therefore a certain 
social pressure was exerted on many refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina to switch to the eastern variant (ekavica) as much as possible. 
On the other hand, parochial patterns of group identification emerged 
among refugees, largely resulting from their relative social marginalization. 
For example, quite a few refugees from Lika tended to identify themselves 
primarily and almost exclusively as ‘Ličani’ (i.e. natives of Lika), others 
from Herzegovina as ‘Herčegovci’ (Herzegovinians). As a result of these 
combined catalysts, one might argue that, throughout the 1990s, the 
refugees formed a distinct segment within the Vojvodinian society.
The spectrum of interethnic relations:  
Institutional provisions
The rights of the national minorities in the Republic of Serbia and FR 
Yugoslavia were to be regulated by a variety of documents. Certain 
provisions were included in the Yugoslav as well as the Serbian 
Constitution.  Nevertheless, as long as neither FR Yugoslavia nor its 
component republics had a specific law on national minorities, the 
constitutional rights of national minorities were also codified in republican 
legal statutes.
73 Nikolić Vera, ‘Progon i Prihvatanje Srba iz Hrvatske 1991. Godine’, Zbornik za Društvene 
Nauke, broj 88, 1994: 189–204, 193; Milka Bubalo, Najnovije demografske promene u 
Novom Slankamenu (Diplomski rad) (Novi Sad: GIS Institute Library [University of 
Novi Sad], 1994), 11.
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From a theoretical perspective, these provisions were compatible 
with the international standards on minority rights. In this text, 
particular reference is made to the guidelines of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, issued by  the 
Council of Europe.74 Articles 46 and 32 of the Yugoslav and the Serbian 
Constitution respectively, as well as the provisions of the Serbian 
statutes on education the media and radio–television,75 are fully 
consistent with Articles 12, 14 and 9 (Paragraph 3) of the convention. 
Moreover, Article 48 of the Yugoslav Constitution is compatible 
with Article 17 (Paragraph 1) of the convention. This is also the case 
with Articles 15 and 8 of the Yugoslav and the Serbian Constitution 
respectively, as well as with the Law on Official Languages and 
Alphabets,76 which are consistent with the convention’s Article 11 
(Paragraphs 2 and 3). Article 77 of the Yugoslav Constitution went 
a step beyond the convention itself. Article 13 (Paragraph 2) of the 
convention does not oblige the state’s agencies to finance projects 
undertaken by national minorities. To all these might be added that 
Articles 55 and 44 of the Yugoslav and the Serbian Constitution 
respectively (on the prohibition of the dissemination of national, 
racial and religious intolerance and hatred) read compatible with 
Article 6 (Paragraph 2) of the convention, when viewed within the 
context of interethnic relations.
Nevertheless, the actual implementation of these provisions turned 
out to be different. First, most federal provisions for national minorities, 
with the exception of those on the prevention of interethnic hatred and 
75 On the Serbian statutes regulating education see Law on Elementary Schools (‘Zakon o 
osnovnoj školi’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 50/1992); Law on Secondary Schools 
(‘Zakon o srednjoj školi’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 50/1992); Law on High 
Schools (‘Zakon o visokom školstvu’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 50/1992); Law on 
Universities (‘Zakon o univerzitetu’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 54/1992). On the 
Serbian statutes regulating public information in minority languages see: Law on Radio-
Television (‘Zakon o radio-televiziji’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 1991/48); Law on 
Media (‘Zakon o informisanju’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 1991/19).
76 On the Serbian statute regulating the official use of languages and scripts see ‘Zakon o 
službenoj upotrebi jezika i pisama’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 45/91.
74 Council of Europe Publishing House, Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (Strasbourg: COE, 1994).
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the right to public information in minority languages, were not included 
in the Serbian Constitution or any other republican legal document. 
This observation acquires a key significance considering Article 6 of 
the Yugoslav Constitution and its authorization of the Serbian republic 
for the regulation of a variety of issues, pertaining to its jurisdiction, 
by the Serbian Constitution. Therefore, there always remained an 
implication that certain federal provisions on national minorities might 
not be implemented to a proper extent. A good example, regarding the 
discrepancy between the federal and the republican provisions, was the 
field of minority education where a decline in the number of subjects 
taught in the minority languages was observed.77
There exists evidence that the number of judicial procedures in 
minority languages had, too, declined.78 Moreover, the implementation 
of Articles 19 and 20 of the Serbian Law on the Recognized Languages 
and Alphabets might prove rather problematic as well, since the 
signposts as well as the official state’s documents in quite a few parts 
of Vojvodina were available only in Serbian.79 These irregularities 
demonstrate that not particular attention was paid, by the municipal 
and provincial officialdoms, to the proper implementation of the laws in 
question. In certain communities with a notable minority population, 
a small percentage of the employees at the administrative and judicial 
institutions knew the minority language(s) in question.80
Certain deficiencies were also observed in public information. 
The fact that all minority press institutions and electronic media in 
Vojvodina were state funded granted the government the opportunity 
to exert influence on both. This could happen through the appointment 
of the managerial board and the editor-in-chief at the institutions in 
77 Tamas Korhecz, ‘The Rights of National Minorities in Vojvodina: Legal Norms and 
Practice’, (unpublished work) (Novi Sad, 1998), 5.
78 Ibid., 18.
79 Samardžić Miroslav, Položaj manjina u Vojvodini (Belgrade: Centar za Antiratnu Akciju, 
1998), 82.
80 By mid-1990s, for example, not a single judge in the local court of Temerin was 
Hungarian, despite the fact that 38.08 per cent of this municipality’s population was 
ethnic Hungarian.
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question.81 However, the operation of the minority press and media in 
Vojvodina was not seriously obstructed during the 1990s. No minority 
informative institutions were ever banned or closed down. Apart from 
the top-level control of the minority press and media in Vojvodina, the 
state could ensure the loyalty of the lower staff through the practice 
of ‘self-censorship’.82 Employment policy was a field where tensions 
occurred. By 1998, not a single president of a law court throughout 
Vojvodina was Hungarian; with the exception of the public prosecutor 
in the municipality of Senta. Moreover, the employment of individuals 
coming from minority backgrounds at the police and the security forces 
was rather low.83 The new employment policy was not welcomed by the 
minorities in the province.
The case of Vojvodina’s Hungarians, in particular, was highly 
compatible with the triadic nexus theory elaborated by Rogers 
Brubaker. The regime’s nationalizing policies prompted the ethnic 
Hungarian elites to demand more territorial and cultural autonomy. 
As for Hungary’s synchronized reaction, this manifested through 
a variety of statements by the then Conservative government in 
Budapest on the alleged discrimination against the Hungarian 
minorities in Vojvodina and elsewhere in Central Europe. The 
Hungarian Conservatives’ ‘crusade’ for the rights of ethnic Hungarians 
in neighbouring states amplified the tension over the ethnic 
Hungarian minorities in Vojvodina and elsewhere (e.g. Transylvania 
in Romania).
Another state policy that generated tensions in Vojvodina was the 
military mobilization of 1991 and early 1992. Quite a few individuals 
coming from minority backgrounds refused to join the JNA ranks and 
fight for, what they regarded as, ‘solely Serbian interests’ in Croatia 
83 Korhecz, ‘The Rights of National Minorities in Vojvodina’, 22–3; United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia: Special Report on Minorities, E/CN.4/1997/8, 25 October 1996, 17.
81 Poulton Hugh, ‘The Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians and Rysyns/Ukrainians of the 
Vojvodina’, in Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Minority Rights Group 
International, 1993), 27–31, 27–8.
82 Interview with Romanian journalist at RTS Novi Sad; 24 April 2002.
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and Bosnia-Herzegovina.84 This amounted to a brain drain among 
Vojvodina’s minorities. A Federal Amnesty Law benefitting persons who 
escaped military service (June 1996) did not reverse that process, since, 
by then, most draft-dodgers had well settled in their new environment.
Vojvodinian Croats were the minority group who were particularly 
affected by the outburst of interethnic violence in the other parts of the 
former Yugoslavia. The Croat community became the target of acts of 
violence (e.g. arson, physical assaults, attacks on religious monuments) 
perpetrated by incoming Serb refugees from Croatia. Between 1991 
and 1995, the latter would often seek to retaliate for the maltreatment 
that they had previously experienced in Croatia.85 Such incidents were 
witnessed in municipalities with a Croat presence, inside (e.g. Hrtkovci 
in Srem) and outside Vojvodina.86 The attitude of certain political 
actors often fomented the tension.87 Following the consolidation 
of FR Yugoslavia, the ethnic Croats lost their erstwhile status of a 
constituent narod and their collective status was to be ‘readjusted’. 
Croatian language no longer enjoyed an official status in education, 
public information or any other sector. The only exception was the 
broadcast of a Croatian-language programme at Radio Subotica. The 
legal status of the Croatian minority in FR Yugoslavia soon became 
entangled with the Serbian question in Croatia. Especially since 1995, 
the possibilities for the concession of a legal status to the ethnic Croats 
in Serbia remarkably lessened. Even though the ‘Agreement for the 
84 It is estimated that, between 1991 and early 1992, some 30,000 to 40,000 young 
Hungarians had fled Vojvodina in order to avoid conscription. United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia, 17.
85 There exist speculations that during these four years some 45,000 to 50,000 ethnic Croats 
fled FR Yugoslavia towards Croatia, largely intimidated by acts of violence. United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia, 17.
86 Ibid.; Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, In the Name of Humanity 
(Belgrade: HCHRS, 1997), 34–5; Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 
Minorities in Serbia (Belgrade: HCHRS, 1998), 46–7.
87 Vojislav Šešelj overtly called for the expulsion of Croats from Vojvodina, with the 
exception of those Croats who ‘fought with his volunteers and these were not too many’. 
See this statement in Borba, 3 May 1992.
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Normalization of the Relations between FR Yugoslavia and Croatia’, 
signed by the two parties in August 1996, provided for the ‘guarantee 
of the rights of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the Republic of Croatia 
and the Croats in FR Yugoslavia, in accordance with international law’ 
(Item 8), little progress was observed towards either direction.
The spectrum of interethnic relations:  
Realities ‘on the ground’
The results of the survey by Ilić and Cvejić detected a tendency towards 
ethnic introversion on the Serb respondents’ part.88 The relatively increased 
degree of suspicion towards minority groups became subject to external 
catalysts such as the contemporary developments in the other parts of 
the former Yugoslavia (most notably the fall of Krajina) and the gradual 
radicalization of the Albanians in Kosovo. Serbian fears over their republic’s 
integrity, as well as their adherence to national solidarity, were subtly 
communicated in the same survey through the high degree of admiration 
towards figures associated with the Serbian ethnogenesis (e.g. Saint Sava); 
the nineteenth-century national awakening (e.g. Vuk Karadžić); and the 
unification of the Serbian lands (e.g. King Petar I Karađorđević).89
The responses by the Hungarian sample can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the nationalizing process. This seems to have triggered 
a counter-nationalistic attitude directed against the dominant 
nationality, the Serbs. When viewed through the spectrum of 
Brubaker’s triadic nexus concept, the allegedly marginalized 
minority’s reaction to the nationalizing policies is to adopt an equally 
homogenizing attitude within  itself. The Hungarian opinion-formers 
(intellectuals and  politically active individuals) avoided to stress any 
sort of internal cleavages (e.g. political, socio-economic and territorial) 
88 Ilić Vladimir and Cvejić Slobodan, Nacionalizam u Vojvodini (Zrenjanin: Ekspres, 1997), 
181, 184–5, 188, 191–2 and 193.
89 Ibid., 102.
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and sought to present their group as homogeneous, especially as far 
as its grievances were concerned. In a somewhat similar fashion to 
their Serb counterparts, the Hungarian respondents expressed a high 
admiration for political figures who had defended the national rights 
of the Hungarians in the past (e.g. Lajos Kossuth, Sandor Petöfy) and 
the present (e.g. the party leaders Jozsef Kasas and Andras Agoston in 
Vojvodina).
The high degree of ethnic solidarity and relative introversion 
encountered among Slovaks can be interpreted in terms of a small 
group that strives to preserve its cultural identity. Slovak worries over 
cultural survival might have been prompted by the lack of organized 
political structures within the community, as well as the geographic 
distance of their kin-state. The observation that Slovak nationalist 
resurgence in Vojvodina was of an essentially cultural character is 
substantiated by the fact that in Ilić and Cvejić’s survey most Slovak 
respondents expressed particular admiration towards Slovak men of 
art and literature, quite a few of those originated from Vojvodina.90 As 
for the Romanians, a low intensity of group consciousness as well as a 
tendency towards conscious assimilation was observed. This incidence 
might have been prompted by the desire for socio-economic mobility91 
and the long-standing tradition of peaceful cohabitation between Serbs 
and Romanians in Vojvodina.
Neither Romanians nor Slovaks seemed to approve of the way that 
the province’s Hungarian elites voiced their grievances.92 On the one 
hand this was subject to the fear that, always bearing in mind the 
Hungarian minority’s size and political organization, the minority 
discourse in Vojvodina might be dominated by the Hungarian side. 
The second catalyst was possibly the assessment, by the Slovak and 
Romanian respondents, that the vocal fashion in which the Hungarian 
90 Ilić and Cvejić, Nacionalizam u Vojvodini, 100.
91 Some information over this issue was disclosed to the author in the course of his field 
research in Vojvodina (Interview with Romanian journalist at RTS Novi Sad; 24 March 
2002).
92 Ilić and Cvejić, Nacionalizam u Vojvodini, 163.
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elites were expressing their grievances might, in the long term, generate 
interethnic friction in Vojvodina. An external factor that might have 
shaped these two groups’ stance was the simultaneous ethnic Hungarian 
aspirations in Romania and Slovakia.
At the same time, a notable percentage of respondents opted for an 
increase in interethnic tolerance and mutual trust among the different 
communities in Vojvodina. In the smaller survey conducted by Vladimir 
Ilić in the early 1990s, the majority of respondents stated that they did 
not put high importance on the ethnicity of their partner or the ethnic 
composition of their workplace.93 Apart from these, the results of 
another survey conducted in 1990 demonstrated that the majority of the 
Serb and Hungarian respondents generally held a positive view of each 
other.94 One might argue that the observations of the two latter surveys 
can be understood by the fact that they were carried out at a time when 
the interethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia had not dramatically 
escalated. Still, the results of another survey, carried out throughout Serbia 
in 1995, demonstrate that nationalist orientation in Vojvodina remained 
lower than it was the case in the rest of Serbia. In addition, the Vojvodinian 
respondents demonstrated a more cosmopolitan attitude towards other 
nationalities in comparison to the respondents from Serbia proper.95
These ostensibly conflicting observations lead to the following 
conclusion. The adequate comprehension of the spectrum of 
interethnic relations in Vojvodina, throughout that period, consists 
in the detachment of the monist attitudes, which became manifest 
primarily on the political level, from the ethno-cultural heterophony 
93 Ilić Vladimir and Cvejić Slobodan, ‘Vojvođani i nacionalizam’, Sociologija, vol. XXXV, 
1993, 533–47, 538–40.
94 Seventy per cent of the Hungarian and 57 per cent of the Serb respondents stated that 
they held a positive view of each other. Liljana Bačević et al., Jugoslavija na kriznoj 
prekretnici (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, 1991), 180, 236.
95 Nationalist orientation was evident among 21.6 per cent of the Vojvodinian respondents 
(Central Serbian respondents: 41.7 per cent) whereas 36.4 per cent of the same sample 
demonstrated a rather cosmopolitan attitude towards other nationalities (Central 
Serbian sample: 18.0 per cent). Zagorka Golubović et al., Društveni karakter i društvene 
promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1995), 159, 219, 248, 252.
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on the social micro-level. Collective monism manifested through the 
stress on group homogeneity as well as ethnic introversion and mistrust 
towards other groups. In regard to the Serbs, a process of political 
de-radicalization was soon put under way. Nevertheless, the state of 
crisis continued to foment sociopolitical tensions, thus deepening 
mistrust of everyone (e.g. politicians, institutions and ‘others’). So 
the Vojvodinian society became more segmented and Serbs, as well 
as minority groups, became more introverted as a psychological 
mechanism of self-protection.
Besides these monist group attitudes, there co-existed a bicultural, 
or, more precisely, intercultural social practice. Vojvodina’s ethno-
cultural heterophony on the grassroots level was a by-product of the 
province’s long-standing tradition of multiethnic cohabitation. This 
heterophony became institutionalized during the Communist era and 
was reinforced through the contraction of ethnically mixed marriages, 
especially in the 1970s and the ’80s. Despite the inevitable political 
cleavages, this intercultural practice among individuals coming from 
different ethnic backgrounds would not radically alter during the 
1990s. After all, always bearing in mind that between 1980 and 1985 
approximately 27.1 per cent of the marriages in Vojvodina were mixed, 
it is likely that even quite a few of the respondents who demonstrated 
an ethno-culturally introverted attitude had relatives of a different 
ethnic affiliation themselves.
Despite symptoms of ethnic introversion, it would certainly not be 
precise to categorize the Vojvodinian society of the 1990s as a segregated 
one. In regard to the Serb majority, the institutional reaffirmation of 
Vojvodina’s Serbian character did not necessarily imply that minority 
group identities could not co-exist with the dominant one. In other 
words, a more ‘inclusive’ version of Serbian nationalism became the 
case in Vojvodina. The positive grassroots climate among members of 
different ethnic groups primarily became evident in the more diverse 
parts of the province. Although the voting patterns in some of these 
municipalities were conditioned by the ethnic factor, still there would 
not be many cases that a Hungarian, say, could not understand Serbian 
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   131 30-08-2019   16:41:01
National Identity in Serbia132
or, vice versa, a Serb or Montenegrin could not understand, at least 
elementary, Hungarian.96
The Serbian opposition in Vojvodina
The second half of the 1990s was not a calm period for Serbia, either. 
This period was marked by the mounting tension between the Serbian 
and Montenegrin leaderships. On top of this, the friction with the 
West over the situation in Kosovo culminated in Serbia’s bombing by 
NATO between spring and summer 1999. This section highlights the 
gradual emergence of the anti-Milošević opposition in Vojvodina. 
It concentrates on Vojvodina’s regionalist elites, the standpoints of 
the Belgrade-based parties’ representatives in the province, as well 
as the ethnic Hungarian parties. Particular attention is paid to the 
contribution of the Vojvodinian politicians and voters to the fall 
of Slobodan Milošević and the change of the political guard. This 
section demonstrates that Vojvođanski identitet (‘Vojvodinian regional 
identity’) emerged as a powerful mass phenomenon that provided a 
common umbrella and accommodated a multitude of anti-SPS political 
forces in the province.
The Serbian-Montenegrin rift, the escalation of the crisis in 
Kosovo and the fall of Slobodan Milošević
Throughout the second half of 1997, the dissident faction within 
Montenegro’s ruling Party of Democratic Socialism (DPS) started 
to acquire a more articulate shape under the leadership of the prime 
minister, Milo Đukanović. The cleavage between Đukanović and 
the Belgrade loyalist Momir Bulatović culminated in the successful 
no-confidence vote submitted to the Montenegrin Assembly by the 
96 Jovan Komšić, Vojvođanska iskustva i savremene dileme (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 
1998), 42.
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former’s associates and the political opposition with the aim to oust 
Bulatović from the Montenegrin Presidency. In the presidential 
elections held in October 1997, Đukanović emerged as the victor with 
174,745 votes to the 169,257 won by his rival in the second round. A 
more definitive development took place some months later, in March 
1998, when Bulatović transformed his wing of DPS into a new political 
party, the Socialist National Party (SNP). Đukanović’s position was 
enhanced by the decisive victory of his DPS over SNP in the May 1998 
parliamentary and municipal elections (42 to 29 seats and two-thirds 
of the municipalities).
Milo Đukanović was enabled to distance his policies from those of 
Momir Bulatović, at an early point, by a specific constitutional provision. 
Article 94 (Paragraph 1) of the Montenegrin Constitution (1992) 
enabled the Montenegrin PM to ‘carry out domestic as well as foreign 
policy’. This had helped Đukanović cement some preliminary links with 
international organizations and foreign governments. The assumption 
of the Montenegrin presidency by Milo Đukanović radically altered 
the operation of the administrative mechanism on the level of federal 
politics. This resulted from the fact that, in terms of the sovereignty 
granted to the component republics by the Yugoslav Constitution, DPS 
was enabled to pursue very different policies in comparison to SPS in 
regard to a various areas of policymaking (e.g. the implementation of 
OSCE recommendations and the Dayton Agreement).
Meanwhile, throughout 1998, Serbian anxieties had intensified 
following Western criticism of the operations carried out by the Serbian 
security forces against the Kosovo Liberation Army paramilitaries. 
On 7 February 1999, a series of talks, involving NATO officials and 
representatives of the Serbian government and the Kosovan Albanians 
commenced in the Rambouillet chateau, France. The Kosovan Albanian 
delegation accepted the terms dictated by NATO. Their Serbian 
counterparts, on the contrary, declined NATO’s conditions because 
they found them particularly unfavourable for their side. This resulted 
in a controversial NATO air campaign that lasted from 24 March until 
3 June 1999. NATO’s air campaign took a much higher toll on Serbia’s 
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infrastructures than on the Yugoslav military.97 A compromise between 
NATO and Belgrade was reached on 3 June. In the final version of the 
document, signed in Kumanovo (FYR Macedonia) on the same day, 
the withdrawal of the Serbian army, as well as the other security forces, 
from Kosovo and their replacement by a NATO-led peace-keeping 
force was agreed upon. UN Declaration 1224 reaffirmed Kosovo as an 
administrative part of FR Yugoslavia. The formation of a provisional 
government in Kosovo, consisting of representatives of the ethnic 
Albanian parties, was put under way.
The post-bombing reality in Serbia was harsh. Apart from the 
damage inflicted on the state’s infrastructure by the NATO air 
campaign, the indictment of Slobodan Milošević and Serbian President 
Milan Milutinović of war crimes by The Hague Tribunal meant that 
the sanctions would be prolonged as long as these two individuals 
remained in power. Fearful of the negative signs, the regime proceeded 
to constitutional amendments on the federal level. According to the 
amendments made to the Yugoslav Constitution on 6 July 2000, the 
Federal president and the deputies to the Chamber of the Republics 
at the Federal Parliament were to be elected directly by the Serbian 
and Montenegrin electorates. Another amendment made it possible 
for the Yugoslav president to be elected twice to that post. The driving 
force behind the amendments was Milošević’s desire to consolidate 
his position for the years to come, in the event of his victory in the 
September 2000 ballot.
These amendments were detrimental to the equality of the 
component republics. Especially the direct election of the deputies 
to the Federal Chamber of the Republics inflicted the definitive blow 
on Montenegro’s status, since the chamber in question was the main 
institutional guarantee for the equal standing of the two republics. So, it 
97 On this issue, see Amnesty International, ‘Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings?’, 
A1 I INDEX EUR 70/018/2000, 6 June 2000 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
ENGEUR700182000); Human Rights Watch, ‘Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air 
Campaign’, Volume 12, Number 1 (D), New York, February 2000, http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2000/nato/.
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became obvious that an additional objective behind the constitutional 
revision was the ostracism of the dissident Montenegrin leadership 
from influential posts on the federal level. Đukanović’s reaction was 
to declare that his government would not participate in the September 
federal elections but that he would not object to them taking place in 
Montenegro. At that point, FR Yugoslavia became the first state in the 
history of contemporary federalism where the one member of a two-
partite federation did not recognize the validity of the federal elections 
but, at the same time, did not object to these elections taking place in 
its territory.
At the same time, a series of alignments were taking place within the 
bosom of the ‘democratic opposition’. By summer 2000, an opposition 
coalition bearing the name Demokratska Opozicija Srbije, or DOS, 
(Serbian Democratic Opposition) gathered seventeen parties around 
the larger DS and DSS. The coalition nominated Vojislav Koštunica 
as its candidate for the Yugoslav Presidency. The party leaderships 
comprising DOS were encouraged to set aside any programmatic or 
other differences and form a united front, by two factors. The domestic 
factor was Milošević’s steadily declining popularity. The external 
catalyst was that this time the powerful Western governments and 
Russia were firm, each from their own angle that Milošević no longer 
should remain in the leadership of FR Yugoslavia.
Consequently, 69.7 per cent of the Yugoslav electorate (Serbia: 
72.5 per cent) proceeded to the poll. The higher turnout to the election, 
in comparison to most previous polls, served as an early indication that 
the Serbian electorate desired a decisive break from its recent political 
past. The results of the presidential elections confirmed the Socialists’ 
decline of popularity. Vojislav Koštunica garnered 2,470,304 (50.24 
per  cent) to the 1,826,799 (37.15 per cent) votes won by Slobodan 
Milošević. The Radical candidate, Tomislav Nikolić, secured 5.88 per 
cent of the vote whereas SPO’s Vojislav Mihajlović sank to the fourth 
place with a mere 2.95 per cent. In the elections for the Federal Assembly, 
DOS obtained 59 of the 108 mandates in the Chamber of Citizens to the 
44 won by the SPS–United Yugoslav Left (JUL) coalition. As for the 
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Chamber of the Republics, half of the mandates (10) went to DOS and 
7 to the Socialists.
In a last moment attempt to rescue Milošević from defeat, the 
Federal Electoral Committee called for the repetition of the presidential 
poll, through reference to ‘irregularities’ committed while counting the 
votes. Nevertheless, following the subsequent call, on behalf of the DOS 
leadership, for civil disobedience the opposition supporters stormed 
the Republican Assembly, thus forcing the Commission to recall 
its decision. Vojislav Koštunica was elected the new president of FR 
Yugoslavia. The new order consolidated in Serbia with the December 
2000 elections for the Serbian Assembly. The DOS coalition won a 
stunning victory, securing 176 of the 250 seats in the parliament. SPS, 
on the contrary, won a mere 37 seats.
Vojvodina turns against Milošević: Parties and issues
Throughout 1990, political parties with a regionalist orientation were 
formed in Vojvodina. These were the League of Vojvodina’s Social-
Democrats (LSDV), the Reformist-Democratic Party of Vojvodina 
(RDSV) and the National Peasants’ Party. This work pays particular 
attention to the former two.
During the early 1990s, the League as well as the Reformists had 
joined the reformist pro-Yugoslav coalition GSS. In 1991, under 
the leadership of Nenad Čanak, a Novi Sad economist, the League 
presented its concept regarding Vojvodina’s status within the crumbling 
Yugoslavia. In a document entitled ‘Memorandum on Vojvodina’ 
(23  December 1991) the party demanded the reorganization of 
Serbia along the lines of a confederation, within the bounds of the old 
Yugoslavia, where Vojvodina and Kosovo would enjoy an asymmetric 
status in comparison to the other Serbian regions. An alternative option, 
proposed in the same document, was that, as an interim solution, 
Vojvodina might become an ‘independent, sovereign and neutral 
territory … whose final status would be decided-in terms of equality-
inside the spectrum of a commonly agreed territorial rearrangement 
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within the bounds of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.98 This 
approach was gradually modified in the course of the groundbreaking 
developments in the former Yugoslavia.
The League and the Reformists gained some popularity mainly 
within two segments among Vojvodina’s Serbian majority. One of them 
was some old settlers who, although acknowledging and respecting 
the significance of Vojvodina as the heartland of the modern Serbian 
national movement, still lay a stronger emphasis on Vojvodina’s 
regional identity. These old settlers attempted to justify their regionalist 
stance, by reference to the different historical experience of the 
province in comparison to the rest of Serbia, as well as to its multiethnic 
composition. Consequently, these old settlers were and still are the ones 
to prove keener on the employment of the ‘other-regarding’ stereotypes 
on uža Srbija (e.g. the ones according to which Vojvodinians are 
regarded as more ‘cultured’ and ‘sophisticated’ than the inhabitants of 
Serbia proper). The same group has always emphasized the tradition of 
peaceful multiethnic coexistence in Vojvodina as an indication of the 
Vojvodinian Serbs’ developed civic consciousness.
Those old settlers’ support to regionalist alternatives was additionally 
conditioned by the economic factor. In the beginning, these old settlers 
saw the restriction of Vojvodina’s autonomy (1990) as a detrimental 
move for the province’s economic performance. In the long term, 
however, and in the process of de-legitimization of the old regime, 
no nostalgic allusions to the Communist era as such were made. By 
contrast, any demands for economic autonomy were couched in 
arguments over the need for administrative decentralization, in the light 
of a deteriorating economic situation, with a simultaneous overview 
of other autonomy arrangements across Europe. Still, the pattern of 
Vojvodinian autonomy, as promulgated during the Communist era, 
always served, if only subtly, as a compass. In all of this, the old settlers 
in question interweaved their demands for economic autonomy with 
references to Vojvodina’s distinct historical identity. This, in turn, 
98 Socijal-Demokratski Front Vojvodine, Autonomija Vojvodine Danas (Novi Sad, 1993).
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would render these old settlers prone to advocate for the restoration of 
Vojvodina’s autonomy at all levels (political, economic and cultural).99
There exists evidence that these two parties found popularity 
among Vojvodina’s colonists as well. Opinion polls and other empirical 
research conducted in Novi Sad demonstrated that the pro-autonomy 
tendencies encountered in some of the predominantly colonist-
populated parts (those built after the Second World War) sometimes 
could be stronger than those encountered in the old settler-populated 
parts of the city.100 Even further, the pro-autonomy elites themselves 
largely comprised second-generation colonists.101 One explanation 
that can be offered regarding this trend, especially among second-
generation colonists, is the influence that the state’s ideology exerted 
on the colonists’ first generation throughout the Communist era. Some 
of the ideological slogans adopted, especially since the mid-1970s, were 
those stressing Vojvodina’s status as a constitutional element of the 
Yugoslav federation. Although the present-day demands of Vojvodina’s 
autonomists are no longer cast within the self-management matrix, 
still it seems that certain aspects of the Communist era’s ideological 
indoctrination had a subtler and further-reaching impact on quite a 
few second-generation colonists.102
Social psychology can provide an alternative explanation. According 
to Zdzislaw Mach, as a result of a variety of pressures from their social 
background (e.g. the school, the family circle and other spaces of social 
interaction), the second generation of migrants generally demonstrated 
an inclination to outbid themselves in integrating, even assimilating, 
99 For a brief example of this specific trend among Vojvodina’s old settlers see Boarov, 
Politička Istorija Vojvodine, 240–51 (English-language summary). The author, Dimitrije 
Boarov, is an ‘old’ Vojvodinian Serb himself.
100 Interview with historian at the University of Novi Sad; 13 March 2001.
101 The most notable example, perhaps, is the League’s leader, Nenad Čanak, an individual 
coming from a family background that traces its origins in Lika. This fact soon generated 
much criticism, even irony, on behalf of Vojvodina’s pro-centralist old settlers, towards 
Čanak and his party. For instance, Liga Socijal-Demokrata Vojvodine would often be 
addressed, in a joking manner, as Lika Socijal-Demokrata Vojvodine.
102 Interview with historian at the University of Novi Sad; 13 March 2001. Also, interview 
with representative of Vojvodina’s Reformists; Novi Sad, 20 March 2001.
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to the new environment. In the author’s own words, the second 
generations of migrant groups often try to pose as ‘more Catholic than 
the Pope’ in their endeavour to integrate into the social environment.103 
This phenomenon was the polar opposite to the reactivation of the 
sentimental connection with the lands of their ancestors in Croatia 
and Bosnia, among other colonists, during the outburst of interethnic 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
The regionalist opposition in Vojvodina acquired a more coherent 
shape from the mid-1990s onwards. In 7 December 1995, seventeen 
Vojvodinian parties/political groupings as well as civic groups and 
NGOs signed a common declaration under the title ‘Manifesto for the 
Autonomy of Vojvodina’.104 This document was signed by the League 
but, for still unknown reasons, not by the Reformist Party. The text of the 
manifesto expressed the following demands: a constitutional procedure 
for the revision of the Serbian Constitution so that Vojvodina would 
be recognized as ‘an autonomous entity within the jurisdiction of the 
Republic of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia and, at the same time, as a modern 
European region with the competency to forge bilateral relations with 
other regions in the neighbouring states or elsewhere in the Continent’; 
the full endorsement of the individual/collective rights of the national 
minorities resident in Vojvodina; the recognition of Vojvodina as a 
‘community of citizens’ (laička zajednica) endorsed with ‘political 
and legal subjectivity – on the basis of the federal and republican 
constitutional principles – to enjoy its regional autonomy within the 
bounds of the Serbian republican jurisdiction’; the consolidation of 
Vojvodina’s revised status within Serbia and FR Yugoslavia through 
reference to the legal acts of the international community in regard to 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia (e.g. the Dayton Agreement).
The Vojvodinian autonomists decided to form a united front for 
the November 1996 Yugoslav and local elections. A coalition named 
Koalicija Vojvodina (Coalition Vojvodina) was formed, comprising 
103 Mach 1989.
104 Boarov, Politička Istorija Vojvodine, 228–9.
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LSDV, RDSV and the National Peasants’ Party. The coalition adopted a 
balanced platform with the objective to attract voters from all segments 
of the electorate. Programmatic standpoints that castigated Vojvodina’s 
alleged economic exploitation by the central government (most of 
them prepared by Nenad Čanak) coexisted with the declaration that 
‘regardless of Vojvodina’s historic and cultural particularities in relation 
to the rest of Serbia, the question of Vojvodina’s administrative status 
remains, first of all, a Serbian issue’ (the latter prepared by the National 
Peasant leader, Dragan Veselinov). The coalition’s performance, though, 
was not very successful.
The relations between the autonomaši and the governing apparatus 
were anything but positive from the start. The SPS functionaries in 
Vojvodina stood firm in their position that the province’s autonomy was 
fully endorsed and that it was not negatively affected by the constitutional 
reforms of 1990. Moreover, the SPS and JUL representatives saw in 
Vojvodina’s regionalists ‘potentially dangerous separatists’ and ‘pawns 
of anti-Serbian decision-making centres based abroad’.105 Similar and 
more vocal was the denunciation of the autonomaši by SRS. In addition 
to the accusations of separatism and pliability to ‘foreign decision-
making centres’, the Radicals portrayed the regionalist opposition in 
Vojvodina as ‘the inheritors of the Comintern’s interwar strategy with 
the aim to fragment Serbia and undermine the collective status of the 
Serbian narod in its homeland’.106 Especially the League was accused of 
expanding the interwar agenda of the Comintern and CPY on Serbia.107
The relations between the regionalists and the Vojvodinian 
representatives of the Belgrade-based ‘democratic opposition’ were 
more complex. As previously mentioned, a short-lived coalition was 
105 As emphasized in the declaration of the 3rd Congress of the Vojvodinian SPS Committee 
(issued in January 1996) ‘the Socialists will fight against all these local forces that aim to 
fragment or separate Vojvodina from Serbia, namely the League of Vojvodina’s Social-
Democrats, the Democratic Community of Vojvodina’s Hungarians and the Democratic 
Union of Vojvodina’s Croats’. Socijalistička Partija Srbije- Pokrajinski Odbor SPSa u 
Vojvodini, ‘Vojvodina 2000. Korak u novi vek- Izveštaj’, Novi Sad, 1996, 2.
106 Interview with SRS representative; Novi Sad, 1 April 2002.
107 Ibid.
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established between DS and the Reformist Party of Vojvodina in the 
December 1992 Yugoslav and Serbian elections. On that occasion, 
the DS representatives in the province turned out to be flexible and 
agreed on a common platform with their counterparts, in which the 
need for Serbia’s democratization combined with the demand for the 
restitution of certain competencies to Vojvodina. However, relations 
with SPO were not particularly positive. Vuk Drašković’s party formally 
did not oppose a certain degree of autonomous jurisdiction for 
Vojvodina. SPO did not object to the concession of decision-making 
powers to Vojvodina on economic and cultural matters. According 
to its Programmatic Declarations, the party favoured ‘the concession 
of broad economic authority to Vojvodina, as well as the efficient 
protection of the national, religious and cultural rights of the national 
minorities within its territory’. At the same time, though, it was stressed 
that the concession of any sort of jurisdiction to Vojvodina ‘must not 
jeopardize the unity of the Serbian state or, as far as interethnic relations 
are concerned, the rights of the province’s Serb majority’.
In this light, the SPO officials in Vojvodina did not view from a 
positive angle what they regarded as the ‘parochial’ insistence of the 
regionalists on the province’s status. By contrast, SPO always put 
primary importance on the need to bring an end to the Socialists’ rule 
in Serbia as a whole and viewed regionalist initiatives as potentially 
detrimental to the broader political objectives of the ‘democratic 
opposition’. With specific regard to the Vojvodinian political landscape, 
the SPO functionaries often accused the autonomaši of fomenting 
unnecessary ‘crypto-secessionist’ tendencies and, occasionally, 
denounced them as ‘separatists’.108 The stance of the Vojvodinian DSS 
branch vis-à-vis the regionalist elites did not differentiate much from 
that held by SPO.
The state of friction between the representatives of the ‘democratic 
opposition’ and the regionalists, the LSDV in particular, reached 
a critical point in early 1998. By that time, Čanak and his party had 
108 Boarov, Politička Istorija Vojvodine, 231.
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abandoned their concept of Vojvodina enjoying an asymmetric status 
within Serbia and started propagating the territorial reorganization 
of Serbia in terms of a symmetrically arranged federation (Vojvodina 
being one of the constituent parts). What infuriated certain 
representatives of the ‘democratic opposition’ in Vojvodina, however, 
was the League’s proposal in its ‘Declaration for a Republic of 
Vojvodina’ (February 1998) that Kosovo must obtain republican status 
within FR Yugoslavia, as a means to pacify Albanian irredentist trends 
within that province and keep Kosovo within the ‘third’ Yugoslav 
federation.109 In light of the increasing radicalization among Kosovan 
Albanians, the representatives of SPO and other opposition parties 
interpreted Čanak’s proposal as a first step towards the southern 
province’s secession from Serbia.
The powerful emergence of Vojvođanski identitet  
as a mass political phenomenon
Nevertheless, it was precisely during the late 1990s that the gap between 
the regionalists and the provincial representatives of the Belgrade-based 
opposition parties was gradually bridged. This had largely to do with 
the ‘situational’ reinforcement of Vojvodinian regional identity. This 
process took place within the bipolar interaction between Belgrade and 
the province and it reflected a set of grievances, on behalf of the latter, 
towards certain policies pursued by the former. Vojvodina’s sociocultural 
particularities (namely, its richly diverse ethno-cultural composition) 
infused this identity-reinforcement process with a multidimensional 
character, which also comprised a sociocultural aspect besides the political 
and economic ones. In all of this, the role of political and economic 
interest groups within the province remained of vital significance.
109 Also, the symbolic use of the 1980s Albanian slogan ‘Kosovo Republika’ by Nenad 
Čanak, on the occasion of the presentation of the League’s declaration in Sremska 
Mitrovica, generated additional tension. Ibid., 232.
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Consequently, the regionalists, the League in particular, constantly 
employed as a key argument of their rhetoric the alleged ‘plunder’ of 
Vojvodina (in their jargon: pljačka) by the centre. The employment of 
this argument intensified, in the course of the deteriorating economic 
situation in the province. By the late 1990s, the representatives of 
the Belgrade-based opposition parties in Vojvodina also started to 
add a more powerful ‘Vojvodinian’ dimension to their agendas. The 
revitalized interest, on behalf of the rest of the ‘democratic opposition’ 
in Vojvodina, on issues pertaining to the province as such should not 
be interpreted as a political victory of the autonomaši. Nor should it 
be taken as an indication of the latter’s increasing popularity among 
the Vojvodinian electorate, since this was not the case. Although 
the platforms of the various autonomaši circles expressed some 
major grievances of the province’s populace, the adoption of more 
‘Vojvodina-specific’ standpoints by the anti-SPS opposition in the 
province as a whole was the outcome of a more complex bottom-up 
process.
First of all, deficient economic management exerted a definitive 
impact on the political attitudes of Vojvodina’s citizens. Especially 
the use of a considerable percentage of the province’s revenues, by the 
republican government, in order to subsidize other less developed 
Serbian regions was a factor that embittered many Vojvodinians vis-à-vis 
the regime in Belgrade. To this one might add the broader collateral 
damage inflicted on Vojvodina’s economy by certain policies pursued 
by the regime, such as the international sanctions which rendered the 
cross-border transactions between Vojvodina and other regions in the 
neighbouring states extremely problematic; the Yugoslav government’s 
inconsistent policies on the ex-Yugoslav crisis and their consequences 
for Vojvodina (e.g. the influx of refugees from the interethnic wars). In 
the long term, these economic grievances interweaved with others of a 
more sociocultural nature. In other words, a notable percentage among 
Vojvodina’s citizens became increasingly disappointed with the visible 
impact of the past decade’s nationalist resurgence on the Vojvodinian 
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society; namely the relative deterioration of the interethnic relations 
and the emergence of interethnic cleavages.
The combination of these catalysts gradually made a larger number 
of Vojvodinians keener on the idea that their province must enjoy 
greater autonomy in matters of regional administration. In almost 
all cases, the term autonomy implied the regional devolution of the 
economic administration. Apart from that, however, the very same 
term generated a rather abstract variety of opinions in regard to the 
regional devolution of the political administration.
Consequently, a variety of ‘symmetric’ and most commonly 
‘asymmetric’ viewpoints over the reassessment of Vojvodina’s status 
within Serbia and FR Yugoslavia made their appearance on the 
grassroots level. In spite of this diversity of viewpoints, though, what 
remains of primary significance is that the developments throughout 
the 1990s made an increasing percentage of Vojvodinians more 
conscious over their province’s specific needs; a popular trend which 
was soon communicated on the political level.
Nevertheless, it should not be understood that the deterioration 
of the socioeconomic situation during the 1990s caused the re-
emergence of Vojvodinian identity almost by default. Nor should 
it be understood that this bottom-up process was a mere symptom 
of the parochialization of sociopolitical attitudes in Serbia as a 
whole, as a result of the worsening material conditions. Especially 
in regard to the sociocultural aspect, the earlier cited results of the 
public surveys carried out during the 1990s indicate that the trans-
ethnic substratum of the Vojvođanski identitet was always there, 
on the grassroots level. The emergence of interethnic cleavages in 
Vojvodina did not bring about any sort of large-scale segregation 
within the province and the instances of interethnic violence were 
certainly not as pronounced as was the case in the other multiethnic 
regions of the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the deterioration of the 
material conditions over the 1990s was merely the trigger that made 
the residents of Vojvodina (Serbs and national minorities alike) 
regain more emphatically their regional consciousness and opt for 
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certain changes, as perceived from a variety of angles, for the benefit 
of their province.
Vojvodina and Montenegro: A comparison
At this point, it would be interesting to make a qualitative comparison 
between the Vojvodinian case and the case of another ‘situationally-
reinforced’ identity within FR Yugoslavia over the same period; the 
Montenegrin one. A common denominator between the two cases 
was the fact that the reinforcement of both identities was largely 
fuelled by unfavourable economic circumstances. In the Montenegrin 
case, popular grievances towards the regime in Belgrade were caused 
by the impact that the international sanctions had on the economic 
performance of Montenegro (e.g. difficulties in conducting trade with 
foreign states; the atrophying state of Montenegro’s tourist industry). 
Despite their common point of departure, however, the two cases were 
characterized by essential differences.
By contrast to Vojvodina, in Montenegro, the reinforcement of 
Montenegrin identity was largely engineered from the top level 
downwards and from within the governing structures. Furthermore, 
even though Đukanović’s change of course corresponded to the 
economic grievances of quite a few of his compatriots, there still exists 
some evidence that the transformation of his previous stance was 
conditioned by additional factors. Owing to its geographic location, 
Montenegro was rendered a hotspot of grey economic activity 
(mainly smuggling and other sanctions-busting activities) during the 
1990s. In this light, the privatization policy pursued by Đukanović’s 
government since 1997, as well as the strengthening of economic 
cooperation with neighbouring Italy and Croatia, should not be 
merely viewed as an attempt to distance Montenegro’s position from 
the failed Serbian policies for the benefit of the former’s citizens. It was 
also a policy dictated by the demands of certain ‘grey’ entrepreneurs – 
with access to the Đukanović circle – who saw in the aforementioned 
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policies the solution for the gradual legalization of their semi-legal or 
fully illegal activities.110 In Vojvodina, on the contrary, the regional 
autonomy issue and grey economic activity formed two completely 
separate areas.
On the other hand, there exist differences in regard to the popular 
bases of support of the two trends. In Vojvodina, the reinforcement 
of regional identity (also the various anti-autonomy standpoints) cut 
across the ‘old settler/colonist’ distinction and was irrespective of the 
territorial factor. In Montenegro, on the contrary, the stronghold of the 
reformed DPS, as well as that of the strongest proponents of a distinct 
Montenegrin identity, was situated along the coast; the southeast part 
in particular. This is the most developed part of Montenegro, where 
many of the locals were engaged in the tourist industry as well as the 
above-mentioned grey economic activities. It is also home to certain 
ethnic minorities (Albanians, Montenegrin Muslims) who, from their 
own perspectives, did not see Podgorica’s differentiation from Belgrade 
as a negative sign. In stark contrast, the Montenegrin hinterlands were 
soon rendered stronghold of the anti-Đukanović opposition and home 
of the proponents of an essentially Serbian Montenegrin identity. 
On the latter occasion, the semi-clannish social organization largely 
accounted for the preservation of certain collective myths regarding 
the alleged quality of Montenegrins as the ‘purest Serbs’ (e.g. the state 
of autonomy enjoyed by the Montenegrin hinterlands in the centuries 
of the Ottoman conquest).
Moreover, even though the question of Vojvodina’s status stirred 
heated debates, it never amounted to the actual polarization of the 
Vojvodinian society. In Montenegro, on the contrary, the split of the 
old DPS corresponded to a state of polarization within the society. 
The polarization between the pro-Bulatović and the pro-Đukanović 
camps reached such an extent that, just as was the case during the 
110 The indictment of the Montenegrin Foreign Minister Branko Perović and other 
Montenegrin officials with charges of illegal cigarette trading by the Italian authorities 
(December 1999) attests to the validity of this argument. Goati Vladimir, Izbori u SRJ 
od 1990 do 1998 – Volja građana ili izborna manipulacija (CESID: Belgrade, 2001), 142.
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early 1990s in Serbia, political preferences were rendered an indicator 
of either ‘patriotic’ or ‘treacherous’ orientations. Consequently, it 
almost became fashionable for supporters of the reformed DPS to 
be referred to by their rivals as ‘Turks’ or ‘pawns of the new world 
order’ and, on the other hand, supporters of the Socialist National 
Party (SNP) and Bulatović to be addressed as ‘Bolsheviks’ or ‘servants 
of Belgrade’ by the opposing camp. The fear of civic unrest caused by 
this state of polarization obstructed the organization of a referendum 
over the question ‘independence or union with Serbia?’ throughout 
the 1990s.
Finally, the appropriation of a distinct Montenegrin identity in 
the 1990s, on the academic as well as the popular level, largely drew 
its material from similar attempts made during the Communist era. 
It reflected the continuation of discourses that had appeared during 
the 1970s and the ’80s in publications such as Ovđe and Stvaranje. 
The renewed discourses touched upon subjects such as a presumed 
Montenegrin ‘core’ identity, through reference to certain elements 
of Montenegrin folk tradition, certain aspects of social organization 
specific to Montenegro (e.g. the semi-clannish social organization of 
the Montenegrin hinterlands), linguistic factors (the use of the western 
ijekavica variant in contrast to the ekavica spoken in Serbia) and the 
collective memory of old state’s formations in the region (the old 
Kingdom of Zeta; the anti-unionist zelenaši dynastic notables and their 
followers111).
In Vojvodina, things were distinctly different. As already clarified, 
no attempts, even subtle, were made during the Communist era with 
the objective to promote a distinct ‘core’ Vojvodinian identity in 
relation to the Serbian one. By contrast, the image of Vojvodina as a 
successfully integrated multiethnic community was promoted, though 
always within the ideological spectrum of self-management. In a rather 
111 The zelenaši (‘Greens’) were supporters of the Montenegrin King Nikola Petrović who, 
between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, opposed Montenegro’s 
unification with Serbia.
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similar light, the revitalization of Vojvodinian identity in the second 
half of the 1990s never corresponded to any attempts to appropriate a 
Vojvodinian identity separate from the Serbian one, or the other group 
identities of the province. By contrast, Vojvođanski identitet and all the 
components associated with it (e.g. the space of Vojvodina through time; 
some common behavioural patterns adopted by all groups resident 
in the province) were granted the meaning of a sociocultural mosaic 
where the Serbs and the other groups could coexist without, at the same 
time, being deprived of their particularities. On the political level, the 
very same concept functioned as the common ground that enabled all 
residents of Vojvodina to share their aspirations and air some common 
grievances towards the central government. The only area where the 
respective Vojvodinian and Montenegrin issues interweaved with each 
other was the question of structural reorganization in FR Yugoslavia, 
triggered by the gradual distancing of Podgorica from Belgrade.
The standardization of the anti-SPS  
opposition in Vojvodina
Coming back to Vojvodina, the first attempt to conceptualize 
the common stance of the Serbian ‘democratic opposition’ on 
the reassessment of the province’s status within Serbia was made at the 
meeting of the opposition representatives in Vienna, Austria (23–25 
September 1999). In the communiqué of this meeting, attended by 
political representatives of all opposition parties, it was commonly 
agreed that ‘the autonomy of Vojvodina within the Republic of Serbia 
corresponds to the interests of democratization and decentralization 
of Serbia as well as the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. It also represents the most suitable framework for the 
resolution of all issues pertaining to the national communities … these 
issues are more efficiently resolved on the local level’; ‘decentralization 
and greater autonomy for the municipalities, including the management 
of respective shares of revenues, is an important element of the 
modern democratic government; regionalization and formation of 
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administrative districts requires taking into account interests of citizens 
and interests of ethnic communities’.112
Nevertheless, certain disagreements on the top level persisted between 
the regionalists and the representatives of other opposition parties. For 
instance, the SPO officials contended that the League’s proposal for the 
restructuring of Serbia in terms of a symmetric federation might appeal to 
certain sections of the Vojvodinian electorate but not to the voters resident 
in the other parts of Serbia. Consequently, they objected to the inclusion 
of those or similar proposals in the opposition’s central platform and, once 
again, underlined that the Serbian opposition should set as its top objective 
the effective elimination of SPS from the country’s political map. In the longer 
term, a consensus was reached and the Platform of the Serbian Democratic 
Opposition (3 March 2000) included a clause according to which ‘a new 
Serbian Constitution should be inaugurated where the elaboration of 
forms of administrative autonomy for Kosmet and Vojvodina, on the 
grounds of the two provinces’ historic and cultural particularities, would 
be ensured’.113 The very same clause was later included in the main platform 
adopted by DOS in summer 2000. The epitome of these programmatic 
declarations was a document signed by the representatives of the victorious 
DOS coalition at the Vojvodinian Assembly in October 2000, where the 
respect to Vojvodinian autonomy was endorsed by the new government; 
the inauguration of a new constitutional act, endowing Vojvodina with 
special legislative, judicial and executive functions, was envisaged.114
The ethnic Hungarian parties in Vojvodina
Two of the parties that signed all aforementioned documents and later 
participated in DOS were the Democratic Community of Hungarians 
112 Project on Ethnic Relations, Vojvodina: The Politics of Interethnic Accommodation 
(Vienna, 23–25 September 1999; Athens, 13–15 February 2000), 37–8. These 
standpoints were repeated and expanded at the meeting held on 13–15 February 2000 
in Athens, Greece. Ibid., 39–41.
113 Boarov, Politička Istorija Vojvodine, 237–8.
114 Ibid., 240. It should be added that this document was not signed by the representatives 
of DSS at the Vojvodinian Assembly.
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in Vojvodina (Hungarian: Vajdasagi Magyarok Demokratikus 
Kozossege, VMDK) and the Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina 
(Vajdasagi Magyar Szovetseg, VMSZ). The two parties sprang from 
the division of the united VMDK in 1994. The VMDK was initially 
launched in Novi Sad on 14 February 1990, under the leadership of 
Andras Agoston. The party opted for a tripartite concept of autonomy 
for Vojvodina’s Hungarians, which consisted of: personal autonomy115; 
territorial autonomy116; local self-administration.117 The VMDK officials 
regarded their concept as a fair compromise between the right to self-
determination and the principle of inviolability of national borders. A 
very similar concept of tripartite autonomy had been proposed, at the 
same time, by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Cluj 
Declaration, October 1992).118
As was also the case with the Transylvanian Hungarians, the first half 
of the 1990s saw the powerful ‘political ethnification’ of Vojvodinian 
Hungarians (those resident in the Northern Bačka enclave, in 
particular) who put their overwhelming support behind VMDK. The 
insistence of VMDK on ethno-territorial autonomy was an additional 
factor that prevented the party from finding a common ground with the 
representatives of the Serbian ‘democratic opposition’ in Vojvodina. By 
the mid-1990s, however, certain changes occurred. By 1994, a dissenter 
group made its appearance within the bounds of VMDK. This group 
115 Personal autonomy addressed the collective legal subjectivity of the Hungarian minority; 
a partner-like relation to the Serbian and provincial governments. This notion addressed 
the vitally important fields of culture, education and public information with the aim 
to protect the ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the minority. Personal 
autonomy further entailed the formation of a Hungarian minority assembly in Vojvodina.
116 Territorial autonomy referred to the self-government of those municipalities where 
the Hungarian concentration was particularly dense. This would involve the merger of 
the predominantly Hungarian populated municipalities into a Hungarian autonomous 
region; a special status entity with a separate management. This proposed autonomous 
region would stretch along the Kanjiza–Senta–Topola line and have its seat in Subotica.
117 Local self-administration would be exercised in certain rural communities with a 
predominantly Hungarian population, along the Serbian-Hungarian border. On all 
these issues see VMDK, Memorandum on Self-Administration of Hungarians Living in 
the Republic of Serbia (Novi Sad, 1992).
118 Aurelian Craiutu, ‘A Dilemma of Dual Identity: The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians 
in Romania’, East European Constitutional Review, Spring 1995, 43–9.
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accused the leadership of arbitrary decision-making and complete 
disregard of the viewpoints of the lower ranks within VMDK.119 The 
unbridgeable gap between the dissident group and the rest party 
leadership led to the expulsion of seventy-five prominent VMDK 
members by the latter. The expelled members founded the Alliance of 
Hungarians in Vojvodina in due time.
VMSZ acquired a more concrete shape as a political actor through 
the adoption of its ‘Proposal for an Agreement on the Self-Organization 
of the Hungarians in Vojvodina’ in January 1996.120 The programmatic 
foundations of this document did not differentiate from those of 
the 1992 VMDK Memorandum (e.g. the concept of the tripartite 
autonomy). Nevertheless, whereas the concept of VMDK described 
the goal of ethno-territorial autonomy for Vojvodina’s Hungarians, 
the proposal of VMSZ went one step further and drafted the way 
that it could be realized. Contrary to the VMDK’s demand for the 
establishment of a ‘centralized’ Hungarian Assembly in Vojvodina, 
VMSZ proposed the establishment of five separate councils within the 
assembly, each of which dealing with the major areas of interest for the 
Hungarian community (the Political Council, Council of Education, 
Cultural Council, Media Council and Council of Science – Section IV, 
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4).
The document drafted by VMSZ went one step ahead the VMDK 
declaration and namely proposed nine municipalities,121 which 
would form the ‘Hungarian Self-Governing District’; the latter being 
under the jurisdiction of the political council (Section V, Paragraph 
Aa). According to the same document, the superiors and officers 
in a variety of organizations within the autonomous district (the 
community courts, the revenue service and the police) would be 
appointed by the authorities of the district self-government, agreed 
119 Laszlo Szekeres, ‘VMDK-s voltam’, Magyar Szo, 28 May 28–7 July 1995. Szekeres was 
one of the VMDK members expelled from the party in 1994.
120 VMSZ, Proposal for an Agreement on the Self-Organization of Hungarians in Vojvodina 
(The Concept of the Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina), Novi Sad, 18 January 1996.
121 These municipalities were, namely Ada, Bačka Topola, Bečej, Čoka, Kanjiza, Mali Idoš, 
Subotica, Kneževac and Senta.
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upon by consent of the Serbian Parliament (Section V, Paragraph 
B). In a further attempt to convince the Serb majority about its non-
secessionist motives, the VMSZ proposal stated that the competencies 
of the Hungarian Autonomous District would be agreed upon between 
the Political Council of the Assembly of Hungarians in Vojvodina and 
the Serbian Parliament, and they would be regulated by law (Section 
V, Paragraph A). Finally, the text explicitly states that even though it 
should not be hindered from maintaining bilateral relations with the 
neighbouring municipalities in Hungary, the Hungarian Autonomous 
District must remain a part of the Serbian administrative structure and 
have essentially the same entitlements, rights and duties as the other 
Serbian districts (Ibid.).
Nevertheless, what essentially differentiated VMSZ from VMDK was 
the fact that the former placed more emphatically the Hungarian issue 
in Vojvodina within: the question of restoring certain competencies to 
the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina; the question 
of democratic changes in Serbia as a whole. With specific regard to the 
former, the VMSZ proposal overtly demanded that ‘the autonomous 
provinces should gain back the right to legislate in the domains of 
education and culture’ (Section III, Paragraph II.1).122 Even further, 
the party stood firm in its position that the question of Vojvodinian 
Hungarians was indissolubly linked with the broader question of 
political changes in Serbia, by actively approaching the ‘democratic 
opposition’ and seeking cooperation with them. The first actual instance 
of cooperation between VMSZ and the ‘democratic opposition’ was at 
the local elections of November 1996, when the party formed a coalition 
with the Vojvodinian Reformists.
At the other end of the spectrum, VMDK repeatedly set as 
top priority the question of ethnic Hungarian autonomy within 
Vojvodina and regarded the issues of Vojvodinian autonomy and the 
democratization of Serbia as separate questions, primarily concerning 
122 It should be added that this demand, as put in the text, did not regard exclusively the 
Hungarians of Vojvodina but the Slovaks, the Ruthenes and the Romanians as well 
(Section III, Paragraph III.2).
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   152 30-08-2019   16:41:02
Vojvodina in the 1990s 153
the Serbs in Vojvodina and the rest of Serbia. Furthermore, VMDK were 
more interested in presenting their standpoints to the international 
community (e.g. international and European organizations such as 
the OSCE) and seeking support from the Hungarian government 
in Budapest, instead of engaging into any sort of negotiations with 
representatives of the Serbian political elites.123
The dichotomy of the policies pursued by VMSZ and VMDK 
witnessed a notable political development within the Hungarian 
community: The emergence of intra-minority pluralism and its gradual 
prevalence over the persistence of groupness, which was triggered by 
the process of political ethnification and was typical of Vojvodina’s 
Hungarian minority until the mid-1990s. In turn, the vocal rejection, 
on behalf of the Hungarian political elites, of any sort of cooperation 
with the Serbian political elites (on the top as well as on the grass-
roots level) gave its way to more flexible alternatives, which opted for 
macro-level changes in the Serbian political landscape that could have 
a positive impact on the minority group micro-level. Consequently, 
even though the political preferences of most ethnic Hungarians in 
the northern Bačka enclave still rotated around ethnic parties, the 
Hungarian political map in Vojvodina no longer was monolithic.
This fully contrasted with the contemporary case of the Transylvanian 
Hungarians and their political elites, whose political introversion and 
groupness persisted throughout the decade. An additional difference 
between the Hungarian minority cases in Vojvodina and Transylvania 
was the fact that in the former case the alternative policies pursued by 
VMSZ effectively broke the erstwhile prevalent triadic nexus relation 
among the minority, the Serbian state and Hungary. In other words, 
the Hungarian political elites progressively opted for the improvement 
of the minority’s status through political changes on the Serbian 
macro-level, instead of seeking support from Budapest. This process 
123 Ildiko Arpasy, The Hungarians in Vojvodina: Political Condition of a Minority in a 
Nationalizing State (MA Thesis, Central European University Press, Budapest, 1996), 
40, 43, 62.
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culminated with the final cooperation of both ethnic Hungarian parties 
with the Serbian opposition.
Even more significant is the fact that these developments on the 
elite level found a positive response from the grassroots level. This 
initially manifested in the 1996 Yugoslav elections where VMSZ 
won 81,310 votes and three seats in the Chamber of Citizens of the 
Federal Assembly. On the other hand, VMDK won a mere 46,807 
votes and no representatives on the federal level. The results in the 
provincial elections held in the same year were even more positive for 
VMSZ. Of 120 seats in the Vojvodinian assembly, VMSZ won thirteen 
(10.8 per cent) and the VMDK only one (0.8 per cent). Political analysts 
interpreted these results as a punishment of the VMDK leadership for 
the 1994 purges and their intra-party authoritarianism. Nevertheless, 
it seems more likely that the results of the 1996 electoral contest were 
a reward to VMSZ’s more articulate concept of autonomy and its 
more pragmatic strategy that, apart from minority rights, opted for a 
‘Vojvodina for all’ inside a democratic Serbia.
Vojvodina and Kosovo: A comparison
At this point, it would be interesting to proceed to a qualitative 
comparison between the cases of Kosovo and Vojvodina and the political 
attitudes of their Albanian and Hungarian populations, in the second 
half of the 1990s. With regard to Kosovo, comparative evidence from 
other cases of interethnic conflict demonstrates that hegemonic control 
is not always a successful instrument for managing ethnic differences. 
This instrument often marginalizes the moderate segments within 
the ethnic community in question, it simultaneously bolsters radicals 
and ultimately hinders prospects for peaceful accommodation in the 
future.124 Indeed, in Kosovo, the Serbian top-level policies resulted in 
124 On the Northern Irish case, see Brendan O’ Duffy, ‘British and Irish Conflict Regulation: 
From Sunningdale to Belfast. Part I: Tracing the Status of Contesting Sovereigns, 1968–
1974’, Nations and Nationalism 5, no. 4 (1999): 529–33.
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the radicalization of the Albanian community, a development that saw 
the gradual outflanking of Ibrahim Rugova and his passive resistance 
policies by KLA.125 In Vojvodina, on the contrary, the policies of the 
Serbian nationalizing state were much subtler. Therefore, there was no 
serious chance that the large-scale radicalization of the Hungarian, or 
any other ethnic, community might be triggered ‘from above’.
On the other hand, a key difference between the political attitudes 
of the Vojvodinian Hungarians and the Kosovan Albanians was the 
continuous participation of the former in the state’s political arena and 
the boycott of all sorts of mainstream political activity (e.g. elections at 
all levels) by the latter. In Vojvodina, participation in the state’s political 
life was the case with all minority groups. The overwhelming success 
of the boycott in Kosovo was not merely an indication of successful 
mass mobilization by the ‘parallel’ elites; it also relied on a sociological 
factor. This factor was the prevalence of a highly collectivist social ethos 
among Kosovo’s Albanians. This, in combination with the persistence 
of a highly patriarchal as well as extended family ethos within the same 
community, might make the participation in the boycott appear (in 
accordance with a homocentric circles pattern) as the moral thing for 
an individual to do with respect to the family and the extended kin, 
the local community and the ethnic group as such.126 The combination 
of all aforementioned catalysts also accounted to a large extent for the 
125 For further information on Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK, its passive resistance agenda and 
the ‘parallel’ political organizations in Kosovo see Sqhelzen Maliqi, ‘The Albanian 
Movement in Kosova’, in Yugoslavia and After, 138–54; Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics 
in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations and Parties, New York: 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (1994), 153–6. On the origins, the 
formation and the increasing popularity of KLA among the ethnic Albanian masses, see 
Tim Judah, ‘A History of the Kosovo Liberation Army’, in Kosovo: Contending Voices on 
Balkan Interventions, ed. William Joseph Buckley (Cambridge: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2000), 108–15.
126 Similar patterns of grassroots political behaviour are encountered among the semi-
clannish Ghegs of Northern Albania. On certain occasions, a political candidate’s clan 
background can be of primary significance for his popular appeal. A typical example is 
the vast support channelled towards Sali Berisha, the leader of the Democratic Party of 
Albania, by the Northern Albanian electorate at the first Albanian multiparty elections 
(March–April 1991). Sali Berisha belongs to the powerful Gheg clan of the Berishas.
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high degree of political homogeneity among the Kosovan Albanians127 
and, following the community’s radicalization process, the unequivocal 
support channelled towards KLA.
In the Vojvodinian Hungarian case, on the contrary, neither a high 
degree of internal political homogeneity (especially since the mid-
1990s) nor any indications of ethnic radicalization were the case. In 
regard to the latter, no demands, even subtle, were ever raised by the 
Hungarian political elites in Vojvodina for the secession of the northern 
Bačka enclave from Serbia. Especially during the second half of the 
1990s, the Vojvodinian Hungarian elites would always try to maintain a 
responsible and balanced stance with regard to ethnic issues pertaining 
not only to the micro-level of the province but the Serbian/Yugoslav 
macro-level as well.128
Finally, the most essential difference between Vojvodina and 
Kosovo was that, in the former case, the persistence of the trans-
ethnic substratum of Vojvođanski identitet, as a mass phenomenon, 
effectively preserved the character of Vojvodina as a multiethnic space. 
This was definitely the factor that brought Vojvodina’s political elites 
together, regardless of the ethnic divisions. By contrast, in the case of 
Kosovo, a combination of ethnic segregation on the grassroots level 
and unbridgeable standpoints between the political actors involved 
(the Serbian state and the Albanian ‘parallel’ elites) resulted, first, in the 
extreme aggravation of the crisis and, following NATO’s intervention, 
the transformation of the southern province into a mono-ethnic and 
mono-cultural society.
128 In the eve of the NATO bombing, the VMSZ presidium issued a declaration in which it 
was stressed that ‘the resolution of the Kosovo question can only be achieved by means 
of negotiations’. The party condemned the incoming air campaign against Serbia as 
unacceptable because ‘it would sink the country into even greater misery and endanger 
the lives of the entirety of its citizens, including the Hungarians of Vojvodina’. The 
party equally castigated ‘Slobodan Milošević’s decade-long domestic policy of defying 
the entire world’. On this issue, see the ‘Statement by the Presidium of the Alliance of 
Hungarians in Vojvodina Regarding the Situation in Kosovo’, 24 March 1999 (http://
www.hhrf.org/kosovo.htm).
127 Even though the ‘parallel’ political landscape in Kosovo comprised nearly eighteen 
parties, Rugova’s LDK enjoyed the support of over 95 per cent of Kosovan Albanians 
throughout most of the 1990s.
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The change of the political guard in Serbia:  
The contribution of the Vojvodinian voters
The Yugoslav elections of 1996 in Vojvodina were marked by the 
decisive victory of the SPS–JUL–ND coalition. The ‘left’ coalition 
garnered 35.57 per cent of the vote (371,875 votes and 12 mandates 
in the Federal Chamber of Citizens) to the 15.57 per cent (163,659 
votes and 3 mandates) won by Zajedno and the 18.96 per cent (199,390 
votes and 6 mandates) won by the SRS. As for the regionalist Koalicija 
Vojvodina, it garnered 6.53 per cent of the total vote (68,669 votes) and 
secured two seats at the federal parliament.
The results of the 1996 federal elections in Vojvodina can be 
interpreted, first of all, through reference to ‘objective’ factors that 
were of a crucial significance throughout Serbia. The most noteworthy 
was the inability of Zajedno to overcome its internal inconsistency 
and project a solid and convincing image to the Serbian electorate. 
On the other hand, the performance of the anti-SPS opposition in 
the provincial elections that were held at the same time was largely 
affected by the electoral legislation. First, the application of an 
absolute majority system enabled SPS to secure 67.2 per cent of the 
seats (74 out of 110) at the Vojvodinian assembly with only 23 per 
cent of the total vote (236,414 out of 1,025,103). Moreover, in the 
same contest, a peculiar two-round majority system was applied in the 
election of the premier of the Vojvodinian assembly. The peculiarity of 
that system, in comparison to the procedure applied in the federal and 
municipal elections, rested in the fact that it was three (instead of 2) 
candidates, winning the greatest number of votes, who entered the 
second round. Therefore, it became fairly obvious that the application 
of this system aimed at weakening the possibilities of a serious 
challenge to SPS’s rule on the provincial level. As the actual outcome 
of the poll demonstrated, it was highly improbable that the two other 
candidates could gain in their own right as many votes as the SPS one.
However, the victory of Zajedno in the 1996 municipal elections in 
Novi Sad served as an early indication that Novi Sad and the other major 
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urban centres in the province would soon become the strongholds of 
the ‘democratic opposition’ in Vojvodina. Apart from Novi Sad, Zajedno 
also won the local councils in the industrial centre of Kikinda, the small 
borderline town of Vršac and, although not winning the contest, had 
a decent performance in Sombor, Pančevo and Zrenjanin (Table 12). 
What served as an additional indication of the increasingly dominant 
political trends in the Vojvodinian capital and the other major urban 
centres was the particularly successful mobilization of their population 
in the course of the autumn–winter 1996 protests.
Table 12 Electoral results by number of votes at selected municipalities in 
Vojvodina
Novi Sad
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 32,742 48,234
SPS–JUL–ND 39,124 30,794
SRS 30,203 36,567 40,835 20,584
SPO 12,624
DSS  1,493
ZAJEDNO 37,064 28,141
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 6,695 29,016 27,995
VMDK  1,867
VMSZ
Others 28,992  7,048 16,546
Pančevo
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 17,996 18,049 24,994
SPS–JUL–ND 27,028
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Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS  19,105 28,529
SPS–JUL–ND 21,653 18,154
SRS 11,563 12,676 19,438 22,289
SPO  5,892
ZAJEDNO 15,220  9,464
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 4,498 12,800 10,722
VMDK    36
VMSZ  3,129  1,032
Others 16,553  7,362  7,930
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SRS  5,950 12,590 17,687 22,484
SPO 11,359
ZAJEDNO 17,180 14,240
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 4,500
VMDK   315  1,438
VMSZ
Others 17,488  4,925  4,654
Zrenjanin
Kikinda and Vršac (local elections, 1996)
Parties Kikinda Vršac
SPS 8,661
SRS 7,624 2,069
ZAJEDNO 8,810 9,073
KOALICIJA VOJVODINA 4,556
VMDK  339
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Parties Kikinda Vršac
VMSZ  432
Others 7,431 13,503
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian 1997 (Third 
round)
SPS 13,834 19,614
SPS–JUL–ND 18,557 14,498
SRS 10,006 12,007 16,197 18,880
SPO  6,791
ZAJEDNO  8,558  9,480
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 4,598
VMDK
VMSZ
Others 10,458  3,605  2,971
Sremska Mitrovica
Stara Pazova
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 8,900 11,022
SPS–JUL–ND 11,736 7,273 
SRS 6,270  8,423 10,972 11,758
SPO  3,290
ZAJEDNO 4,636  4,654
KOALICIJA
VOJVODINA
 1,724
VMDK
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Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
VMSZ
Others 7,069 2,193 1,927
Sombor
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 12,987 21,426
SPS–JUL–ND 17,924 13,079
SRS  8,345 10,285 15,109 15,940
SPO  3,180
ZAJEDNO 12,573  9,445
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 4,646
VMDK  1,826
VMSZ   399  3,668
Others  9,128  3,976  6,589
Kovin
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 8,300 9,930
SPS–JUL–ND 9,197 6,727
SRS 1,995 3,092 4,443 6,429
SPO 3,190
ZAJEDNO 5,202 3,253
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
1,420
VMDK  558
VMSZ  741
Others 2,578 1,851 1,206
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Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 6,059 8,866
SPS–JUL–ND  801 6,106 4,470
SRS 1,860 2,828 4,334
SPO 1,835
ZAJEDNO 1,902 1,980
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
2,108
VMDK
VMZS  307
Others 3,651 2,034  836
Alibunar
Vršac
Parties Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 1997 
(Third round)
SPS 13,808
SPS–JUL–ND 10,821 8,922
SRS  4,753 7,838  9,658
SPO 2,872
ZAJEDNO  5,227
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
5,167
VMDK
VMSZ   771
Others  3,128 1,596
Subotica
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 8,482 37,583
SPS–JUL–ND 17,955 11,946
SRS 7,515  5,394 10,033 11,801
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Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPO  2,483
ZAJEDNO  1,785  5,172
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 2,562
VMDK  6,362
VMSZ 14,023 24,112 18,819
Others 28,863 13,199 15,551
Čoka
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS 1,750 4,130
SPS–JUL–ND 1,888 1,276
SRS  750  880 1,759 1,701
SPO  484
ZAJEDNO  333
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 350  529
VMDK  670
VMSZ  244 2,087 1,431
Others 4,234 1,990 1,953
Temerin
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian 1997  
(Third round)
SPS 2,184 5,271
SPS–JUL–ND 3,673 2,888
SRS 3,754 3,907 4,770 5,301
SPO 1,014
ZAJEDNO 1,753 2,171
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
1,338
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Apart from that, no notable changes in the local bases of support of 
other political forces became evident in the November 1996 elections. 
SRS, for instance, remained powerful – though not dominant – in the 
municipalities of Srem where a dense concentration of colonists and 
refugees is observed (Table 12). Moreover, the voting procedure in 
the northern Bačka and Banat municipalities with a Hungarian local 
majority once again took place in ethnic terms at all levels (Table 12). 
Finally, Zajedno remained quite popular in certain predominantly old 
settler-populated municipalities (though not to the extent that DEPOS 
was some years ago), whereas the regionalists still proved themselves a 
noteworthy political force in quite a few ethnically mixed constituencies 
(Table 12). Overall, the 1996 elections in Vojvodina can be regarded as 
‘elections of continuity’ by most aspects.
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian 1997  
(Third round)
VMDK 3,412
VMSZ  664
Others 2,526 3,398 3,552
Ada
Parties Local 
1996
Yugoslav 
1996
Serbian 
1997
Serbian Presidential 
1997 (Third round)
SPS  403 5,446
SPS–JUL–ND 1,024  940
SRS   97  427  835 2,085
SPO  493
ZAJEDNO  692  619
KOALICIJA 
VOJVODINA
 435  763
VMDK
VMSZ 3,234 4,027 3,477
Others 5,110 2,871 2,129
Source: http://www.cesid.org.
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Almost identical was the case at the 1997 Serbian elections. In these 
elections, the ‘left’ coalition won 28.81 per cent of the vote and elected 
twenty-two mandates to the Serbian parliament. SRS came second with 
28.52 per cent of the vote (21 mandates) and SPO had a disappointing 
performance with 9.73 per cent of the vote and only four mandates to 
the Serbian parliament. An interesting incidence was the rather decent 
performance of the Koalicija Vojvodina (11.37 per cent of the vote). 
As for the presidential race, in most constituencies, it turned into a 
question of SPS–ND–JUL versus the Radicals. Finally, VMSZ won 5.15 
per cent of the total vote.
As far as the negative performance by SPO was concerned, it had to 
do with Vuk Drašković’s increasingly discredited image as the leader of 
the ‘democratic opposition’ throughout Serbia. On the other hand, the 
Radicals’ startling performance was much subject to the fact that, as 
a result of the DSS’s boycott of the procedure, no moderate nationalist 
option was available in these elections. This, in combination with the 
SPO’s diminishing popular appeal, might have accounted for the diversion 
of a certain percentage of voters, who had previously voted for Zajedno, 
towards SRS. With specific regard to the SRS voters, a larger percentage 
among them (especially in Srem) voted for the party in the 1997 Serbian 
elections than in the 1996 Yugoslav ones (Table 12). Quite similar was the 
case in 1992, when a larger percentage of the Radicals’ voters in Vojvodina 
voted for them in the Serbian elections than in the Yugoslav ones, which 
were held at the same time. Therefore, it seems that a greater percentage 
of SRS voters in Vojvodina were interested in their party securing a 
firmer place in the Serbian parliament, largely because of the way that the 
constitutional structure of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia was set up.
As far as the performance of Koalicija Vojvodina was concerned, one 
explanation that can be given is that it was also affected by the boycott of the 
elections by certain parties. In other words, it is quite likely that a certain 
percentage of voters previously affiliated to DS voted for the regionalist 
coalition. A complementary explanation that can be offered is that, in 
terms of what was earlier mentioned, a greater number of Vojvodinians 
had started becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Belgrade’s policies 
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on the province by then. The ostensibly illogical electoral geometry 
applied in the 1997 contest might have claimed an additional number of 
votes from the regionalists.129 Vojvodina was divided into seven electoral 
districts (i.e. Subotica, Zrenjanin, Pančevo, Sombor, Novi Sad, Vrbas, 
Sremska Mitrovica), the constituent municipalities of which often had 
no geographic connection to each other. The most plausible explanation 
that can be offered, in regard to this gerrymandering, is that it formed 
an attempt by the regime to counterbalance the powerful support 
channelled towards the anti-SPS opposition, including SRS, in certain 
parts of Vojvodina (e.g. Bečej and its surrounding municipalities in 
Bačka, as far as the ‘democratic opposition’ was concerned). After all, 
the local and Yugoslav elections held one year earlier had adequately 
demonstrated that a notable percentage of urban residents in Vojvodina 
harboured either pro-SRS or pro-‘democratic opposition’ sympathies.130
At this point, it might be useful to highlight that the period between the 
1993 and the 1997 Serbian elections saw the steady decrease in the voters’ 
turnout to the procedure. In the 1996 Yugoslav elections, the percentage 
of the Vojvodinian electorate who proceeded to the poll was 66.68 per 
cent. One year later, a mere 62.13 per cent of the province’s registered 
voters participated in the Serbian elections. As far as the latter case is 
concerned, it is always likely that the opposition’s call for a boycott found 
some appeal among Vojvodinian voters. Still, it is even more likely that 
a greater percentage of Vojvodinian citizens had become, just as was the 
case throughout Serbia, disillusioned with their country’s political elites. 
However, it seems that, irrespective of any boycott tactics, abstention from 
polling did particular harm to the opposition parties in Vojvodina.131
The effective projection of the growing dissatisfaction with the 
regime’s policies in Vojvodina, on the electoral patterns encountered in 
129 Boarov, Politička Istorija Vojvodine, 231–2.
130 This explanation is supported through reference to the way that the Novi Sad electoral 
unit was set up. In a city populated by over 400,000 inhabitants, an electoral unit 
consisting of merely 257,000 voters and electing just 9 representatives was finally formed.
131 On this issue, see the results of an empirical survey conducted by the Sociology 
Department at the University of Novi Sad in the late 1990s, in ‘Umorni od lidera’ (http://
www.medijaklub.cg.yu).
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the province, was subject to two kinds of catalysts: macro-level and micro-
level ones. With regard to the former, the most notable was the process 
of bridging the programmatic and ideological differences within the 
‘democratic opposition’, which culminated into the formation of DOS. 
In Vojvodina, specifically, this development was further encouraged 
by the aforementioned reawakening of the unifying substratum of 
Vojvodinian identity, on the grassroots level, and its endorsement in 
the platform employed by DOS in the province. This provided the key 
to the coalition’s decisive victory in Vojvodina, since it managed to melt 
the diverse pockets of anti-SPS, and at the same time not particularly 
sympathetic to SRS either, opposition (the pro-opposition urbanites, 
the regionalist trends encountered in the ethnically mixed settlements, 
the anti-regime disposition of the Hungarians and other minorities)132 
into a viable political movement (Table 13). Therefore, the paradoxes 
of previous contests, when the ‘democratic opposition’ could not 
capitalize on the electorate’s apparent discontent with the regime’s 
policies because of its high degree of fragmentation, were not repeated.
The results of the 2000 electoral contest ‘spoke for themselves’. In 
stark contrast to the previous elections, over 70 per cent of Vojvodina’s 
Table 13 The results of the Yugoslav parliamentary elections (September 
2000) at the Vojvodinian electoral units
Subotica
Parties Votes % Mandates
SPS–JUL 21,742 18.61 1
Civic Alliance of Subotica-Vojvodinian 
Opposition
 7,176  6.14 0
Communist Alliance of Yugoslavia in 
Serbia-Communists of Subotica
 2,278  1.95 0
(Continued)
132 On the grievances of Vojvodina’s Slovaks towards the governing apparatus, see Juraj 
Bartos, ‘Izbori 2000: I Slovaci su rekli DOSta’, Reflektor, nos. 13–14 (2001): 3–5.
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Parties Votes % Mandates
SRS  8,436  7.22 0
DOS 45,878 39.20 2
SPO   877  0.75 0
Ecological Party of Vojvodina  2,888  2.47 0
VMDK  9,247  7.92 0
VMSZ 18,377 15.73 0
Zrenjanin
Parties Votes % Mandates
SPS–JUL 61,951 27.80 2
VMDK 14,717  6.60 0
SRS 26,870 12.06 0
VMSZ 29,391 13.19 1
New Communist Party of Yugoslavia  2,053  0.92 0
DOS 76,561 34.36 2
Vojvodinian Coalition for Yugoslavia  4,614  2.07 0
Radical Party of the Left ‘Nikola Pašić’  2,433  1.09 0
Party of Natural Law  1,260  0.57 0
SPO  2,998  1.35 0
Pančevo
Parties Votes % Mandates
SPS–JUL 54,701 30.12 1
DOS 96,464 53.12 3
New Communist Party of Yugoslavia  3,839  2.11 0
SPO  6,819  3.76 0
VMDK  3,107  1.71 0
SRS 16,660  9.17 0
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Parties Votes % Mandates
SPS–JUL 43,853 36.42 1
SPO  3,484  2.89 0
SRS 15,234 12.73 0
DOS 55,991 46.50 2
VMDK  1,748  1.45 0
Sombor
Novi Sad
Parties Votes % Mandates
Civic Group for a Better Serbia 6,282  3.31 0
SRS 31,862 16.81 1
SPO  5,690  3.00 0
Serbian Radicals  2,054  1.08 0
SPS–JUL 44,989 23.68 1
DOS 94,791 50.00 2
VMDK  1,927  1.02 0
New Communist Party of Yugoslavia 1,170  0.62 0
Radical Party of the Left ‘Nikola Pašić’  897  0.47 0
Vrbas
Parties Votes % Mandates
SPS–JUL–ND 50,431 35.36 1
DOS 63,262 44.36 2
SRS 21,106 14.80 0
SPO  2,978  2.09 0
VMDK  4,839  3.39 0
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Parties Votes % Mandates
SPO  9,042  5.16 0
Radical Party of the Left ‘Nikola Pašić’  5,570  3.18 0
SRS 30,288 17.28 1
SPS–JUL 59,694 34.06 1
DOS 70,664 40.32 2
registered voters participated in the poll – a sign that a strong desire for 
change was evident. Moreover, in the elections for the Yugoslav president, 
Koštunica secured 57 per cent of the vote in Vojvodina to the 29 per 
cent won by Milošević. At the same time, in the elections for the Federal 
Chamber of Citizens, DOS secured 55 per cent of the vote to 33 per cent 
garnered by the SPS–JUL coalition. The victory of the united opposition 
was even more overwhelming in the elections for the Vojvodinian 
Assembly where DOS won 117 out of the 120 seats. On the latter occasion, 
the application of absolute majority (3 candidates on the second round) 
ultimately backfired at the Socialists. Finally, in the local elections, DOS 
was victorious in 38 out of the 45 municipalities in Vojvodina.
In addition to the Socialists’ defeat, the performance of the Radicals 
was not successful either. The SRS was left with no representatives at 
the Vojvodinian assembly, whereas its performance at all levels was 
disappointingly low, even at its electoral strongholds in Srem. This was a 
sign that the Vojvodinian electorate had been literally de-radicalized and 
was keener on the reintegration of Vojvodina and Serbia with the rest of 
the world rather than on the politics of groupness and ethno-cultural 
introversion. Finally, the active participation of protesters from Novi 
Sad and other Vojvodinian cities at the civil disobedience acts organized 
in Belgrade (5 October 2000) served as an additional indication of 
the dominant political trends in Vojvodina.133 A new political era had 
dawned for the province, even though various problems persisted.
Sremska Mitrovica
133 Dragan Bujošević and Ivan Radovanović, October 5: A 24-Hour Coup (Belgrade: Media 
Centre Press, 2000), 312.
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This chapter places Vojvodina inside the broader spectrum of Serbia’s 
regionalization during the first decade after the year 2000. This 
consists in an overview of the actual developments in regard to the 
administrative status of Vojvodina within Serbia which stretches from 
the inauguration of the Omnibus law (2002) all the way to the adoption 
of the new statute for Vojvodina (2009). Simultaneous attention is paid 
to Serbia’s regionalization as viewed from the perspectives of the local 
political elites in the province. Then, this chapter sets in context the 
grassroots outlooks on regional identity and the state of interethnic 
relations in Vojvodina during that period. Of particular importance is 
to underline how the question of restituting Vojvodina’s autonomous 
competencies interweaved with and became entangled into other 
crucial policymaking areas for Serbia, namely the developments in 
Kosovo and the readjustment of the Serbian-Montenegrin relations.
The Omnibus Zakon (Omnibus law) for Vojvodina: 
Adoption, content and implementation
An early indication of the new government’s disposition vis-à-vis the 
Vojvodinian question was the inauguration of the Omnibus Zakon 
in February 2002. The initial draft was presented to the Vojvodinian 
assembly on 14 December 2001. The final approval of the new law 
by the Serbian Parliament was preceded by the emergence of certain 
cleavages. Apart from the accusations, brought forward by SPS and 
SRS, that the new law would be a step towards the break-up of Serbia 
4
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certain disagreements arose within the provincial DOS circles.1 The 
Vojvodinian DSS representatives judged that the circumstances were 
not yet ripe for the reassessment of Vojvodina’s status within Serbia. 
They added that Serbia had issues of a more vital importance to take 
care of, such as the redefinition of its relations with Montenegro and 
the evaluation of the new prospects that had opened for the Kosovan 
question. Even though the DSS representatives agreed that the 
question of Vojvodina had to be entrenched in novel foundations, 
they still contended that this issue had to be settled within the 
bounds of a new Serbian Constitution and not partially. Therefore, 
when the voting for the approval of the Omnibus law was called at 
the Vojvodinian assembly, the DSS representatives voiced their 
reservations over the draft. By contrast, the representatives of DS, as 
well as those of LSDV, the Reformists and VMSZ voted in favour of 
the draft.
The law’s dispatch to the Serbian parliament for its final approval 
generated further disagreements. At the initial parliamentary session 
on the Omnibus Zakon, on 22 January 2002, over 300 amendments 
(most of them drafted by SPS and SRS delegates) were proposed.2 
Even though most of these amendments were rejected in due time, the 
Serbian government proposed thirty amendments on the draft. Most 
of these amendments were proposed by the DSS delegates. First of all, 
objections were raised in regard to the financing of projects organized in 
Vojvodina from the provincial budget. Moreover, some MPs expressed 
their objections in regard to the draft’s suggestions on: Vojvodina 
organizing its provincial plan for agriculture; the appointment of a 
provincial ombudsman with the task to supervise the arrangement of 
the educational system in Vojvodina.
The recommendation of the amendments generated friction 
between the Serbian parliament and the executive council of the 
1 ‘SPS protiv omnibus zakona: Korak ka razbijanju Srbije’, Glas Javnosti, 20 January 2002.
2 ‘Više od sto amandmana na “omnibus” zakon’, Glas Javnosti, 22 January 2002; 
‘Autonomaški apetiti’, Velika Srbija (the SRS monthly journal), February 2002, 36–7.
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Vojvodinian assembly. The latter made clear to Belgrade that they 
would not accept any restrictive amendments on the draft document. 
They also warned the republican government that any serious 
tension between the two sides over the Omnibus Zakon might pose 
a challenge to the internal cohesion of the DOS coalition as such.3 
The fact that at that time the DSS representation at the provincial 
executive council was weak, served as an additional factor that 
enabled the Vojvodinian autonomaši to voice their disagreements 
with the Serbian government more emphatically. Soon, a 
compromise was reached between the two sides. The amendment 
on the provincial ombudsman of education was recalled, by the 
Serbian government, whereas modifications were made to the other 
amendments. Consequently, on 28 January 2002, the Vojvodinian 
assembly declared that they unanimously accepted all other twenty-
nine amendments on the law. When the document was returned 
to the republican parliament for its final approval, on 4 February 
2002, 118 MPs voted in favour of the law, 72 voted against, 42 held 
their reservations over the proposed text and 1 representative 
abstained from the procedure. With specific regard to DOS, the DSS 
representatives held their reservations.
The law conceded to the Vojvodinian assembly a set of competencies, 
which extended to over twenty areas.4 Article 57 provided for the 
institution of an ombudsman appointed by the Vojvodinian assembly 
in accordance with the relevant Serbian law.5 In regard to education, 
official use of alphabets/languages and public information quite a few 
competencies were conceded to the province. As far as elementary and 
middle-level education was concerned, Articles 12 and 13 authorized 
the responsible provincial organs to: issue educational programmes 
and textbooks in the languages of national minorities; allow for the 
arrangement of teaching programmes in the languages of ethnic 
3 ‘Omnibus zakon neće oboriti Vladu Srbije’, Dnevnik, 14 January 2002.
4 For a full text-version of the Omnibus Zakon (including an explanatory section), see 
http://www.vojvodina.com/prilozi/omnibus.htm.
5 The first provincial ombudsman was appointed on 23 December 2002.
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minorities in such cases that less than fifteen pupils per school were 
native speakers of a minority language (Articles 12.4, 12.5, 12.8, 
13.6 and 13.11). Furthermore, Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 enabled the 
responsible provincial organs to found elementary, middle-level 
and high schools, as well as universities or new departments at the 
already existing universities (Articles 12.1, 13.1, 14.1 and 15.1). Finally, 
Article 16 (Paragraphs 11 and 14) allowed for the establishment of 
administrative–supervisory boards, as well as for the organization of 
inspections to all educational institutions.
In regard to the official use of the recognized languages and 
alphabets in Vojvodina, Article 18 (Paragraphs 1 and 2) authorized 
the responsible provincial organs to guarantee the official use of the 
recognized languages and their alphabets throughout the territory of 
the autonomous province; appoint a supervisory board with the task 
to carry out inspections, regarding the actual implementation of this 
article’s terms. As far as the sector of public information was concerned, 
Article 19 (Paragraphs 5 and 6) enabled the provincial organs to appoint 
the director and the other members of the administrative–supervisory 
boards at those informative and broadcasting institutions under the 
immediate jurisdiction of the autonomous province (e.g. RTS Novi 
Sad); carry out the relevant inspections at the local radio and television 
stations, as well as any other provincial institution in the field of public 
information.
As clarified in the explanatory section, attached to the legal 
document, the Omnibus Zakon was basically drafted with the aim to 
secure the more efficient execution of certain administrative functions 
on the provincial level. It was noted that, since the inauguration of the 
1990 Constitution, little actual progress had occurred in the field of 
the autonomous provincial administration. In some cases, on the one 
hand, many of the legal decisions enacted by the Serbian Assembly 
for Vojvodina were not applied properly. On the other hand, at some 
instances, certain republican enactments over the autonomous province 
actually reduced Vojvodina’s capacities to a symbolic level. The authors 
of the Omnibus Zakon concluded that this law signified the initial step 
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towards the inauguration of the new Serbian Constitution and the 
definitive settlement of the province’s status.6
In regard to the official use of the minority languages and alphabets, 
it was estimated that the closer communication between the provincial 
organs and the local minorities would ensure a quicker response by the 
former to any requirements of the latter. The role of the supervisory 
board was particularly stressed. As far as public information was 
concerned, it was underlined that, as specified in the relevant clause 
of the Omnibus Zakon, RTS Novi Sad was to become an independent 
legal subject with regard to the territorial, cultural, linguistic and other 
specificities of Vojvodina.7 However, as clarified in the basic clauses of 
the legal document, the provisions of this law were always to be applied 
in harmony with the Serbian Constitution and the republican legislation 
(Articles 1, 2 and 3). The requirement for the provincial organs to have 
reached a previous agreement with the relevant republican ministries 
was reminded in various parts of the Omnibus Zakon (e.g. Articles 12.7 
and 13.11, on the issue of textbooks in the minority languages).
As far as the finance of the above-mentioned projects was concerned, 
following a modus vivendi between the Serbian government and the 
Vojvodinian executive council, in most cases they were to be financed 
jointly by the provincial and the republican budget. For example, 
Article 17 dictated that all administrative and supervisory functions 
on educational matters were to be either fully or partially funded by 
the provincial budget. Nevertheless, Articles 12.7 and 13.11 on national 
minority education stated that the execution of certain tasks in that 
given area was, on certain occasions, to be financed either partially 
or wholly by the republican budget. Finally, in regard to agriculture, 
Article 42 (Section b, Paragraph 1) authorized Vojvodina to arrange 
special projects for the protection, use and organization of arable land 
and fund them from its own budget. However, it was added that the 
6 ‘Razloži za Donosenje Zakona i Ciljevi koji se Ostvaruju’, Omnibus Zakon, 14 December 
2001.
7 Ibid., ‘Objasnenje Osnovnih Pravnih Instituta’ (1, 2, 3 and 4).
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execution of all such agricultural projects must be carried out in firm 
accordance with the uniform agricultural planning of the republic.
A top issue that emerged soon after the inauguration of the Omnibus 
Zakon was the financial question. In other words, there was an urgent 
need for the rebalancing of the provincial budget, regarding the 
percentage of the provincial income to be transferred to the republican 
coffers in Belgrade and the percentage to be invested on regional 
projects in accordance with the law. By the time that the proposal for 
the Omnibus Zakon was drafted by Vojvodina’s executive council, the 
provincial secretary for finance, Đorđe Misirkić, estimated that in the 
event that a compromise was reached between the republican and 
provincial organs around 27 to 33 billion dinars would be required 
for the execution of regional projects. The Serbian minister of finance, 
Božidar Đelić, suggested that a slightly lower amount (i.e. 25 to 30 billion 
dinars) should be invested on the same purpose.8 Nevertheless, when 
the final decision was reached over this issue, in late June 2002, the 
actual amount agreed upon, by the provincial secretariat for finance 
and the Serbian Ministry of Finance, was 9 million dinars.9
The financial debate over the Omnibus Zakon and the inauguration 
of the law as such generated certain disagreements within DOS in 
Vojvodina. Nenad Čanak, for instance, assessed that little would change 
regarding the central government’s control over the economic potential 
of Vojvodina.10 A certain discontent, though from a different angle, was 
expressed by the DSS. Dejan Mihajlov, DSS group-representative at the 
Serbian Assembly, stated that ‘the new law is the fruit of new conflicts 
that have resulted from the imprecise distribution of authority’ and 
repeated that the Vojvodinian question should be resolved ‘within 
8 Milena Putnik, ‘Omnibus Zakon ili vraćanje autonomije: Prenete nadležnosti ali ne 
i novac’, 24 December 2001, http://www.aimpress.org. By March 2001, Vojvodina 
had accumulated around 6.5 billion dinars from taxes and other sources of income. 
Approximately 4.5 billion dinars of this total were siphoned towards the republican 
budget, whereas less than 57 million dinars were returned to the Vojvodinian coffers.
9 Dimitrije Boarov, ‘Ustavnoj povelj ususret: Ima neka tajna veza’, July 2002, http://www.
helsinki.org.yu.
10 ‘Referendum i u Vojvodini’, Medija Klub Podgorica, 2002. http://www.medijaklub.cg.yu.
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the bounds of a new Serbian Constitution, not separately’.11 Mihajlov’s 
statements echoed the mood of the entire DSS Vojvodinian committee. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the late Zoran Đinđić greeted the new 
law and stressed that ‘decentralization and the restoration of Vojvodina’s 
true autonomy is one of the most important tasks in the agenda of the 
new government’.12 A very similar position on the matter was held by 
DS’s Đorđe Đukić at the provincial assembly, during the drafting of the 
law.13 Furthermore, the Reformists regarded the Omnibus Zakon as a 
sign that the issue of Vojvodinian autonomy still existed and added that 
this autonomy should increase in the near future.14 The reactions of 
VMSZ were very positive as well.15
In an overall assessment, the Omnibus Zakon signified a small 
but notable step towards the gradual acquisition of more extensive 
competencies by Vojvodina. The new law reinforced Vojvodina’s 
asymmetric status within Serbia, even though Belgrade retained some 
authority over the finances. One can comprehend the importance of the 
Omnibus Zakon in the following sense: it was the first occasion since the 
constitutional reforms of 1990 that the Vojvodinian executive council 
drafted and submitted a legal text on its administrative jurisdiction to 
the Serbian Assembly and that text was largely accepted.
One year later, in March 2003, the new constitutional charter of 
the state’s union between Serbia and Montenegro was inaugurated. 
With specific regard to Vojvodina, the charter’s preamble stated that 
the component republic of Serbia also comprised ‘the Autonomous 
Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija-the latter currently 
being under an international administration according to the UN 
Resolution 1244’.16 This was a formal recognition of Vojvodina’s status 
11 ‘Vojvodina je dobra vest za Srbiju’, Dnevnik, 5 February 2002.
12 ‘Omnibus Vojvodina, Srbija u Evropi’, Dnevnik, 23 January 2002.
13 ‘Omnibus Zakon za sada je dovoljan’, Glas Javnosti, 10 December 2001.
14 ‘Vojvodina je dobra vest za Srbiju’, Dnevnik. Also, the relevant article in the daily Danas, 
20 March 2002, http://www.danas.co.yu.
15 ‘Klali vola za kilo mesa’, Bulevar, 8 February 2002.
16 ‘Ustavna Povelja Državne Zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora, 2003’, Srbija i Crna Gora: 
Direkcija za Informisanje, 2003. http://www.gov.yu.
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as a constituent part of the Republic of Serbia. Nevertheless, no other 
references to the autonomous provinces were made elsewhere in the 
document. This, in combination with the fact that the Serbian organs 
still retained primacy over most issues pertaining to the republic’s 
jurisdiction, served as a reminder that Vojvodina’s final status would 
only be resolved through the inauguration of the new Serbian 
Constitution.
Vojvodina’s political elites and the question of 
regionalization in the early 2000s
At this point, it would be interesting to outline the standpoints of the 
political elites in Vojvodina on the question of the province’s status 
during the early 2000s. Particular attention is paid to the two most 
popular parties back then, with an appeal all over Serbia (DSS and DS); 
and to the League and the Reformists from the pro-autonomists.
The DSS Committee in Vojvodina regards the province as the hearth 
of the modern Serbian national movement, whereas the Vojvodinian 
Serbs are viewed as the pioneers of modern Serbian nationalism. The 
short-lived Vojvodstvo Srpsko of 1848–9 as well as the struggles of Jaša 
Tomić and other Vojvodinian Serb political figures for the national 
unification of the prečani Serbs with Serbia proper, are regarded with 
particular respect.17 By contrast, the system of autonomies established 
within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is viewed from a 
particularly negative angle. The DSS Vojvodinian representatives argue 
that this system merely signified the implementation of the Yugoslav 
Communists’ interwar ideological platform with the aim to weaken the 
political sovereignty of the Serbian nation within Yugoslavia. The 1974 
Constitution especially is regarded as a document which ‘set up a model 
of autonomies incompatible with any European or universal precedents 
17 Dejan Mikavica, ‘Vojvodina kao Politički Program’, Srpska Atina (the journal of the DSS 
Novi Sad committee), February 2002, 3–12.
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in the fields of legal theory and political practice’. It is further added that 
in accordance with the 1974 arrangements three constitutional areas 
were set up in Serbia, the two of which (Kosovo and Vojvodina) were 
granted more extensive competencies than the remaining one (Serbia 
proper).18 In this light, even the 1990 Serbian Constitution was viewed 
as an arrangement that maintained certain aspects of the Communist 
constitutional order.19
Therefore, in regard to the broader question of regionalization in 
Serbia, the DSS representatives in Vojvodina and in Serbia as a whole 
seem to be keen on a unitary solution. The main standpoints of the party 
on the regional question were outlined in DSS’s ‘Osnovna načela za novi 
Ustav Republike Srbije’ (‘Basic Principles for the New Constitution of 
the Republic of Serbia’). First of all, this document declared the territory 
of Serbia ‘united and inalienable’. The official language recognized was 
Serbian in the Cyrillic script. The respective languages and alphabets 
of the national minorities were to be officially used in those territories 
where a national minority forms the local majority. Furthermore, 
the rights (individual and collective) of national minorities were to 
be codified in the state’s legislation on civil rights and freedoms. The 
option of positive discrimination, in favour of individuals coming from 
a minority background was also endorsed.
This document proposed the establishment of six regions with their 
respective seats at the capital Belgrade, Kragujevac, Niš, Novi Sad, 
Užice and Priština – following the final settlement of Kosovo’s status. 
The Serbian Assembly was to be bicameral, comprising a Chamber 
of Citizens and a Chamber of Regions. The latter was given a right of 
veto over decisions of the former that might prove detrimental to the 
status of a region. The regional parliament was endorsed to enact the 
regional statute, whereas the main executive organs of the region were 
to be its government and president. In regard to financial autonomy, 
18 Dejan Mikavica, ‘Kome Treba Vojvođanski KomunističkiUstav?’, 2002, http://www.
dssns.org.yu.
19 Dejan Mikavica, ‘Vojvodina kao Politički Program’, 10–11.
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every region was entitled to arrange its budget and have a say over 
which taxes should remain local and which should be directed towards 
the republican coffers. Nevertheless, a republican mechanism should 
supervise the equal economic development of all regions. As far as 
legislative authority was concerned, the regional parliament was to 
enact certain regional laws in a variety of areas (e.g. agriculture, regional 
planning, natural resources). Nevertheless, in case the republican 
government considered that a proposed regional law was not in 
harmony with the republican legislation (e.g. in case it jeopardized civil 
rights within a region or it attributed that region a higher legal status 
in comparison to the rest) it would be enabled to test the law’s validity 
before the Republican Constitutional Court prior to its application. 
Finally, all regional courts of justice were to operate in full harmony 
with the republican judicial system.20
The proposal of the whole arrangement was theoretically entrenched 
in the necessity to safeguard the territorial integrity of Serbia and the 
national rights of Serbs in their homeland. Moreover, it was made clear 
that the DSS opposes the concession of any kind of ‘special status’ that 
might encourage ethnic segregation or separatist tendencies. Finally, 
in regard to the functional aspect, the asymmetric option was rejected 
on the grounds that ‘Serbia is a small and poor country and cannot 
afford to finance any “parallel” governmental entities.’ By contrast, 
the gradual strengthening of local self-government was proposed 
as a more pragmatic and effective solution.21 Even though the DSS 
proposal seemed quite unitary in its conceptualization, still it favoured 
decentralization in a number of areas. This was particularly the case 
with its allowance for vetoes at the republican parliament, the degree of 
regional financial autonomy, as well as the authorization of the regions 
to proclaim certain laws pertaining to their jurisdiction (not merely the 
issuing of sub-legal acts). Furthermore, the six regions proposed by the 
20 Demokratska Stranka Srbije, ‘Osnovna načela za novi Ustav Republike Srbije’, 2001, 2–3, 
10–14.
21 Milovan Mitrović, ‘Politika Demokratske Stranke Srbije u Vojvodini’, 22 April 2002, 
http://www.dssns.org.yu.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   180 30-08-2019   16:41:02
Vojvodina Going through Transition 181
DSS would follow at least some historical divisions, so therefore might 
potentially form the basis of future regionalist demands. However, the 
DSS officials tended to offset this probability in a rather dubious manner 
by arguing that in Serbia there do not exist historically established 
regions as it is the case in, say, Spain or Italy.22
Meanwhile, DS did not present an articulate platform on the 
question of regionalization in Serbia. In the party’s political programme 
it was mentioned that Vojvodina is a region with specificities of a 
historical, cultural, geographic and national character. It was further 
recommended that the Republic of Serbia should devolve part of its 
authority (e.g. in economy, education, exploitation of natural resources, 
minority rights, public information) to the province, as long as these 
functions did not resemble the attributes of a state. It was also suggested 
that Vojvodina should be granted the appropriate fiscal and executive 
authority.23
The party’s relaxed attitude towards the issue of Vojvodinian 
autonomy had gained some popularity for DS among the province’s 
pro-autonomist parties and groupings. On certain occasions, 
though, DS firmly rejected certain demands by the regionalist elites 
as detrimental to the state’s interest. The party’s policy of tactical 
adjustments over the Vojvodinian question had resulted from its 
intention to keep the ‘democratic forces’ in the province together. 
However, a question that remained unanswered is where, exactly, the 
DS’s lenience towards asymmetric alternatives ended and where those 
of the party’s consideration of the broader state’s interest began. DS’s 
manoeuvring between these two poles occasionally generated criticism 
over the party’s alleged inconsistency, from the League of Vojvodina’s 
Social Democrats all the way to DSS.24
22 Interview with DSS representative; Novi Sad, 15 March 2001.
23 See the political program of the DS at: http://www.demokrata.org.yu/srpski/program/
politicki.html.
24 DS had been also accused of displaying an equally ‘chameleonic’ attitude vis-à-vis the 
management of interethnic relations in Vojvodina, thereby, frequently switching from 
lenient to more reserved outlooks on minority rights (Interview with sociologist at the 
University of Novi Sad; 14 November 2005).
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The League’s greatest gain from the nomination of posts within DOS 
in autumn 2000 was the appointment of Nenad Čanak to the position 
of president of the Vojvodinian assembly. According to the League’s 
agenda, Vojvodina is characterized by such a degree of ethno-cultural 
diversity that is difficult to encounter anywhere else in Europe. As a 
result of these regional specifics, the provision of certain institutional 
guarantees was prescribed. These provisions were, namely, a bicameral 
parliament (consisting of a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber 
of Nationalities) and a Vojvodinian Constitution arranged by the 
Vojvodinian assembly. The territorial autonomy of Vojvodina’s sub-
regional units (Srem, Bačka, the Banat) was also endorsed.
In regard to Serbia’s constitutional rearrangement, federalization 
was proposed as the most appropriate option. According to LSDV, 
Serbia should be rearranged in terms of a democratic federal state 
whose units would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. The League 
proposed the establishment of six units drawn in accordance with their 
political interests, historical particularities, economic features and 
demographic factors. The units proposed were Vojvodina, Šumadija, 
Southeast Serbia, the greater Belgrade area, the Sandžak and Kosovo – 
following the settlement of its status. This ‘democratic federal Serbia’ 
was to be endowed with a bicameral parliament comprising a Chamber 
of Citizens and a Chamber of the Federal Units. The competencies 
assigned to the central government were to be national defence, foreign 
policy, monetary policy and other macro-economic issues. The primacy 
of the Chamber of Citizens was also endorsed.25
At this point, a similarity by default between the programmes of the 
League and DSS becomes apparent, namely the arrangement of an equal 
number of units in accordance with almost the same criteria. Especially 
in regard to functional and demographic catalysts, it seems that both 
parties found the drawing of units consisting of 2,000,000 residents on 
average as an efficient option. But this is where the similarities between 
25 Liga Socijal-Demokrata Vojvodine, ‘Republika Vojvodina: Put mira razvoja i stabilnosti’, 
March 1999, 1–4.
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the programmes of the two parties ended. In regard to the powers that 
the central government should retain, according to LSDV, the picture 
looked much closer to the very minimalist arrangement of the Serbia-
Montenegro union – thus implying some sort of loose union of regions 
with extensive self-government.
The very use of the term ‘federalization’ by LSDV implied the 
concession of more extensive competencies, even though not 
explicitly clarified in its programme. Perhaps it should be noted that 
the employment of the term ‘federalization’ in the party’s programme 
was not to be taken literally, but mainly as a means to emphasize deep 
decentralization. After all, the application of a genuine federal structure 
in a country as small and as poor as Serbia would not sound as a 
rational proposal, at the first place. Finally, even though at a first glance 
symmetric, the League’s programme mentioned that the six units 
would be granted ‘a higher or lower degree of autonomy in comparison 
to each other’.26 This, in combination with the institutional provisions 
proposed for Vojvodina, would leave much room, if only implicitly, for 
the attribution of a higher status to the province.
The Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina emphasized the 
historical and other particularities of Vojvodina in relation to the rest 
of Serbia. The Reformists also underlined, more emphatically than 
the League, the internal subdivision of Vojvodina into the, equally 
historical, sub-regions of Srem, Bačka and the Banat. In this sense, they 
argued that Vojvodina differentiated from other European regions.27 
By contrast to LSDV, the Reformists openly stood for the asymmetric 
regionalization of Serbia. The party envisaged the establishment 
of ‘a state of autonomous provinces and regions’ in Serbia. It was 
underlined that the autonomy of these regions and provinces should be 
explicitly defined in the Serbian Constitution. The areas in which the 
autonomous provinces, by their acts, independently and thoroughly 
would regulate certain decisions should be clarified as well. Also, the 
26 Ibid., 3.
27 Interview with RDSV representative; Novi Sad, 20 March 2001.
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constitutionality of the provincial legal acts should be assessed by the 
single Constitutional Court of the republic. The central competencies of 
the Serbian government would be national defence, foreign policy, state 
security, criminal law, monetary policy and other macro-economic 
issues.
In the specific case of Vojvodina certain institutional provisions were 
recommended. In accordance with the province’s internal subdivision, 
a power-sharing model of autonomy was proposed, in which the 
provincial government in Novi Sad would share its authority with 
sub-governments established in Srem, the Banat and the rest of Bačka. 
Finally, RDSV opted for the utilization of certain aspects of the 1974 
arrangements that might still be applicable today.28
Nevertheless, none of the two pro-autonomy parties was 
particularly popular then. The League, in particular, would not succeed 
in augmenting its public appeal, in the years to come, despite its 
continuous participation in the provincial institutions and decision-
making organs. There can be given quite a few explanations in regard 
to this occurrence. First of all, as a result of the wide diversity of popular 
views over what ‘autonomy’ means, the agendas of the pro-autonomy 
parties might not necessarily correspond to the way that many 
Vojvodinians perceived decentralization or regionalization. Second, 
both parties had often been accused of being too ‘region-centered’ and 
monopolized by their leaders (e.g. Nenad Čanak’s focal position within 
the League). In regard to the former allegation, Vojvodina’s status 
within the broader political context of Serbia and Montenegro was not 
adequately addressed in their programmes. To these might be added 
allegations regarding the inefficient staffing of LSDV and RDSV alike. 
Finally, the previous association of quite a few individuals among the 
pro-autonomist elites with the reformist branch of the old LCY (also, 
their frequently nostalgic allusions to the post-1974 era) might have 
28 Ibid.; Radosavljević Duško, ‘Autonomy of Vojvodina: Challenges and Perspectives’, 
in Open University Subotica, Essays on Regionalization (Subotica: Agency for Local 
Democracy, 2001), 151–6.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   184 30-08-2019   16:41:02
Vojvodina Going through Transition 185
discouraged quite a few Vojvodinians who opted for a definitive break 
from whatever they perceived as remnants of Titoism.
The Serbian Constitution of 2006  
and Vojvodina’s status
As it was stated in the Omnibus law’s explanatory section, this 
document simply signified a step towards the inauguration of the 
new Serbian Constitution and the definitive settlement of Vojvodina’s 
status. In practice, however, this objective became entangled into the 
fuzzy and multifaceted web of geopolitics within the ex-Yugoslav 
space. The main areas of concern were the redefinition of Serbian-
Montenegrin relations; Kosovo’s locus within Serbia since 1999. 
Especially with regard to the latter, Serbian policymakers concentrated 
their efforts on negotiations with the international community, hoping 
to secure Kosovo’s maintenance within Serbia, while pending the 
definitive settlement of the province’s status. Correspondingly, Serbian 
constitutional theorists and policymakers started favouring centralized 
options for Serbia’s regional restructuring with only some room for 
functional decentralization and limited financial autonomy.29 This 
dominant trend among Belgrade’s political circles was reflected in the 
new Serbian Constitution, which was inaugurated on 8 November 2006.
At this point, it should be noted that the period prior to the 
inauguration of the new Constitution saw the drafting of certain 
proposals for Serbia’s symmetric regionalization. For the purposes 
of this work, attention is paid to Pavle Nikolić’s recommendations.30 
Nikolić, a constitutional theorist at Belgrade University, advocated for 
the dissolution of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo 
29 Zorica Radović, ‘Srbija kao država regiona’, Forum za Etničke Odnose, Prinčipi ustavne 
deklaracije (Belgrade: Forum za Etničke Odnose Publikacije, 2000), 30–48; Zoran Bačić, 
Mijatović Boško, Aleksandar Simić and Zorica Radović, Regionalizacija Srbije (Belgrade: 
Centar za Liberalno-demokratske Studije Publikacije, 2003).
30 Dnevnik, 2 February 2004.
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and the establishment of thirteen regions with equal competencies. 
As part of this arrangement, Vojvodina was to be divided into 
the sub-regions of Srem, the Banat and Bačka. Nikolić contended 
that symmetric regionalization would ensure the administrative 
autonomy of all Serbian regions whereas, on the contrary, asymmetric 
regionalization would generate inequalities and tensions. Especially the 
existence of the two autonomous provinces in Serbia was judged, by the 
author, as an out of date reminder of the 1946 arrangement. In a similar 
vein to the DSS proposal (2001), Nikolić called for the concession of 
an equal degree of fiscal autonomy to all regions plus their entitlement 
to veto certain governmental decisions that might prove detrimental 
to their jurisdiction. However, as a result of functional considerations, 
the author proposed the formation of thirteen regions instead of DSS’s 
six. Nevertheless, the Serbian policymakers’ top objective remained the 
formal affirmation of Kosovo’s locus (within its existing limits) inside 
the bounds of the Serbian republic. This amounted to no room for such 
‘symmetric’ considerations.
Indeed, the Preamble of the Constitution defines Kosovo and 
Metohija as ‘an integral part of the territory of Serbia with substantial 
autonomy’.31 In addition, Part VII designates Kosovo, together with 
Vojvodina, as one of Serbia’s autonomous provinces with all the rights 
and obligations prescribed (Articles 182–187). With specific regard to 
Vojvodina, Article 184.3 dictates that ‘the budget of the autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina shall amount to at least 7 per cent in relation 
to the budget of the republic, bearing in mind that three-sevenths of 
the budget of the autonomous province of Vojvodina shall be used for 
financing the capital expenditures’. This provision signifies a departure 
from the 1990 Constitution and establishes the preconditions for 
regulated fiscal autonomy. Nevertheless, Article 184 does not make 
it explicitly clear whether the autonomous provinces are allocated a 
right of taxation or not. In addition to this, Article 177 specifies that 
31 For a full-text version of the 2006 Serbian Constitution, see ‘Ustav Republike Srbije’, 
Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 98/06. For a commentary on the Constitution, see 
Venice Commission, Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, Opinion No. 405/2006.
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‘local self-government units (opštine) shall be competent in those 
matters which may be realized, in an effective way, within a local self-
government unit, and autonomous provinces in those matters which 
may be realized, in an effective way within an autonomous province’.
However, nowhere in the new Constitution are the relations 
within the triadic nexus that comprises the Serbian government, the 
autonomous provinces and the opštine precisely defined and regulated. 
This leads to the conclusion that the new Constitution informally 
strengthened local self-government in an attempt to counterbalance any 
potential aspirations by the autonomous provinces (namely Vojvodina) 
to enhance their status. The strengthening of local self-government 
has often formed part of the political bargaining, on the national 
governments’ behalf, with the objective to place a check upon larger 
regional institutions (e.g. Spain in the 1980s). In the case of the new 
Serbian Constitution, this argument gains greater weight if the previous 
articles are read in combination with Article 97 which places the 
jurisdiction and operation of both autonomous provinces and opštine 
under the auspices of the Serbian government (once again, though, 
not clearly defined). Lastly, Article 182.3 allows for the establishment 
of new autonomous provinces if so decided in a referendum. At this 
given moment, though, it is hard to predict how this clause might 
bring about a long-term ‘symmetricization’ of Serbia’s regionalization. 
In an overall assessment, the 2006 Serbian Constitution relatively 
enhanced Vojvodina’s control over its revenues but not Vojvodina’s 
asymmetric status as such. In practice, the 2006 Constitution favoured 
decentralization over asymmetric regionalization.
Rapid developments in Serbian politics  
and the European dimension
The provisions of the new Serbian constitution for Vojvodina caused 
dissatisfaction among a variety of interest groups in the province. As 
expected, this was particularly the case with the League of Vojvodina’s 
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Social Democrats and other regionalist groupings. As already stated, 
neither the League nor any other pro-autonomy parties had been 
particularly popular in Vojvodina. This also became evident in the 
results of the May 2008 elections for the Vojvodinian assembly, where 
the ‘Together for Vojvodina’ coalition (led by Nenad Čanak) garnered a 
mere 8.2 per cent of the vote.
Nevertheless, the year 2008 saw radical realignments at the 
governmental level in Serbia. As illustrated throughout this work, 
Serbian elite politics have long been dominated by short-term interests 
and characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and fluidity. 
Numerous coalitions have been formed and swiftly dissolved as a 
result of conflicting standpoints, disagreements in decision-making or 
even personal antipathies. This is what happened when Boris Tadić’s 
and Vojislav Koštunica’s positions on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration 
of independence (17 February 2008) clashed; a disagreement which 
brought about the May 2008 elections. The fear of losing the elections 
to SRS rendered DS flexible even to alliances with the League and the 
Sandžak minority parties. The League’s participation in the governing 
structures after May 2008 enhanced this party’s bargaining potential in 
regard to the reinforcement of Vojvodina’s asymmetric status. To this 
objective, Čanak and his associates were also encouraged by indications 
that the popular mood in Vojvodina had been constantly swinging 
towards asymmetric or highly devolved options.32
In light of these new circumstances, a number of DS policymakers in 
Belgrade and Novi Sad started regarding allegations over ‘secessionist’ 
trends in Vojvodina as rather exaggerated. DS policymakers were soon 
encouraged to adopt a more positive outlook on the restitution of certain 
competencies to the Vojvodinian assembly, in an attempt to placate the 
EU and enhance Serbia’s prospects for accession to the Union; respond 
to the popular demands in Vojvodina for the reinforcement of the 
32 NVO Diferentija Niš, Istraživanje o stavovima građana regiona Srbije prema toleranciji, 
suočavanju s prošlošću, decentralizaciji, i prepoznavaju osnovnih demokratskih vrednosti 
(2009), Niš, 14; Zsölt Lazar, Vojvodina amidst Multiculturality and Regionalization 
(Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing, 2007), 51–60.
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province’s status. In regard to the former objective, the more favourable 
disposition, on Belgrade’s behalf, towards the restitution of autonomous 
competencies to Vojvodina was greeted with satisfaction in Brussels. 
This was reflected in the positive remarks that Serbia’s regionalization 
process had received in the EU progress reports for 2009 and 2010.33
Moving to the ‘external front’, Serbia’s path towards the EU has long 
been paved with obstacles. Since 2000, the pressures on the Serbian 
government to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal had generated 
tensions between the two sides. This even led to the suspension of 
the EU–Serbia negotiations (3 May 2006). Radovan Karadžić’s arrest 
(21 July 2008) reopened the way to Serbia’s accession to the European 
structures. This culminated with the country’s formal application to the 
EU (22 December 2009).
EU advisors have not exerted overt and intense pressures on Serbia 
in regard to Vojvodina’s status and regionalization per se. No universally 
agreed-upon and binding ‘European’ guidelines on regionalization 
are in force, at the first place, either. In 1997, the Council of Europe 
issued the Draft European Charter on Regional Self-Government. This 
signified an attempt to introduce some universal standards on the 
implementation of regionalization and the allocation of administrative 
capacities to regional authorities. Nevertheless, this draft charter was 
never officially approved due to the objections, by certain COE and 
EU member-states, to its prerogatives. In spite of this, the Council of 
Europe and certain bodies operating under the umbrella of the EU 
have highlighted the necessity for European states to devolve part of 
their authority towards the regional and local self-government levels, 
in a balanced and coordinated manner; reach a modus vivendi over 
the percentage of the regional revenues channelled towards the central 
coffers.
With specific regard to Vojvodina, these guidelines acquired 
particular significance considering that Vojvodina is a rich agricultural 
33 European Commission, Serbia 2009 Progress Report, SEC (2009) 1339; European 
Commission, Serbia 2010 Progress Report, SEC (2010) 1330.
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region which has been participating in a number of EU-sponsored 
cross-border cooperation schemes such as the ‘Banat’ (or DKMT) 
Euro-region.34 Despite the absence of any serious pressures on 
Belgrade, the EU’s informal engagement over Serbia’s regionalization 
and Vojvodina’s status had been rather active. EU advisors held a series 
of meetings with their Serbian counterparts. In the course of these 
sessions, the former outlined to the latter the benefits of enhancing 
Vojvodina’s administrative competencies in light of Serbia’s accession 
to the European structures. EU advisors particularly stressed that the 
extension of the province’s capacities could contribute to the more 
efficient management of ethnic relations ‘on the spot’. They underlined 
that this could also facilitate Vojvodina’s fruitful participation in a 
number of EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation schemes. Lastly, 
they emphasized that, in the long term, the strengthening of the 
administrative institutions in Vojvodina could operate as an efficient 
mechanism for the local management and distribution of the Structural 
Funds.
The new statute for Vojvodina (2009)  
and its political significance
The outcome of this intersection between domestic and external 
catalysts was the inauguration of the new statute for Vojvodina. The 
draft version of this document was ready, as early as mid-August 
2008.35 The drafting board comprised Vojvodinian DS-affiliates, local 
academics and constitutional theorists involved in pro-autonomy 
workshops (e.g. the Novi Sad Centre for Regionalism). The Vojvodinian 
assembly approved this document after a heated session on 15 October 
34 Vassilis Petsinis, ‘The Banat Euro-Region: Prospects and Obstacles’, in The Borders of 
Europe, New Europe College and Goethe Institute Bucharest (Bucharest: University of 
Bucharest Publishing, 2007).
35 ‘DS: Novi statut Vojvodine,’ Dnevnik, 21 August 2008.
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2008.36 As Bojan Pajtić, a DS-member and president of the executive 
council at Vojvodina’s assembly, stated: ‘the Communist-era system of 
autonomies was embedded in an one-party state structure …. The new 
statute brings about a novel concept of autonomy, always considering 
that Vojvodina aspires to become a European region and have more 
effective control over its resources’.37
Nevertheless, not everyone shared this state of euphoria. A number 
of DSS and SRS deputies voiced their dissatisfaction with the draft 
statute and regarded it as ‘unconstitutional’ and a document which 
builds up a ‘state within a state’.38 The objections by a considerable 
segment of Belgrade’s political elites (including some DS-affiliates) to 
the draft statute delayed this document’s ratification by the Serbian 
parliament for nearly a year. The approval process commenced on 
24 November 2009, and the statute was finally approved by the Serbian 
parliament on 30 November.39 Of all amendments, only a number of 
amendments proposed by the Socialists were accepted. The statute was 
officially proclaimed on 14 December 2009, in Novi Sad and put into 
force on 1 January 2010.
In accordance with Article 185 of the Serbian Constitution, this 
document is formally designated as a statute and not a separate 
constitutional act. In practice, however, the new statute concedes 
numerous competencies to the Vojvodinian assembly. Article 33 of 
the statute designates the Vojvodinian assembly as the ‘highest organ 
and the institution with norm-setting powers in the autonomous 
province of Vojvodina’. Article 47 designates the government at the 
36 The 89 deputies of the DS-spearheaded governing coalition at the Vojvodinian assembly 
voted in favour of the new statute. Meanwhile, the 21 DSS and SRS deputies voted 
against. On this issue, see ‘Novi Statut Vojvodine’, BBC Srpski, 15 October 2008. For a 
full-text-version of the statute, see ‘Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine’, Službeni List 
AP Vojvodine, br. 17/2009.
37 ‘Poslanička većina podržala statut Vojvodine’, Građanski List, 15 October 2008.
38 Ibid.; ‘DSS i SRS nude svoje verzije Statuta’, Radio-televizija Vojvodine, 15 October 2008.
39 The 137 deputies of the ruling coalition voted in favour of the new statute, whereas 24 
deputies from the DSS and New Serbia voted against. The SRS deputies abstained from 
the procedure. On this issue, see ‘Prošla autonomija’, Večernje Novosti, 30 November 
2009.
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Vojvodinian assembly as the highest executive organ. The use of the 
term government instead of ‘executive council’, which was in force 
before, implies an upgraded status – if only at the symbolic level. 
Article 34 authorizes the assembly to have its say on constitutional 
amendments that can have an impact on Vojvodina. Article 18 
authorizes either the Vojvodinian assembly or government to appeal 
to the Constitutional Court in the event that a republican law infringes 
upon the statute. Although Article 34 does not concede separate 
legislative competencies to the assembly (except issuing the statute 
plus certain declarations and resolutions of regional significance), 
the two aforementioned provisions are of great significance since 
they safeguard the premises of the province’s autonomy. Another 
significant provision is the provincial ombudsman with the task to 
supervise the proper implementation of the statute and other relevant 
legislation (Article 61). As far as judicial autonomy is concerned, 
Article 34 authorizes the assembly to organize the network of courts 
throughout Vojvodina.
A question of vital importance was the financial one. Article 62 
reiterates the clause with regard to the ratio between the Vojvodinian 
and the republican budget, as stated in Article 184.3 of the Constitution 
(7 per cent of the republican budget). Article 63 enables Vojvodina to: 
finance projects within its territory from the provincial budget; have 
its own taxation system. Nevertheless, the same article dictates that it 
must be implemented in accordance with a special law on Vojvodina’s 
finances. In principle, Articles 62 and 63 provide plenty of space 
for financial autonomy. Another provision of major importance is 
Vojvodina’s authorization to establish its regional bank (Articles 29 and 
34). Moreover, Article 16 specifies that Vojvodina can sign agreements 
on financial cooperation with foreign agents in its own right; have its 
representatives in Brussels and other European regions. The former 
clause reads like a ‘reformulated reminder’ of certain provisions in the 
1974 Vojvodinian Constitution which also enabled the province to 
arrange financial deals with foreign agents. Here, it should be kept in 
mind that since 2002, Vojvodina has been participating in the Assembly 
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of European Regions (AER) in Brussels. This is an independent network 
and interest-association of regions.40
The statute significantly enhances the protection of minority rights 
and enables provincial organs to manage this issue ‘on the spot’. The 
statute’s preamble upgrades the collective status of national minorities 
to that of national communities (nacionalne zajednice). Articles 6 
and 7 reaffirm Vojvodina’s multiethnic physiognomy and equality 
among all ethnic groups; provide for the implementation of positive 
discrimination with the aim to safeguard minority identities.41 Article 
23 reaffirms the dual dimension of minority rights (individual as well as 
collective), whereas Article 26 safeguards the use of minority languages 
in education and public information.
An institutional provision of major importance is the establishment 
of a Council for National Communities at the assembly (Article 40). 
This thirty-member body is to consist of representatives of the largest 
minorities in Vojvodina; concentrate on the implementation of the 
clauses on minority education, cultural activities and the official use of 
minority languages. Similar provisions were included in the Law for the 
Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities which was 
inaugurated in February 2002 within the framework of the Serbian-
Montenegrin loose federation.42 Therefore, it seems that the statute’s 
drafting committee modified and incorporated certain guidelines of 
this law to their document. Finally, Article 17 sets the preconditions for 
the establishment of the Vojvodinian Academy of Sciences (VANU). 
Throughout this arrangement, the statute stresses its locus within 
Serbia’s constitutional framework and reaffirms Vojvodina as an 
indivisible part of Serbia (Articles 1 and 64).
40 Through its participation in AER, Vojvodina expects to gain from the knowledge 
exchange with developed European regions, such as Lombardy and Catalonia, in a 
number of areas (e.g. financial management and infrastructural issues). For more 
information on AER, see: https://aer.eu/.
41 It should be added that Article 6 restored the collective legal status of the ethnic Croat 
community.
42 Vassilis Petsinis, ‘Vojvodina’s National Minorities: Current Realities and Future 
Prospects’, Spaces of Identity 3[1], no. 2 (2003): 8–11.
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As one might expect, the new statute did not leave everyone satisfied. 
In the one end of the spectrum, DSS and SRS representatives, as well as 
certain constitutional theorists, interpreted the statute as a document 
which concedes Vojvodina nearly the attributes of a state. Particularly 
bitter were the reactions of the pro-centralists in regard to Vojvodina’s 
designation as a ‘European region’ (Article 1), its authorization to 
cooperate with other European regions, fiscal autonomy and the 
establishment of VANU. Nevertheless, all these allegations were 
exaggerated. The designation ‘European region’ implies that Vojvodina 
is a region where European civic values prevail; not a separate entity 
within Europe. Moreover, there is nothing unconstitutional with Article 
16 on foreign cooperation since the very same provision for Vojvodina 
is included in Article 181 of the Serbian Constitution. As far as financial 
autonomy is concerned, this was a demand shared among almost the 
entirety of Vojvodina’s citizenry and not exclusively the regionalists. 
This is not hard to grasp, taking into consideration the mismanagement 
of the province’s revenues, by the central government, during the 1990s. 
Lastly, regional academic associations operate in various European 
states; whether unitary (France), federal (Germany) or ‘regionalized’ 
(Italy).
In the opposite end of the spectrum, the League and other pro-
autonomists complained that the new statute does not really touch 
on legislative and judicial powers; neither does it resolve the financial 
question.43 At this point, it should be noted that the 1974 system of 
autonomies still serves as a, if merely symbolic, compass for many 
Vojvodinian autonomists albeit not openly admitted. Nevertheless, 
nowadays, the concession of extensive legislative and judicial powers 
to Vojvodina, along the lines of the 1974 arrangement, might lead to 
Serbia’s confederalization. The introduction of such parallel structures is 
43 Dnevnik, 16 October 2009: A statement by Nenad Čanak on the new statute for 
Vojvodina.
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not something that a small and not particularly wealthy state like Serbia 
could afford. This argument gains greater weight, considering Serbia’s 
‘state-shrinkage’ after the dissolution of the Serbian-Montenegrin state 
union (21 May 2006) and the loss of Kosovo. As it occurred in Spain 
during the 1980s, there is also a serious possibility that such an option 
would anger other Serbian regions who might protest that Vojvodina 
gets a very preferential treatment.
Otherwise, the new statute is compatible with the European 
standards on contemporary regionalization. For the purposes of this 
work, attention is paid to the guidelines of the Draft European Charter 
on Regional Self-Government (Council of Europe 1997). This may not 
be a legally binding document but it still has a ‘framework value’ for 
setting up some basic standards on the devolution of authority towards 
the regional level within the European space.
For a start, the new statute is consistent with the draft charter’s clauses 
which affirm the locus of regional institutions within the administrative 
and constitutional frameworks of the state that they belong to (Draft 
European Charter on Regional Self-Government; Preamble, Article 8); 
and encourage inter-regional cooperation throughout the Continent 
(ibid.; Preamble, Article 11).
In accordance with Article 1.2 of the draft charter, the new statute 
precisely defines the scope of regional self-government for Vojvodina. 
This is equally the case in regard to the designation of the regional 
competencies, the affirmation of their free function and assignment 
to the regional bodies responsible (ibid.; Articles 4, 12.1 and 12.2). 
Furthermore, the new statute authorizes Vojvodina to participate in 
decision-making processes of vital interest, at the macro-political level 
(ibid.; Article  9.1); guarantees its representation in the relevant European 
institutions (ibid.; Article 10.1). As far as finance and the management 
of regional resources are concerned, the new statute precisely specifies 
the boundaries of Vojvodina’s financial autonomy (ibid.; Article 14) 
and establishes a regional taxation system (ibid.; Article 15). Lastly, the 
new statute safeguards the boundaries of Vojvodina’s autonomy and the 
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regional ombudsman functions as an adequate supervisory mechanism 
(ibid.; Articles 16, 17 and 19).
The new statute for Vojvodina was drafted and came into force 
with a rather long delay, amid what has been seen as Serbia’s ‘state-
shrinkage’. In regard to the extent of autonomous jurisdictions, one 
might argue that the new statute somewhat resembles more closely 
the arrangement for the ‘special’ Italian regions. In principle, this 
document strengthens Vojvodina’s asymmetric status within Serbia 
and comes to fill in certain ambiguities in the 2006 Constitution. 
The traumatic experience of the 1990s had rendered the safeguard 
of Vojvodina’s autonomous jurisdiction an imperative. Furthermore, 
it became essential that the Vojvodinian assembly should pass legal 
measures of direct importance to the province (e.g. its statute and 
other relevant legislation) jointly with the republican parliament and 
not under full subordination to the latter. Especially the concession of 
fiscal autonomy to Vojvodina became an urgent necessity, in order to 
reverse the aftermath of economic mismanagement during the 1990s. 
This is equally valid in regard to the more efficient management of 
minority issues on a more regionalized basis and ‘on the spot’.
Public outlooks on Vojvodina’s regional identity  
and the state of interethnic relations
At this point, it would be interesting to highlight the public outlooks 
of Vojvodina’s citizens towards regional identity and the climate of 
interethnic relations during the early part of the 2000s. A general 
trend observed in most public surveys was a preference towards the 
asymmetric and/or substantially decentralized options (Tables 14, 15 
and 16) in regard to Vojvodina’s administrative status within Serbia. 
This trend was highly subject to the deterioration of the socio-economic 
conditions during the 1990s. Hence, the overwhelming stress on the 
questions of economic autonomy and the improvement of the province’s 
economic capacities in several opinion polls (Tables 15, 16 and 17).
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Source: Milka Puzigaca and Aleksandar Molnar, Istraživanje javnog mnenja: Autonomija 
Vojvodine (Novi Sad: SCAN, 2001), 1–19 (Sample size: 1,422 respondents).
Table 14 What should Vojvodina’s administrative status be?
A similar degree of autonomy to what was 
the case according to the 1974 constitutional 
arrangement
33.1% of the respondents
The same as it is today 22.7% of the respondents
More autonomy within Serbia but less 
than it was the case according to the 1974 
constitutional arrangement
17.6% of the respondents
Republic within FR Yugoslavia  6.4% of the respondents
No autonomous jurisdictions whatsoever  6.3% of the respondents
Independent state  4.2% of the respondents
Something else  4.5% of the respondents
I do not know  5.2% of the respondents
Table 15 What kind of status should Vojvodina enjoy?
Source: Zsölt Lazar and Radivoj Stepanov, ‘Odnos Vojvođana prema ustavnopravnom statusu 
Vojvodine’, in Kultura u proćesima razvoja, regionalizacije i Evrointegracije Balkana (University of 
Niš [Institute of Sociology], 2003) (Sample size: 516 respondents).
The existing status 13.9% of the respondents
Economic, political and cultural autonomy 
within the Republic of Serbia
57.9% of the respondents
Republic within the State’s Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro
 9.8% of the respondents
Independent state  0.8% of the respondents
Table 16 What should Vojvodina’s administrative status be?
Vojvodina should become an independent 
state
 1.18% of the respondents
Vojvodina should remain part of FR 
Yugoslavia
14.71% of the respondents
Vojvodina should be granted economic and 
political autonomy within Serbia
28.24% of the respondents
(Continued)
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Meanwhile, certain ambiguities persisted in regard to the other areas 
of institutional autonomy (Table 18). The entire concept of ‘autonomy’ 
remained rather vague for quite a few Vojvodinians, even though the 
general climate regarding the reinforcement of Vojvodina’s autonomy 
beyond the economic sector was rather positive. Even though positively 
pre-disposed towards the prospect of regional autonomy, the majority 
of Vojvodinians still believed that the best path towards strengthening 
Vojvodinian autonomy was through constant negotiation with 
Belgrade’s political elites over the achievement of a compromise over 
this issue.44 This could have been an additional factor that accounted for 
the low public appeal of the pro-autonomy parties.
Vojvodina should have a greater say over 
the management of its income resources
34.71% of the respondents
The existing status 12.35% of the respondents
No autonomous jurisdictions whatsoever/
establishment of a centralized state
 8.82% of the respondents
Source: Novosadska Novinarska Škola, Nacionalistička vrednosna orijentacija kao faktor otpora 
prema autonomiji Vojvodine (Novi Sad: NNS, 2001), 34 (Sample size: 170 respondents).
Table 17 Vojvodina is denied the right to finance projects within its territory 
from the provincial budget. Would this be a good arrangement?
Source: Puzigaca and Molnar (2001, p. 9).
No, because in this way Vojvodina would be 
robbed of its provincial income
68.9% of the respondents
Yes, because in this way Serbia would have 
greater control over Vojvodina’s income 
resources
 9.3% of the respondents
Some alternative arrangement would be 
better
 9.9% of the respondents
I do not know 11.9% of the respondents
44 Milka Puzigaca and Aleksandar Molnar, Istraživanje javnog mnenja: Autonomija 
Vojvodine (Novi Sad: SCAN, 2001), 12.
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As far as the reserved or negative attitudes towards the prospect 
of autonomy were concerned, these had been subject to the gradual 
fragmentation of the old Yugoslavia and its negative repercussions 
on the ethnic Serb communities. Although, as already clarified, the 
question of Vojvodinian autonomy is qualitatively different to the 
various secessionist trends witnessed all over the former Yugoslavia 
throughout the 1990s, the negative consequences of the latter seemed 
to have left their mark on the political outlooks of quite few Serbs in the 
province. This sensitivity over questions of regional autonomy was also 
subject to the memories of the 1974 constitutional arrangements, which 
many Serbs in Vojvodina and elsewhere tended to perceive as, perhaps, 
the root of all evils in regard to the troubles in the former Yugoslavia. 
In addition to these, the positive stance of quite a few Vojvodinian 
Montenegrins and other colonists towards more centralized state’s 
structures (Table 19) seemed to be an additional by-product of the 
psychological turmoil involved in the interethnic warfare across the 
former Yugoslavia. Especially incidents such as the ethnic cleansing 
of the Serb community in the Croatian Krajina (1995) had exerted a 
definitive and largely personalized impact on them.
Furthermore, the high degree of parochial affiliation observed in 
these public surveys originated from a feeling of uncertainty.45 It became 
evident that the disintegration of the old Yugoslavia, the international 
isolation and widespread poverty made the citizens of Vojvodina 
Table 18 What kind of meaning does the term autonomy have for you?
Source: Novosadska Novinarska Škola (2001, p. 34).
A negative one 16.47% of the respondents
A vague and unclear one 44.12% of the respondents
A not particularly clear one 27.65% of the respondents
A very clear and positive one 11.75% of the respondents
45 Zsölt Lazar and Dušan Marinković, ‘Regional Identity: Vojvodina’s Urban Public 
Research Survey’, in Essays on Regionalisation, 184–5.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   199 30-08-2019   16:41:03
Ta
bl
e 1
9 
W
ha
t s
ho
ul
d 
Vo
jv
od
in
a’s
 st
at
us
 w
ith
in
 S
er
bi
a b
e (
br
ok
en
 d
ow
n 
in
 ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 n
at
io
na
l a
ffi
lia
tio
n)
?
N
at
io
na
l a
ffi
lia
tio
n
Ex
ist
in
g 
st
at
us
Ec
on
om
ic
 an
d 
cu
ltu
ra
l 
au
to
no
m
y w
ith
in
 S
er
bi
a
Re
pu
bl
ic
 w
ith
in
 F
R 
Yu
go
sla
vi
a
In
de
pe
nd
en
t s
ta
te
To
ta
l
Se
rb
s
77 23
.4
%
20
2 61
.4
%
37 11
.2
%
13 4
.0
%
32
9
10
0.
0%
M
on
te
ne
gr
in
s
19 65
.5
%
6 20
.7
%
4 13
.8
%
29 10
0.
0%
Cr
oa
ts
10 24
.4
%
25 61
.0
%
5 12
.2
%
1 2.
4%
41 10
0.
0%
H
un
ga
ria
ns
12 23
.5
%
24 47
.1
%
11 21
.6
%
4 7.
8%
51 10
0.
0%
O
th
er
s
23 35
.4
%
27 41
.5
%
11 16
.9
%
4 6.
2%
65 10
0.
0%
So
ur
ce
: Z
sö
lt 
La
za
r a
nd
 D
uš
an
 M
ar
in
ko
vi
ć, 
‘R
eg
io
na
l I
de
nt
ity
: V
oj
vo
di
na
’s 
U
rb
an
 P
ub
lic
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
Su
rv
ey
’, i
n 
Es
sa
ys
 o
n 
Re
gi
on
al
iz
at
io
n,
 1
81
.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   200 30-08-2019   16:41:03
Vojvodina Going through Transition 201
incline more to their local communities where they felt more intimately 
rooted. In this light, the high degree of affiliation with the Republic of 
Serbia, on behalf of many respondents who settled in Vojvodina during 
the 1990s (mostly refugees), serves as an indication that the war evicted 
persons from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina perceived the Serbian 
republic as a safe haven and shelter from persecution. In regard to the 
higher importance attached to social tolerance and personal security by 
refugees,46 this derived from their relative social marginalization and 
instances of confrontation with the locals over the allocation of scarce 
job opportunities.
The public survey Istraživanje javnog mnenja: Autonomija Vojvodine, 
conducted by the Novi Sad SCAN agency throughout 2000 and 2001, 
had observed a generally positive disposition among Vojvodinians 
towards the official use of minority languages and their alphabets; 
relations between Vojvodina’s ethnic minorities and their kin states; 
institutional guarantees for ethnic minorities (Table 20).47 The results 
of this opinion poll serve as an additional indication that in the case 
of Vojvodina we have to do with intercultural instead of multicultural 
cohabitation. In the latter case, contacts among ethnic groups exist on a 
formal level and are mostly of a political and economic nature (e.g. the 
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the recent conflict). In the case of 
Vojvodina, however, it seems that there exist ethnic group cultures but 
beside these cultures there exists a common cultural substratum which 
becomes manifest in the form of Vojvodinian regional identity. It is 
precisely this regional identity that is one of the main factors influencing 
the presence of common denominators. Regional identity establishes 
common human values, developed as significant or even existential by 
diverse ethnic groups. On such an occasion, the part played by similar 
living conditions, historical links and mutual reliance, as well as the 
common future perspectives should be taken into account.
46 On this issue see the results of the opinion poll in Ibid., 179.
47 Puzigaca and Molnar, Istraživanje javnog mnenja, 11 and 15.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   201 30-08-2019   16:41:03
Ta
bl
e 2
0 
Sh
ou
ld
 th
e A
ss
em
bl
y 
of
 th
e A
ut
on
om
ou
s P
ro
vi
nc
e o
f V
oj
vo
di
na
 co
m
pr
ise
 a 
Ch
am
be
r o
f N
at
io
na
l C
om
m
un
iti
es
 w
he
re
 
th
e m
aj
or
 n
at
io
na
l c
om
m
un
iti
es
 in
 th
e p
ro
vi
nc
e w
ill
 b
e e
qu
al
ly
 re
pr
es
en
te
d 
(b
ro
ke
n 
do
w
n 
in
 ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 n
at
io
na
l a
ffi
lia
tio
n)
?
N
at
io
na
l 
affi
lia
tio
n
Ye
s, 
w
ith
 fu
ll-
fle
dg
ed
 
ju
ri
sd
ic
tio
n
Ye
s, 
bu
t o
nl
y a
s a
 b
od
y w
hi
ch
 
w
ill
 d
ec
id
e o
ve
r q
ue
st
io
ns
 
pe
rt
ai
ni
ng
 to
 th
e e
qu
al
ity
 o
f 
na
tio
na
l c
om
m
un
iti
es
N
o
I d
o 
no
t k
no
w
TO
TA
L
Se
rb
s
15
.5
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
37
.7
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
31
.4
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
15
.4
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
Cr
oa
ts
26
.7
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
53
.3
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
3.
3%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
16
.7
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
H
un
ga
ria
ns
45
.7
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
39
.4
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
2.
9%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
12
.0
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
M
on
te
ne
gr
in
s
9.
1%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
31
.8
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
50
.0
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
9.
1%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
Sl
ov
ak
s
40
.6
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
30
.4
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
5.
8%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
23
.2
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
Ro
m
an
ia
ns
47
.1
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
23
.5
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
29
.4
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
Ru
th
en
es
22
.2
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
22
.2
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
33
.3
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
22
.2
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
O
th
er
s
20
.6
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
36
.5
%
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
23
.8
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
19
.0
%
 o
f t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
10
0.
0%
So
ur
ce
: P
uz
ig
ac
a a
nd
 M
ol
na
r (
20
01
, p
. 1
5)
.
9781788313735_txt_rev.indd   202 30-08-2019   16:41:03
Vojvodina Going through Transition 203
This notion of intercultural cohabitation manifests itself in various 
shapes in the Vojvodinian everyday life and experience. Intermarriage 
among different ethnic groups remains a common occurrence in the 
urban as well as the rural settlements. In most cases, catalysts such 
as the workplace or the neighbourhood still seem to take precedence 
over ethno-cultural or religious cleavages. Furthermore, in certain 
multiethnic rural communities the locals often celebrate religious 
and other seoške (‘village’) feasts together, regardless of their ethno-
cultural affiliation and regardless of whether the religious festivities 
are Eastern Orthodox or Roman Catholic.48 This is not to say that 
Vojvodina is anywhere near the American melting pot. By contrast, the 
ethnic communities in Vojvodina have preserved a certain degree of 
integrity, insisting on their own distinctive identities.49 In Vojvodina, 
this often becomes obvious on the grassroots level through the 
persistence of certain auto-stereotypes (images of the self) and hetero-
stereotypes (images of others). All sorts of group stereotypes represent 
oversimplified views on the characteristics of ethnic groups. In social 
science, what is oversimplified cannot be regarded as valid. On the 
popular level, though, it seems that the persistence of mutual stereotypes 
has somewhat facilitated the preservation of the distinctiveness of the 
ethnic communities in Vojvodina.50
On the other hand, the negative stance towards the prospect of 
making further concessions to the province’s minority groups became 
subject to the fragmentation of the old Yugoslavia; the resurgence of 
militant irredentist nationalism (e.g. the ethnic Albanian case); the 
negative impact of the recent conflicts on the Serbs in Kosovo and the 
other parts of ex-Yugoslavia. Finally, the relative reluctance of quite a 
48 Interview with sociologist at the University of Novi Sad; 13 March 2001 – Interview with 
representative of the Serbian Orthodox Church; Novi Sad, 18 March 2001.
49 Interview with sociologist at the University of Novi Sad; 14 November 2005.
50 For example, the dominant group stereotype about Serbs is that they are generally open 
and joyful people but not very punctual. The Hungarians, on the other hand, are regarded 
as precise, gentle and hard-working people but not particularly ‘temperamental’. Some 
information over these stereotypes was disclosed to the author in the course of his 
field research in Vojvodina (interview with sociologist/interview with historian at the 
University of Novi Sad; 13 March 2001).
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few ethnic Hungarians towards the initiatives of VMSZ and VMDK 
for northern Bačka may be interpreted as a fear that the concession of 
autonomy within Vojvodina according to the ethno-territorial principle 
might resurface cleavages and tensions potentially detrimental to the 
state of intercultural understanding in the province.51
Some worrying signs: The ‘ethnic  
incidents’ of the mid-2000s
Between 2003 and 2005, a spate of incidences often categorized as 
‘ethnic’ took place in Vojvodina. These incidences ranged from hate 
graffiti to acts of vandalism directed against churches or graveyards.52 In 
most cases, however, they involved violent clashes between individuals 
or groups of youths belonging to different ethnic affiliations (most 
commonly, Serbs and ethnic Hungarians or Croats).
On this occasion, the impact of external catalysts comes to the fore 
again. The recent wars for secession in the former Yugoslavia were 
largely conditioned by the concept that internal political stability 
and socio-economic progress ‘equal’ national homogeneity. This 
drive towards national homogenization in the breakaway Yugoslav 
republics often escalated to violent excesses in the course of the latest 
conflicts. The equation of internal stability with national homogeneity 
soon found acceptance among international policymakers as well. 
This was reflected, for instance, in the constitutional structuring of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina along the lines of ethnic partition by the Dayton 
Agreement. With specific focus on the Serbs, they had also been target 
of the aggressive drive towards national homogenization in the other 
parts of the former Yugoslavia. In regard to the Serbs of Vojvodina, 
the presence of a considerable number of Serb refugees in the province 
serves as a constant reminder of what many Vojvodinian Serbs perceive 
51 Puzigaca and Molnar, Istraživanje javnog mnenja, 16.
52 Dinko Gruhonjić, ‘Gde je Vojvođanska tolerancija išla?’ Građanski list, 21 October 2003.
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as the ‘historical injustice’ against the Serbian nation. This was not 
solely the case with the 1995 ‘Operation Storm’ or the developments in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina over the 1990s but also the ‘silent’ ethnic cleansing 
of the Serbs from Kosovo since 1999.53 Therefore, a greater percentage 
of Serbs in Vojvodina and Serbia as a whole had come to adhere to 
the principle ‘internal stability=national homogeneity’, thus indirectly 
condoning acts of ethnic intolerance. Despite the non-negligible 
significance of the external dimension, however, the part played by 
domestic political actors also possessed pivotal significance.
In the case of Vojvodinian Hungarians, of particular importance 
was the stance held by the two ethnic Hungarian parties. Both VMDK 
and VMSZ were quick on their feet to label these incidents as a well-
orchestrated campaign with the aim to terrorize ethnic Hungarians. 
These two parties also tried to promote their case in international 
forums, such as the OSCE, though with little success. On the Vojvodinian 
micro-level, the VMDK and VMSZ officials informally declared a ‘state 
of emergency’ for the ethnic Hungarian community. Meanwhile, both 
parties tried to pose as the only agents with the ability to defend the 
Hungarian community’s interests under these adverse circumstances. 
At a first instance, this stance resulted in the temporary deterioration 
of the relations between the two ethnic Hungarian parties and their 
regional partners among the Serbian mainstream parties (namely DS). 
Moreover, this functioned as an additional catalyst that contributed to 
the temporary intensification of ethnic solidarity and groupness among 
Vojvodinian Hungarians; an increase in ethnic segmentation in certain 
Vojvodinian towns with a predominantly Serbian and ethnic Hungarian 
population (e.g. Temerin and Stari Bečej in Bačka).54
In regard to the Serbian majority, the key part was played by SRS. 
Between 2003 and 2004, the then party leader, Tomislav Nikolić, and 
53 OSCE, Ninth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (Period covering 
September 2001 to April 2002), 2002; Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect: Anti-
minority Violence in Kosovo (March 2004) 16, no. 6 (July 2004): 30–53, 62–5.
54 Interview with academic specialist in ethnic relations; University of Belgrade, 
18 November 2005; Áron Léphaft, Ádám Németh and Péter Reményi, ‘Ethnic Diversity 
and Polarization in Vojvodina’, Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63, no. 2 (2014): 143–54.
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Vojvodinian Radical functionaries sought to gain political capital out of 
violent incidents in which the victims were Serbs and the perpetrators 
Hungarians or other ‘ethnics’. Such occurrences were swiftly interpreted 
as the shape of things to come for Vojvodinian Serbs and placed 
within the broader framework of ‘shrinkage of Serbdom’, together 
with the expulsion of Serbs from the Croatian Krajina and the Serbian 
emigration out of Kosovo.55 This rhetoric obviously aimed at declaring 
a ‘state of emergency’ and increasing the party’s mobilizing potential 
among the Serbian majority. The strategy of the Radicals found some 
appeal among the refugees from Croatia and Bosnia; largely owing 
to the vulnerability of this segment as well as its traumatic and easily 
manipulated collective memory. According to empirical evidence, 
quite a few refugees had active involvement in the incidences earlier 
described.56
This issue requires some further elaboration. Especially in the 
light of the broader socio-economic antagonism, ethnic Serb refugees 
occasionally perceived Vojvodinian Hungarians as the intruding ‘other’ 
in terms of ethno-cultural categorization. The refugees perceived 
Vojvodina, and by extension Serbia, as a safe haven from persecution 
where they could live together with the rest of their ‘ethnic kin’. Therefore, 
from the refugees’ perspective, their needs should be granted greater 
priority in comparison to those of ethnic minorities.57 For Vojvodinian 
Hungarians, on the contrary, the Serb refugees were external intruders 
and usurpers of scarce employment opportunities and social benefits. 
Nevertheless, these ‘ethnic incidents’ did not succeed in bringing about 
and cementing a state of ethnic segregation in Vojvodina’s multiethnic 
settlements. According to reports by the Serbian government as well as 
external observers, the intensity of ‘ethnic incidents’ in Vojvodina had 
started to enter a steady phase of decline since late 2004. According 
55 http://www.srs.org.yu/izbori/ns.htm.
56 Ilić Vladimir, Manjine i izbeglice u Vojvodini (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights in Serbia, 2001).
57 Interview with expert in ethnic relations at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
(Budapest), 13 April 2008.
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to the same reports, the main underlying cause behind these incidents 
was the frustration of a considerable percentage among the Vojvodinian 
youth with the deteriorating standards of living. Field research in the 
towns of Sombor, Kikinda, Novi Sad and Subotica demonstrated that 
competition for employment had been the major underlying cause 
behind ‘ethnic’ tensions on the regional and local micro-levels.58
58 Centre for Development of Civic Society, ‘Ethnic Incidents in Vojvodina after 
Internationalization’, May 2004, 1–6, http://www.cdcs.org.yu/docs/internat_engl.
doc; Interview with expert in ethnic relations at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
(Budapest), 13 April 2008.
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This chapter positions Vojvodina inside the context of the latest political 
developments in Serbia and Europe. Particular attention is paid to the 
predominance of President Aleksandar Vučić and the ruling Serbian 
Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka, SNS), as well as to the 
prospects for Serbia within its trajectory of accession to the EU. This 
chapter also casts its focus on the current state of political affairs in 
neighbouring states (namely Hungary) and assesses their ramifications 
upon ethnopolitics within the province. An additional objective is 
to briefly discuss powerful regionalisms in the Continent (the ‘new’ 
Catalan question and, to a secondary degree, the case of Italy’s Lega Nord/
Northern League) and isolate the main aspects which differentiate such 
cases from regionalism in Vojvodina. Lastly, this chapter touches upon 
the recent arrival of war refugees from the Middle East and measures 
the impact that this novel development can exert on social stability 
and inter-group relations in the province. Of essential importance is 
to highlight whether and how Vojvodinian regional identity, as a trans-
ethnic substratum, can withstand the new challenges and benefit from 
the new opportunities.
Aleksandar Vučić and SNS as preponderant political 
actors in Serbia: The implications for Vojvodina
SNS was officially launched on 21 October 2008. It was set up by leading 
figures within the old SRS (former SRS chairman Tomislav Nikolić and 
Aleksandar Vučić) who had departed from the party, between late 2007 
5
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and early 2008, on grounds of tactical disagreements with the nationalist 
hardliners. These cadres and their factions had suggested that the most 
efficient way for SRS to capitalize on the cleavages among their rivals 
in the centre/centre-right (DS, DSS and SPO) and consolidate a firmer 
foothold on the political mainstream should have consisted in a lesser 
emphasis on nationalism; a greater stress on the reformation of the 
economy; the conditional endorsement of Serbia’s accession process 
to the EU. SNS soon evolved from a splinter group into a full-fledged 
party with a, conservative, centre-right agenda.1 It pledged to maintain 
an equal distance from east and west and endorsed accession to the 
EU under the fundamental premise that Serbia’s national interests 
in its neighbourhood (Kosovo and Republika Srpska) are effectively 
safeguarded.
Following Boris Tadić’s tenure in office as president of the Republic 
(2004–12), Serbia’s centrist and liberal forces (namely DS) have 
been continuously shrinking as a result of their inability to project a 
convincing alternative to the electorate. In light of the global economic 
crisis, the ‘Third Way’ prerogatives, espoused by DS until recently, 
quickly lost their popular appeal also in Serbia. To this should be 
added allegations of corruption against the party during its term in 
the government.2 Further along the right angle of the spectrum, the 
decision of DSS to form a coalition with the more nationalistic Dveri 
(‘Gates’) for the latest parliamentary elections (24 April 2016) did not 
succeed in enhancing the party’s political weight. Meanwhile, the ‘new’ 
SRS has been marginalized into a peripheral actor with a low political 
significance. As an aggregate of these circumstances, SNS has come 
to dominate a political continuum that ranges from the fringes of the 
liberal centre all the way to the conservative right. The results of the last 
1 Vassilis Petsinis, ‘Competing Conservatisms in Serbia and Croatia’, Open Democracy, 11 
July 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/vassilis-petsinis.
2 These allegations culminated with the departure of Boris Tadić from DS 
in January 2014. On this issue, see https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.
php?yyyy=2014&mm=01&dd=30&nav_id=89173.
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parliamentary and presidential elections (7 April 2017) clearly testify to 
the party’s preponderance in Serbian politics.3
In its preamble, the party programme (2011) defines SNS as a ‘political 
organization with a clear democratic orientation’ and sets three primary 
areas of concern: ‘protection of the vital national interests; promotion 
of human rights; real and accelerated economic development’.4 SNS 
does not dedicate a separate section of its programme to Vojvodina 
per se. However, elsewhere in the text, the party clarifies that, as far as 
the territorial arrangement of Serbia is concerned, it opts for the model 
of functional decentralization. In greater detail, SNS specifies that it 
encourages the uniform development of all parts of the state, which 
also takes into consideration their regional and local particularities, 
and which should be built around the major urban centres (Belgrade, 
Novi Sad etc.).
The party envisages the municipal units of local administration as 
the main vehicle towards the implementation of the decentralization 
process.5 It further contends that SNS stands for the equal development 
of all parts of the state and that every administrative unit must be 
drawn in correlation with the financial and infrastructural needs of 
the others. In addition, the party-programme pledges to accelerate 
the return of ethnic Serb refugees to Croatia, as well as the restitution 
of their immobile property, and enhance the economic cooperation 
between Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbia. The absence of 
any concrete and extensive references to Vojvodina, in combination 
with the schematic outline of functional decentralization, implies that 
SNS favours a symmetric and unitary pattern of territorial organization 
instead of an asymmetric and regionalized one.
In the parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2016, the electoral 
attitudes of Vojvodinian voters seem to have become subject to the 
3 SNS garnered 48.25 per cent of the vote in the latest parliamentary elections (2016) 
and Aleksandar Vučić 55.06 per cent of the vote in the latest presidential elections (2017).
4 Srpska Napredna Stranka, Bela Knjiga Programom do Promena (Belgrade: SNS, 2011), 
2–3.
5 Ibid., 46.
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macro-political catalysts which are relevant throughout the whole 
of Serbia. As previously mentioned, especially during the tenure 
of Bojan Pajtić as president of the executive council at Vojvodina’s 
assembly, DS had held a favourable stance vis-à-vis the extension of 
the administrative jurisdiction and the enhancement of Vojvodina’s 
asymmetric status within Serbia. Until the parliamentary, presidential 
and provincial elections of 2012, this had enabled DS and Boris Tadić 
to garner the majority of the vote among the Vojvodinian electorate 
(Table 21). Nevertheless, the long-term inability of DS to concretize 
and project a new image to Serbian voters also claimed its toll on the 
party’s performance in Vojvodina. Meanwhile, despite their continuous 
representation in the Vojvodinian assembly and the provincial 
administrative organs, LSDV and the Vojvodinian regionalists kept 
on suffering from the impediment of a poor and inadequate staffing. 
The steady growth of SNS’s public appeal culminated with the party’s 
overwhelming victory in the most recent elections for the Vojvodinian 
assembly (24 April 2016) (Table 22).
The gradual emergence of SNS as a potent political actor across Serbia 
reinvigorated the pro-unitary forces in the province and rekindled their 
pressures for a revision of the 2009 statute on the autonomy of Vojvodina. 
Source: http://www.cesid.rs/.
Table 21 The results of the elections for the assembly of the autonomous 
province of Vojvodina (May 2012)
Party Leader % Seats
DS coalition Bojan Pajtić 48.33 58
SNS coalition Tomislav Nikolić 18.33 22
SPS coalition Ivica Dačić 10.83 13
LSDV Nenad Čanak  8.33 10
VMSZ István Pásztor  5.83  7
SRS Vojislav Šešelj  6.30  5
DSS Vojislav Koštunica  3.33  4
Liberal Democratic Party Čedomir Jovanović  0.83  1
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Party Leader % Seats
SNS coalition Maja Gojković 44.48 63
SPS coalition Dušan Bajatović  8.86 12
SRS Đurađ Jakšić  7.66 10
DS coalition Miroslav Vasin  7.24 10
LSDV Branislav Bogaroški  6.43  9
‘Enough!’ Svetlana Kozić  5.54  7
VMSZ István Pásztor  4.88  6
VMDK Tamás Korhecz  1.71  2
Green Party Branislava Jeftić  1.14  1
This resulted in a new round of tensions between LSDV and the pro-
unitary camp which comprised DSS, the reformed SPS and SNS. DSS, 
in particular, took the statute to the Republican Constitutional Court 
in autumn 2013. At a first instance, the Court judged that two-thirds of 
the statute was not in accordance with the Serbian Constitution.6 In the 
long run, though, a compromise was reached between the Republican 
Constitutional Court and the Vojvodinian assembly. Consequently, an 
amended version of the statute was inaugurated on 22 May 2014.7 The 
amendments were approved at the assembly by the vote of 91 out of the 
113 members in total.8
The changes in the new version of the statute touched upon subjects 
of a mostly symbolic dimension and a slightly more condensed version 
of the 2009 document was produced. Throughout the amended text, 
Table 22 The results of the elections for the assembly of the autonomous 
province of Vojvodina (April 2016)
Source: http://www.cesid.rs/.
6 Jelena Džankić and Christina Isabel Zuber, ‘Serbia and Montenegro: From Centralization 
to Secession and Multi-Ethnic Regionalism’, in Regional and National Elections in Eastern 
Europe: Territoriality of the Vote in Ten Countries, ed. Arjan H. Schakel (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017), 221–2; Jovan Komšić, ‘Autonomism in Vojvodina’, Südosteuropa 61, 
no. 3 (2013): 335–40.
7 ‘Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine’, Službeni List AP Vojvodine, br. 20/2014.
8 https://inserbia.info/today/2014/05/assembly-of-vojvodina-adopts-provincial-statute/.
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Novi Sad was re-designated from ‘capital city’ (glavni grad) into ‘seat of 
the provincial organs’ (sedište pokrajinskih organa) (Article 10) whereas 
‘the government of Vojvodina’ (vlada Vojvodine) was replaced by the 
more neutral ‘provincial government’ (pokrajinska vlada) (Article 44). 
Furthermore, the amendments maintained the right of Vojvodina 
to cooperation with organizations and agencies based abroad but 
underlined that ‘Vojvodina may cooperate with corresponding territorial 
communities and other forms of autonomy in other countries as part 
of Serbia’s foreign policy, and will be under the obligation to respect 
Serbia’s territorial integrity and legal order’ (Article 16). However, a 
symbolic dispute between LSDV and SNS, which persists up to date, is 
the one over the patterns of Vojvodina’s regional flag (Figures 1 and 2).9
Overall, the amendments of 2014 did not result into the actual 
curtailment or the significant reduction of Vojvodina’s administrative 
autonomy. Nor has Serbia’s SNS-led government displayed any 
intentions to cancel or further revise certain terms in the statute on 
provincial autonomy. From a broader angle, SNS’s tenure in office 
has demonstrated that the party is rather keen on a tactical and 
situationally adaptive pattern of policymaking with the objective to 
maintain a favourable balance vis-à-vis a wide range of interest groups 
and stakeholders.10 Nevertheless, the efficient implementation of the 
statute has frequently become entangled into complications of a legal 
as well as a constitutional nature. For a start, it has often not been 
feasible to precisely calculate the 7 per cent of the republican budget for 
Vojvodina as stipulated in Article 57. This ‘vagueness’ has occasionally 
led several interest groups among the Vojvodinian regionalists to 
accuse the Serbian government of deliberately miscalculating the share 
9 SNS favours a flag and coat of arms modelled in accordance with those displayed during 
the Vojvodstvo Srpsko of 1848. LSDV opts for the more recent version which comprises 
the Serbian tricolour plus three stars (each for the sub-regions of Bačka, Srem and the 
Banat). On this issue, see https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/sta-stoji-iza-spora-oko-
novog-grba-i-zastave-vojvodine/d385t88.
10 On this issue, see Vassilis Petsinis, ‘Enter Serbia’s “Orbán”? Aleksandar Vučić and his 
Catch-all Politics’, Open Democracy, 28 June 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/
author/vassilis-petsinis.
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Figure 1 Vojvodina’s regional flag and coat of arms favoured by SNS.
Sources: http://www.skupstinavojvodine.gov.rs/: The official website of Vojvodina’s provincial 
assembly.
Figure 2 Vojvodina’s regional flag favoured by LSDV.
Sources: http://www.skupstinavojvodine.gov.rs/: The official website of Vojvodina’s provincial 
assembly.
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of the republican budget allocated for Vojvodina.11 More importantly, 
as previously mentioned, it remains an imperative that the Serbian 
Constitution defines more concretely and anchors more firmly the 
locus of Vojvodina’s asymmetric status inside Serbia’s constitutional 
order.12 In spite of these shortcomings, though, the statute on the 
autonomy of Vojvodina still preserves Vojvodina’s asymmetric status 
within Serbia and remains consistent with the European standards on 
regionalization.
The management of interethnic relations and the 
domestic ramifications of external developments
However complicated and nonlinear, Serbia’s accession process to the 
EU has corresponded to rapid developments in the institutional and 
legal infrastructure for the protection of minority rights. As early as 
July 2008, the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights came into 
existence as a full-fledged institution on the republican level. Moreover, 
the provisions of the statute for Vojvodina on minority rights are 
anchored inside the relevant clauses of the Serbian Constitution on 
the public use of minority languages, the prohibition of discrimination 
and the relations of minorities with their kin states (Articles 75–80). 
In addition, the Serbian laws on local self-government (2002), the 
official use of minority languages (amended in 2005) and prohibition 
of discrimination (2009) also contribute to the arrangement of an 
articulate infrastructure for the protection of minority rights.13 
Meanwhile, the political programme of SNS fully subscribes to 
11 Dimitrije Boarov, ‘Podrivanje Vojvodinu: U Ustavnom Tunelu’, Vreme, 1136, 11 October 
2012. The urgent necessity to standardize the legislation over the finances of Vojvodina 
has also been highlighted by the European Commission. On this issue, see European 
Commission, Serbia 2018 Report, 17 April 2018, SWD (2018), 8.
12 Komšić, ‘Autonomism in Vojvodina’, 335–40.
13 Vassilis Petsinis, ‘Minority Legislation in Two Successor States: A Comparison through 
the Lens of EU Enlargement’, Baltic Worlds, no. 1 (2012): 31–5.
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safeguarding the collective rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities 
as these are stipulated in the state legislation (education, political 
representation, public use of minority languages and cross-border links 
to the kin states).14
With specific regard to the political engagement of Vojvodina’s 
ethnic Hungarian parties (VMSZ, in particular), this still consists 
in a preference to the politics of consensus over the politics of 
confrontation. Capitalizing on the state of fragmentation in Serbian 
politics since the fall of Slobodan Milošević and prior to the 
consolidation of SNS, VMSZ has been participating in a series of 
government coalitions with larger Serbian parties on the republican 
as well as on the provincial level. Most recently, following the results 
of the 2016 elections for the Vojvodinian assembly, the party has been 
steadily cooperating with the local SNS committee over a broad range 
of policy areas.15 Since 2000, this pattern of engagement has facilitated 
VMSZ to promote their standpoints and demands on minority rights 
from within the halls of power. At the same time, although this 
document still maintains a great symbolic value, VMSZ appears to 
place a secondary importance to the tripartite concept of ethno-
territorial autonomy as the fundamental premise for planning the 
party’s policymaking. Throughout the last decade, this lesser emphasis 
on the various concepts of ethno-territorial autonomy and the higher 
stress on a gradualist strategy of cooperation with the larger political 
actors have been characteristic of several other ethnic Hungarian 
parties across the Carpathian basin (e.g. the Most-Híd/‘Bridge’ party 
in Slovakia).
14 Srpska Napredna Stranka, Bela Knjiga Programom do Promena, 44–5.
15 It should be noted that the party chairman, István Pásztor, currently serves as president 
at the executive council of the provincial assembly. For more on this issue, see https://
www.blic.rs/vesti/vojvodina/blizu-dogovora-i-socijalisti-u-vladi-vojvodine-uz-sns-i-
svm-mirovic-moguci-premijer/mn7dysc.
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Coming back to Brubaker’s triadic nexus theory, the political 
developments in the ethnic minority’s external homeland can exert 
direct and crucial repercussions upon the political attitudes of 
the minority within the state where it resides. The situation of the 
ethnic Hungarian minorities across the Carpathian basin, as well 
as the extension of political rights to ethnic Hungarians from the 
neighbouring states who reside in Hungary, has long formed a focal 
concern among a string of Hungarian governments and Hungary’s 
main parties. On certain occasions, the question of minority rights 
for ethnic Hungarians fomented tensions between Budapest and 
neighbouring governments (e.g. Hungary’s objections during 
Romania’s EU accession process and its opposition to the Slovak 
Language Law of 2009). Since 2010, the preponderant Hungarian 
premier, Viktor Orbán, and his ruling FIDESZ have been consolidating 
their concept of illiberal democracy. The EU’s apprehension over the 
state of democratic freedoms in Hungary, as well as Viktor Orbán’s 
strident opposition to the EU’s refugee quotas arrangement, has largely 
shifted the lens of the Hungarian government’s grievances from the 
neighbouring states towards Brussels.
Further along the right angle of the political spectrum, Jobbik 
(Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom/Movement for a Better Hungary) 
stands as the second most popular party after the 2018 parliamentary 
elections. In addition to its militant pattern of political engagement 
within Hungary, Jobbik firmly cushions its scope inside the political 
culture of Hungarian nationalism. In its political manifesto (2010), 
Jobbik espouses an ethno-nationalist instead of a civic agenda and 
specifies that the party’s political scope is ‘not defined by the borders 
of our country but by the borders of our nation’.16 Moreover, it is made 
clear that one of the party’s main objectives is ‘the reincorporation into 
the national body of both Western and Carpathian-basin Hungarians’ 
16 Jobbik-The Movement for a Better Hungary, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s 
Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto for National Self-Determination and Social Justice 
(Budapest: Jobbik, 2010), 15.
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whereas, elsewhere in the text, Hungary is referred to as ‘the territorially-
maimed, mother-country’.17
Within the context of these programmatic standpoints, Jobbik 
has also demonstrated its interest in becoming active and setting 
up a representation office in Vojvodina. Between 2014 and 2016, 
Jobbik MPs based in Hungary (namely, István Szávay) had been 
engaged in attempts to open offices for the party, first, in Subotica 
and later in Senta (northern Bačka).18 These endeavours were 
repeatedly thwarted by the local authorities on the grounds that 
the Serbian legislation prohibits the operation of political parties 
and organizations which serve foreign interests in the territory of 
Serbia.19 However, there exist allegations that Jobbik’s representation 
office in Senta has still been operating on an informal basis.20 The 
memories from the ‘ethnic incidents’ of the mid-2000s are rather 
fresh. Consequently, any prospects towards the political engagement 
of a radical right-wing party with a revisionist and virulently ethno-
nationalist profile do not leave out promising implications for the 
state of social stability and interethnic relations in Vojvodina. At 
this given moment, it is not an easy task to make further-reaching 
and accurate assessments in regard to the opportunity structures 
for Jobbik to evolve into a potent political actor among the ethnic 
Hungarian community.
Nevertheless, empirical research, conducted on the political 
preferences of ‘trans-border’21 ethnic Hungarians across the Carpathian 
basin, hints that, whereas FIDESZ has succeeded in claiming the lion’s 
share of their vote, Jobbik has not yet managed to gain a momentum 
17 Ibid., 20.
18 https://www.jobbik.com/istvan_szavay_opens_representative_office_in_vojvodina_too.
19 https://dailynewshungary.com/serbian-court-calls-on-jobbik-to-close-local-office/.
20 http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/vojvodina/kancelarija-jobika-u-senti-jos-radi_682736.html.
21 This term denotes those ethnic Hungarians from one of Hungary’s neighbouring states 
who have been awarded Hungarian citizenship but still maintain connections with 
their native places of origin. In accordance to the 2011 national census, 251,136 ethnic 
Hungarians (13 per cent of the total population) resided in Vojvodina (Table 23).
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Table 23 The ethnic structure of the population in Vojvodina (2011 census)
Nationality Numbers %
Serbs 1,289,635 66.76
Hungarians 251,136 13.00
Slovaks 50,321  2.60
Croats 47,033  2.43
Roma 42,391  2.19
Romanians 25,410  1.32
Montenegrins 22,141  1.15
Bunjevci 16,469  0.85
Ruthenes 13,928  0.72
Yugoslavs 12,176  0.63
Macedonians 10,392  0.54
Ukrainians 4,202  0.22
Muslims 3,360  0.17
Germans 3,272  0.17
Albanians 2,251  0.12
Slovenes 1,815  0.09
Bulgarians 1,489  0.08
Gorani 1,179  0.06
Russians 1,173  0.06
Bosnjaks 780  0.04
Vlachs 170  0.01
Others 6,170  0.35
Regional affiliation 28,567  1.48
Non-defined 81,018  4.19
Unknown 14,791  0.77
TOTAL 1.931,809 100
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among this specific segment of the electorate.22 This pattern is equally 
valid in the case of Hungarian voters who originate from Vojvodina. 
More importantly, as early as January 2014, the VMSZ chairman, 
István Pásztor, warned Jobbik, on the occasion of the party’s attempt 
to inaugurate its representation office in Subotica, that ‘we do not 
need anyone, not a single one, who comes from Hungary to ignite 
fire with their irresponsible behavior, and then go home’ and added 
that ‘Vojvodina’s Hungarians have never been and will never become 
protagonists in either Serbian or Hungarian nationalism’.23 Lastly, 
in addition to the prohibition of ethnic discrimination, Serbia’s 
legal infrastructure comprises an articulate platform against the 
dissemination of hate speech and the incitement of ethnic hatred. 
Selected aspects of this legislation were also activated as part of the 
endeavour to hinder Jobbik from opening its representation offices.24 
The aggregate of these sociopolitical and legal realities, in combination 
with Vojvodina’s long-standing heritage of harmonious coexistence, 
hints that the opportunity structures for Jobbik’s successful engagement 
in the province currently do not seem particularly encouraging.
Vojvodina amid the powerful awakening  
of European regionalisms
The last few years have witnessed the virulent resurgence of 
regionalist movements across the Continent. Within certain political 
environments, the reinvigorated engagement of regionalist parties 
seems to coincide with the simultaneous and varying impact of 
the economic crisis (the cases of Spain, Italy and, to a lesser extent, 
23 http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/377296/Pastor-Jobiku-Ne-vrsljaj-po-
Vojvodini.
24 In particular, see Article 317 of the Criminal Code of Serbia (amended in 2012) against 
the instigation of ethnic, religious and racial hatred and intolerance at http://www.
legislationline.org/documents/id/18732.
22 Szabolcs Pogonyi, Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 104–5.
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Belgium). The evolutionary trajectories of regionalist movements 
in the political map of contemporary Europe are highly diverse, 
complicated and idiosyncratic. Moreover, the political physiognomies 
of regionalist parties and groupings may also remarkably vary and 
range from the radical left all the way to the far right. In light of this 
complex landscape, it is not the aim of this book to highlight the 
internal distinctions and qualitative differences among European 
regionalists. Instead, the chief objective here is to isolate the main 
aspects which differentiate selected European regionalisms from the 
case of Vojvodina. Considering that the variants of Spanish and Italian 
regionalisms and regionalization have functioned as pivotal points 
of reference for this book, particular attention is paid to the latest 
developments in Catalonia and, to a secondary extent, Lega Nord and 
‘Padanian’ regionalism.
For a start, whereas Vojvodina remains the richest part of Serbia 
with a developed agricultural industry, Catalonia is Spain’s second 
richest region after the Basque Country. Both regions comprise urban 
centres which are characterized by a socially liberal ethos and a vibrant 
commercial, as well as cultural, entrepreneurship within the bounds 
of their respective states (Novi Sad and Barcelona). It does not come 
as a surprise that Nenad Čanak and other leading cadres of LSDV 
immediately voiced their endorsement to the Catalan referendum 
for independence (October 2017) and rushed to underline what 
they perceived as the common denominators between Catalonia and 
Vojvodina.25 In addition to the apparent similarities, though, there exist 
notable qualitative differences between the two cases.
Throughout the last decades, Catalan regionalism has succeeded in 
fashioning an increasingly civic profile. In the long run, regionalists, 
as well as overt proponents of Catalan independence, succeeded in 
attracting the first generation of internal migrants from other parts of 
25 http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/389917/Canak-u-Barseloni-Situacija-je-dosta-
cudnovata.
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Spain (e.g. Andalusia) to their ranks.26 Nevertheless, one cannot argue 
that this development has effaced the core, ethno-cultural, component 
of Catalan regionalism.27 Instead, Catalan regional autonomy and its 
institutions are still legitimized through reference to the constitutional 
clause that the Catalans are one of Spain’s historical nationalities. Hence, 
the pronounced stress on the institutional promotion of Catalan 
language and culture by the Generalitat (Catalan assembly) which, on 
certain occasions, intensified the cleavage between the proponents of 
independence and the Spanish government.28 By contrast, Vojvodina’s 
asymmetric status and its institutional infrastructure are still legitimized 
along the necessities to accommodate the economic specificities, 
manage interethnic relations and guarantee social stability within a 
highly diverse part of Serbia. This provides plenty of room towards 
the accommodation of a rich mosaic of micro-identities whereas pro-
autonomy leanings still cut across ethnic lines in the province.
Furthermore, alongside its powerful sociocultural and socio-
psychological dynamics, the orchestration of Catalan regionalism has 
long and primarily revolved around certain political parties. At this given 
moment, the dominant pro-independence coalition at the Generalitat 
(‘Together for Yes’) comprises parties as diverse as the nominally 
centrist/centre-right Democratic European Party of Catalonia and 
the leftist ERC. By contrast, although one should not underestimate 
the endeavours by LSDV and other Vojvodinian regionalists towards 
safeguarding the province’s asymmetric status, the political engineering 
of Vojvodinian regionalism has not been primarily revolving around 
parties with an explicitly ‘Vojvodinian’ profile. Instead, especially since 
2000, various local politicians have engaged towards preserving and 
28 Henry Miller et al., ‘Language Policy and Identity: The Case of Catalonia’, International 
Studies in Sociology and Education 6, no. 1 (1996): 113–28.
26 For instance, Oriol Junqueras, the leader of the leftist, pro-independence, Republican 
Left of Catalonia (ERC) originates from an Andalusian family background. For a more 
extensive discussion over this issue, see Ivan Serrano, ‘Just a Matter of Identity? Support 
for Independence in Catalonia’, Regional and Federal Studies 5 (2013): 523–45.
27 Thomas Jeffrey Miley, ‘Against the Thesis of the “Civic Nation”: The Case of Catalonia in 
Contemporary Spain’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13, no. 1 (2007): 1–37.
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enhancing Vojvodina’s asymmetric status from within the structures of 
the larger Serbian parties. The case of DS, during Bojan Pajtić’s tenure 
as president of the executive council at the provincial assembly, serves 
as a representative example.
Moreover, the ‘new’ Catalan question also appears to be subject to 
catalysts which do not bear any particular or direct relevance to the 
cases of Vojvodina and Serbia as a whole. The most noteworthy of them 
is the decisive impact of the economic crisis across the EU member-
states from Southern Europe and the negative toll that the EU’s austerity 
policies have been claiming on the Catalan economy. It is precisely 
within this context of the ‘pro-austerity versus anti-austerity’ debate 
that the question of Catalonia’s status acquires an additional dimension 
which further polarizes and radicalizes the pro-independence and the 
pro-union segments in the local society.29 In the course of autumn 2017, 
a variety of leftist initiatives across Europe channelled their unequivocal 
support towards the ‘Together for Yes’ coalition and perceived Catalan 
independence as one more battlefield in the struggle of the European 
peoples against austerity.30 This is indicative of the powerful external 
ramifications of the ‘new’ Catalan question as well as the ways that it 
interweaves with the toll of the economic crisis across Southern Europe.
By contrast, one cannot discern any drastic intersections between 
the Vojvodinian question and the European economic crisis. In 
addition, the divergent opinions over Vojvodina’s status do not 
polarize the local society and, as it became obvious in the compromise 
over  the amendments of 2014, the politics of consensus still prevail 
in the provincial assembly. Most importantly, as repeatedly stressed, 
Vojvodina’s autonomaši circles and groupings never endorsed 
29 To this one should add the successful campaigning by ERC and the smaller Popular Unity 
Candidacy (CUP) with the objective to embed the question of Catalan independence 
inside their anti-austerity platforms on the EU’s monetary policies across the European 
south. On this issue, see https://www.politico.eu/article/austerity-fuels-catalan-
disaffection/; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/catalan-seccession-
anti-austerity-party.
30 For a brief example of this line of thought among the European left, see the analytical 
commentary by Boaventura de Sousa Santos for Critical Legal Thinking, http://
criticallegalthinking.com/2017/09/28/the-left-and-catalonia/.
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secessionist inclinations or put Serbia’s territorial integrity under 
scrutiny. In this specific light, one might argue that Nenad Čanak’s 
hurried and unequivocal endorsement of the pro-independence faction 
in Catalonia runs the risk of generating undesirable connotations and 
associations for LSDV among certain sections of the Vojvodinian 
electorate.31
The last decade has also seen the consolidation of right-wing 
regionalist movements and parties with an overtly Eurosceptic and 
xenophobic profile such as Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) in 
Belgium and Lega Nord in Italy. Taking into account the rapid and 
steady transformation of the latter into a political organization with 
a ‘pan-Italian’ profile and appeal, one might seriously scrutinize the 
extent to which Lega can still be regarded as a regionalist party. For 
the purposes of this work, though, a, if only schematic, comparison 
between Vojvodina and ‘Padania’ would suffice to illustrate that whereas 
the former is a European region with a deeply embedded identity and 
historical origins, the latter has been a situationally adaptive, if not 
utterly artificial, geographic construct.32 More importantly, by stark 
contrast to Lega’s Euroscepticism, Vojvodinian regionalist parties and 
groupings have long espoused a pro-EU orientation whereas Vojvodina 
still participates in the Brussels-based Assembly of European Regions 
(AER) as well as cross-border cooperation schemes under the auspices 
of the EU (e.g. the Danube–Kris–Mures–Tisa, or ‘Banat’, Euroregion).
32 Throughout the 1990s, the geographic limits of ‘Padania’ coincided in the Lega’s party 
pamphlets with the territory of the Po Valley. In the longer run, though, this concept 
came to comprise the entire Northern Italy, plus a few territories of Central Italy, largely 
as part of the party’s endeavour to expand its bases of support. For a more analytical 
treatise of this subject, see Benito Giordano, ‘The Contrasting Geographies of “Padania”: 
The Case of the Lega Nord in Northern Italy’, Area 33, no. 1 (2002): 27–37; ‘A Place 
Called Padania? The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of Northern Italy’, 
European Urban and Regional Studies 6, no. 3 (1999): 215–30.
31 Nenad Čanak repeatedly stated that Catalonia’s future status must be decided inside 
the framework of the Spanish constitutional order. Nevertheless, the Catalan flag had 
been flying from the LSDV’s headquarters throughout the duration of the Catalan 
referendum in October 2017. For more on this issue, see https://www.blic.rs/vesti/
politika/katalonska-zastava-na-sedistu-lsv-canak-znak-solidarnosti-sa-gradanima-cije-
se-pravo/z5yj1rw.
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Lastly, Lega has recently succeeded in consolidating its ‘pan-Italian’ 
appeal, by large, on the basis of its anti-immigration/xenophobic 
platform and via the capitalization on the public grievances over 
the impact of the refugee crisis across Italy.33 The following section 
illustrates that, by contrast, the political mobilization against the influx 
of refugees in Vojvodina and Serbia, as a whole, has been much less 
intensive in comparison to other parts of Central and Eastern Europe 
(namely, the ‘Visegrad Four’ group of states).
Vojvodina and the ‘new’ refugee question  
in Central and Eastern Europe
Since the second half of 2015, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
started sensing, however remotely, the repercussions of the refugee 
crisis. The refugee waves from Greece to Hungary, via the corridor 
through the former Yugoslavia, and their temporary concentration 
in Budapest were a unique experience which swiftly impacted upon 
these societies’ perceptions as well as actual management of otherness. 
Especially the gradual consolidation of the Islamic State and its militant 
Salafism in Syria and Iraq intensified the public apprehension over the 
potential export of asymmetric threats to their region among many 
Central Europeans. In light of these new realities, a series of political 
actors started building their platforms along the virtual politics of (anti-)
immigration. This term addresses the alarmism over the ‘imminent 
threat of Islamization’, in the rhetoric of various political actors across 
Central and Eastern Europe, despite the actual absence (or minuscule 
presence) of Muslim war refugees in these societies.
The first endeavours to capitalize on popular insecurities over the 
refugee question were carried out by the populist and radical right 
33 For a more extensive discussion over this topic, see Stella Gianfreda, ‘Politicization of the 
Refugee Crisis? A Content Analysis of Parliamentary Debates in Italy, the UK and the 
EU’, Italian Political Science Review 48, no. 1 (2018): 85–108.
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but were not restricted within this angle of the party spectrum. In due 
time, the political mainstream in the ‘Visegrad Four’ group of states 
virulently opposed the European Commission’s refugee redistribution 
plan and its directive for the proportional allocation of war-displaced 
persons to each EU member-state on the basis of fixed quotas. These 
objections were frequently cushioned inside the cultural argument. 
Viktor Orbán, in particular, rushed to accuse the European Commission 
of ‘irresponsibility’, underlined that ‘Europe and European culture are 
rooted in Christian values’ and judged that ‘there is no alternative, and 
we have no option but to defend Hungary’s borders’.34 Further to the 
north, Slovakia’s Premier, Robert Fico, attempted to draw tentative 
comparisons between the refugee and the Roma questions arguing 
that if the social integration of the Slovak Roma has been so complex, 
the social integration of Muslim migrants would be tantamount to 
impossible.35 The standoff between the ‘Visegrad Four’ governments 
and the European Commission culminated with Viktor Orbán’s 
decision to seal Hungary’s southern borders with Serbia (15 September 
2015) and Croatia (17 October 2015). Empirical surveys, conducted 
across the ‘Visegrad Four’ states, hinted at the clear resonance between 
the tough line of the national governments over the EU’s redistribution 
plan and the reserved public outlooks on the refugee crisis.36 Further to 
the northeast, opinion polls have detected a comparable sentiment of 
apprehension, vis-à-vis the admission of war refugees, among the local 
societies in the Baltic States.37
35 https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-are-central-europes-new-roma-refugees-
viktor-orban-robert-fico/.
36 On Hungary, see http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/30/hungarians-
share-europes-embrace-of-democratic-principles-but-are-less-tolerant-of-refugees-
minorities/. On Slovakia, see https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/
study-cautious-slovaks-take-eu-approach-to-refugees/.
37 On Estonia, see http://news.gallup.com/poll/216377/new-index-shows-least-accepting-
countries-migrants.aspx. On Latvia, see https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/
majority-of-latvians-against-taking-in-refugees.a195952/.
34 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-
victor-orban-europe-response-madness.
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The locus of Serbia inside these new realities is rather idiosyncratic 
and complicated. On the one hand, Serbia is not an EU member-state. 
This means that the country is not bound to the conditions of the EU 
refugee resettlement scheme although it has been receiving financial 
assistance from the EU towards the management of the migration 
flows.38 On the other hand, by September 2017, approximately 4,146 
refugees and other migrants had been stranded inside the country 
(many of them along the Serbian-Hungarian borderline in northern 
Bačka) as a result of the Hungarian government’s decision to shut the 
southern border.39 By contrast to the ‘Visegrad Four’ leaderships, the 
Serbian government never resorted to anti-refugee rhetoric along 
the lines of the cultural argument. However, on 3 October 2016, Serbia 
also decided to close its borders to the migrants and the then President 
Tomislav Nikolić, as well as the Minister of Labour Aleksandar Vulin, 
underlined that the state possessed neither the logistics nor the technical 
infrastructure to accommodate an additional number of refugees.40
The main objective in this section is to concentrate on the 
sociocultural aspects of the presence of war-displaced persons in 
Vojvodina and assess the new realities that this may engender for the 
state of inter-group relations and social stability in the province. The 
primary sources are the observations of empirical surveys conducted 
by research institutes and human rights NGOs in localities with a 
high concentration of refugees and other migrants all over Serbia.41 
The results of the empirical survey conducted jointly by UNHCR and 
CESID (September 2014) across the country detected overall high levels 
38 Approximately €80 million have been allocated by the European Commission and the 
EU member-states to assist Serbia in effectively managing the migration waves. For this 
figure, see http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/serbia_en.pdf.
39 Ibid.
40 https://visegradpost.com/en/2016/10/03/serbia-closes-her-borders-to-migrants/.
41 In May 2015, a total of 13,148 foreign nationals had expressed their intention to seek 
asylum in Serbia. By the end of 2017, the total number of refugees, asylum seekers and 
other migrants stationed in the territory of Serbia dropped to 4,000 with more than 
90  per cent of them accommodated in state-managed accommodation centres. For 
these figures, see Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Human Rights in Serbia (Belgrade: 
BCHR, 2015), 50; European Commission, Serbia 2018 Report, 35.
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of empathy and understanding, among the respondents, in regard to 
the reasons why asylum seekers moved there and their desire to stay in 
Serbia42; a general agreement, among the respondents, that the Serbian 
state should improve living conditions for asylum seekers and refugees 
stationed within its territory43; generally relaxed outlooks vis-à-vis the 
prospects for the establishment of refugee accommodation centres in 
the respondents’ neighbourhoods.44
These observations largely resonate with those of another empirical 
survey, conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation across the country 
throughout 2016 (including the Vojvodinian localities of Subotica 
and Šid), which detected: a higher stress on humanitarian than on 
‘securitized’ attitudes, among the respondents, vis-à-vis the arrival of 
refugees45; overall relaxed outlooks on the prospects for refugees to 
become members of the local communities, in the longer run46; a more 
pronounced stress on the economic than on the cultural obstacles to 
the social integration of the newcomers.47 With specific regard to the 
two Vojvodinian localities where refugees are accommodated (Subotica 
and Šid), a series of micro-surveys, conducted by the Ana and Vlade 
Divac Foundation throughout 2016, observed generally high levels of 
compassion and understanding, among the respondents, in regard to 
the reasons why asylum seekers fled there (namely, war)48; a satisfactory 
degree of daily contacts between the newcomers and locals49; optimism 
45 Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Serbia), Studija o Izbeglicama: Srbija 2016 (Belgrade: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016), 7 and 8.
46 Ibid., 14.
47 Ibid., 19–20.
48 Ana and Vlade Divac Fondacija, Stavovi građana Srbije prema izbeglicama (Belgrade: 
USAID/Ana and Vlade Divac Foundation, June 2016), 1 and 2; Ana and Vlade Divac 
Foundation, The Attitudes of Serbian Citizens towards Refugees: Key Findings of the Third 
Wave of Survey (Belgrade: USAID/Ana and Vlade Divac Foundation, 2016), 5 and 6.
49 Ibid. (June 2016), 2; Ibid. (2016), 8.
42 UNHCR, Izvestaj sa istraživanja javnog mnenja: Stav građana Srbije prema tražiocima 
azila (Belgrade: UNHCR/CESID, September 2014), 13 and 15. This survey was 
conducted in southern and central districts of Serbia.
43 Ibid., 24 and 25.
44 Ibid., 34 and 39.
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towards the prospects for the long-term integration of refugees in the 
local communities.50
These strikingly more favourable outlooks on refugees in comparison 
to the ‘Visegrad Four’ societies, which persisted through the closure of the 
Hungarian-Serbian border, have, first of all, been subject to catalysts that 
pertain throughout the territory of Serbia. The most important of them 
is that, by contrast to the ‘Visegrad Four’ governments, Serbia’s major 
political parties did not endeavour to weaponize the refugee question, 
and incorporate culturally essentialist or Islamophobic speech, within the 
context of potential disagreements with the European Commission over 
the management of the crisis. This is not to contend that there were no 
political actors who voiced their staunch opposition to the accommodation 
of refugees in Serbia, such as the SRS leader, Vojislav Šešelj,51 and several 
DSS/Dveri local committees including the one in Pančevo.52 Nevertheless, 
the sociopolitical repercussions of such statements cannot compare to the 
systematic mobilization against the influx of refugees which was coordinated 
by the populist and radical right across Central Europe between 2015 and 
2016 (e.g. Jobbik and, further to the north, the ‘Our Slovakia’ party).
From a more socio-psychological angle, the high levels of empathy 
expressed in all relevant surveys, on the grounds that the refugees 
had fled their hearths because of the war and in order to avoid 
50 Seventy-seven per cent of the respondents in Subotica and 69 per cent in Šid expressed 
their optimism towards the long-term social integration of refugees (June 2016). 
Moreover, 87 per cent of the respondents in Subotica and 82 per cent in Šid judged 
that Serbia had accepted refugees more positively in comparison to other countries 
(December 2016). For these figures, see Ibid. (June 2016), 1; Ana and Vlade Divac 
Fondacija, Stavovi građana Srbije prema izbeglicama (Belgrade: USAID/Ana and Vlade 
Divac Foundation, December 2016), 2.
51 On 15 March 2017, Vojislav Šešelj had stated that ‘following Viktor Orbán’s example, 
I would erect a barbwire fence and if this was not sufficient, I would set up minefields 
along the border’. On this issue, see http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/2660/
izbori-2017/2679047/seselj-ogradom-ili-minskim-poljem-smanjiti-priliv-migranata.
html.
52 On 26 September 2016, the DSS local committee issued a statement according to which 
the party does not object to the refugees crossing through Pančevo but opposes their 
long-term settlement in the municipality. It was added that the culprit for the war in 
Syria is not Serbia but NATO and the EU; therefore, the most developed EU member-
states must accommodate the refugees. For this statement, see http://www.dss.rs/dss-
protiv-trajnog-naseljavanja-migranata-u-pancevo/.
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persecution, have been of decisive significance. This appears to have 
alleviated the impact of potentially negative connotations generated 
by the Muslim religious affiliation among many of the newcomers 
or, even worse, their indirect association with the older conflicts in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. To this one might add the widespread persistence 
of popular narratives within the Serbian society, according to which 
both the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East have equally fallen 
victims to the ‘geopolitical antagonisms and the machinations of 
global powers’. Lastly, Yugoslavia’s participation in the non-aligned 
movement and the widespread cooperation with the secular regimes of 
the Arab world (including Syria and Iraq) must have also contributed 
to the development of more receptive and compassionate outlooks on 
refugees, at least among the older generation in the society.
With specific regard to Vojvodina, not so long ago, the province 
succeeded in accommodating and largely integrating the refugee waves 
from Croatia, Bosnia and, since 1999, Kosovo. As also highlighted in 
the empirical surveys, one crucial difference between the current and 
the previous newcomers is that, by contrast to the ethnic Serb refugees 
of the 1990s, the ‘new’ migrants possessed neither a command of the 
Serbian language nor kin-networks within the local society.53 More 
importantly, the main bulk of refugees and other migrants still perceive 
that they are on transit to the West and usually do not foresee the 
prospects of a long-term stay in Vojvodina or elsewhere in Serbia.
At this given moment, though, one can single out two major factors 
which have contributed to the successful, first-stage, reception of the 
migrants and which, if necessary, can also contribute to their longer-
term inclusion to the local society. The one of them is the highly 
professional and well-coordinated mobilization of the civic society and 
the provincial, as well as municipal/local, institutions of government 
towards the objective to accommodate the newcomers.54 The other 
53 UNHCR, Izvestaj sa istraživanja javnog mnenja, 21–2.
54 Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Serbia), Studija o Izbeglicama, 20–1; Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights, Human Rights in Serbia, 50.
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is the absence of a systematic endeavour by local political actors, 
originating either from the Serbian majority or from one of the ethnic 
minorities, with the objectives to mobilize the society and obstruct the 
accommodation of refugees in Vojvodina.
Lastly, Vojvodina’s higher living standards and more developed 
infrastructures in comparison to other parts of Serbia can provide the 
necessary financial incentives towards the more effective inclusion of 
the refugee population. Especially considering the constant mobility 
and decline in the numbers of refugees accommodated in the province, 
it is rather precarious to make solid and longer-term predictions 
about the prospects for the social integration of this recently arrived 
segment. Nevertheless, and in light of Serbia’s persistent economic and 
other shortcomings, the local society has undoubtedly made a sound 
contribution towards the initial reception of war-displaced persons.55 
This acquires an even greater significance, taking into account the 
alarmism and prevalence of the virtual politics of (anti-)immigration in 
other societies of Central and Eastern Europe despite the much lower 
presence of war refugees therein.
Vojvodina as a European region: What comes next?
Serbia’s party landscape has long been fluid and highly malleable. 
The multiparty map of the 2000s was gradually replaced by the 
preponderance of SNS and Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić. 
Despite SNS’s pro-unitary leanings, this party’s consolidation was not 
accompanied by any attempts to further revise or restrict Vojvodina’s 
administrative jurisdiction beyond the latest amendments to the 
statute on provincial autonomy (2014). The statute on the autonomy 
of Vojvodina preserves Vojvodina’s asymmetric status within Serbia, 
55 Quite a few refugees also expressed their satisfaction with their reception by the local 
authorities and society. On this issue, see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
aug/08/eu-refugees-serbia-afghanistan-taliban.
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remains consistent with the European standards on regionalization 
and provides an adequate roadmap for further developments in the 
future. At this given moment, though, it remains an imperative that the 
Serbian Constitution defines more concretely and embeds more solidly 
the locus of Vojvodina’s asymmetric status inside Serbia’s constitutional 
order. The most urgent necessity is to standardize the legislation 
over the finances of Vojvodina and concretize more transparently 
the calculation of the budget’s percentage allocated for the provincial 
coffers.
In regard to the climate of interethnic relations, the political 
actors who represent Vojvodina’s largest minority group (the ethnic 
Hungarians) appear to prioritize the politics of consensus over the 
politics of confrontation. Following a widespread trend among ethnic 
Hungarian parties across the Carpathian basin, VMSZ focuses on a 
gradualist strategy of cooperation with the larger political actors towards 
the more effective promotion of the ethnic Hungarian minority’s 
standpoints and demands from within the halls of power. This lesser 
emphasis on the tripartite concept of ethno-territorial autonomy, 
in combination with the existence of an articulate legislation on 
minority rights and Vojvodina’s long-standing heritage of harmonious 
coexistence, considerably limits the opportunity structures for the 
successful engagement of nationalist actors originating from Hungary 
(namely Jobbik) among the ethnic Hungarian community.
By contrast to resurgent European regionalisms which are embedded 
into a core, ethno-cultural, component (e.g. the ‘new’ Catalan question), 
Vojvodinian regionalism is still legitimized along the necessities to 
accommodate the economic specificities, manage interethnic relations 
and guarantee social stability within a richly diverse part of Serbia. This 
provides plenty of room towards the accommodation of a rich mosaic 
of micro-identities whereas pro-autonomy leanings cut across ethno-
cultural lines in the province. Furthermore, Vojvodinian regionalists 
never espoused secessionist trends, or put Serbia’s territorial integrity 
under scrutiny, whereas the divergent opinions over Vojvodina’s 
administrative status do not polarize or radicalize the local society. 
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From a broader and longer-term angle, this book is an additional 
contribution towards the more extensive and in-depth study of the 
under-researched multiethnic regionalisms in Southeast Europe. 
Alongside Vojvodina, the Croatian region of Istria represents one 
more case where multiethnic regionalism, as a bottom-up movement, 
united a multitude of local micro-identities, preserved social stability 
and successfully withstood the nationalizing pressures emanating from 
Zagreb during the 1990s.56
Moreover, by contrast to European regionalisms with an explicitly 
anti-immigrant and xenophobic agenda (e.g. Lega Nord and ‘Padanian’ 
regionalism), no political actors, originating either from the Serbian 
majority or from one of the ethnic minorities, endeavoured to 
systematically mobilize the local society against the latest influx of 
migrants. Instead, the recent arrival of the refugee waves saw the highly 
professional and well-coordinated mobilization of the civic society and 
the provincial, as well as municipal/local, institutions of government 
towards the objective to accommodate the newcomers. As it was also 
the case with the Serb refugees during the 1990s, Vojvodina’s society has 
demonstrated that it is capable of integrating newcomers even under 
particularly adverse circumstances. From a more functional angle, the 
refugee crisis, if only subtly, provides an additional argument in favour 
of Vojvodina’s autonomous jurisdiction so that such urgent issues can 
be managed efficiently and ‘on the spot’.
Since the fall of Slobodan Milošević, Serbia’s trajectory to the EU 
has been complicated, nonlinear and subject to a variety of uneven 
catalysts (e.g. the normalization of bilateral relations with Kosovo and 
cooperation with the Hague Tribunal). Most recently, the decision of the 
European Commission to freeze the EU’s enlargement process further 
prolongs the anxiety and uncertainty over Serbia’s prospects to finally 
join the Union. This decision was taken amid the threatening spectrum 
of the economic and the refugee crises in the EU interior, as well as 
56 Instead of multiethnic, Dejan Stjepanović defines the pattern of Istrian regionalism 
as plurinational. On this issue, see Dejan Stjepanović, Multiethnic Regionalisms in 
Southeastern Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 49–100.
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Russia’s gradual emergence as a potent contender in the east. From a 
further-reaching perspective, it would not be a wise idea for Brussels to 
postpone for an indefinite period of time and additionally complicate 
the EU accession process of Serbia and the Western Balkans as a whole. 
This argument acquires greater weight in light of the simultaneous 
and systematic engagement by powerful and illiberal actors across the 
region (namely, Russia in Serbia; and Turkey in Albania and Bosnia).57
With specific regard to Vojvodina, it is a multiethnic society that, 
throughout history, has proven its capacity to withstand the impact of 
war and interethnic strife. Moreover, Vojvodina is ‘traditionally’ outward 
looking (as already exemplified in the way that the nineteenth-century 
Vojvodinian Serb political elites and intelligentsia made successful use 
of Western political and ideological currents), less nationalistic, and its 
ethnic minorities can function as a bridge to neighbours and beyond. 
However stereotypical this might seem at first, it is not an exaggeration 
to claim that Vojvodina can still reassume the potential towards leading 
Serbia ‘back to Europe’. This, however, is also conditional upon the 
genuine intention of the EU not to bring about, even by default, a new 
era of prolonged isolation for Serbia and the Western Balkans. Especially 
Vojvodina’s example of harmonious multiethnic cohabitation may have 
plenty of useful lessons to teach to several other multiethnic societies, 
both in the eastern and the western part of the Continent.
57 On Russia’s engagement in the Western Balkans, see Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power: Russia 
in Southeast Europe (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2017), 51–85.
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